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I.
I4BSTRACT
In the last few decades the economics of oil has been very much
influenced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
OPEC behaviour has been a paradox to economists and politicians alike; this
thesis attempts to analyse how OPEC members actually behave, and to assess
the impact such behaviour has on their economic development.
The common view about OPEC since 1973 is that it is a real cartel,
controlling world oil prices. This view has become even more popular since
production quotas were introduced in 1982. This thesis offers an
alternative explanation of OPEC behaviour, derived from a game theoretic
approach. It is suggested that OPEC success during the 1970s had been a
result of a game between Libya and the international oil companies at the
beginning, and a game between OPEC as a whole and the international oil
companies later on. Furthermore, the present and future oil market
situation depends upon the likely outcome of the game between OPEC members
themselves on the one hand, and the game between cooperative producers and
non-cooperative producers on the other.
This thesis has been organised into two parts. The first part consists
of four chapters which offer a general analysis of OPEC behaviour. Chapter
1 provides a background to the pre-OPEC oil market and the environment and
the factors which led to the creation of OPEC. Chapter 2 outlines the
theory of exhaustible resources, which is the main theoretical source for
OPEC behaviour models. The division of oil revenues between present and
future generations is also considered. Chapter 3 provides a critical
review of OPEC behaviour models; game theory is introduced as an
alternative to the existing models. Chapter 4 provides an account of how
OPEC became the dominant power in the world oil market.
The second part consists of three chapters which analyse the Libyan
economy. Chapter 5 discusses the pre-oil Libyan economy and the emergence
of the petroleum sector. Chapter 6 assesses the post-oil Libyan economy.
Chapter 7 considers the efforts of the Libyan Government in the development
of its oil industry and the role of Libya in the confrontation with
international oil companies.
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Part I
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The nature of the oil industry as a capital intensive industry and the
high level of technology involved in it, led to the limitation on the
number of companies which actually control the industry. The famous Seven
Sisters until recently monopolized the exploration, production, marketing
and refining of crude oil in the free world. Unfortunately the term
"monopoly" which has been used to describe the behaviour of oil companies,
is now used to describe the behaviour of Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), even 25 years after its creation. Although
this seemed to be the case in the early 1970s, the above term does not
describe its long-run behaviour.
The failure of cartelisation theory to offer a practical explanation of
OPEC behaviour made the search for alternative interpretations to OPEC's
paradoxical behaviour a topic for further research. This study attempts to
make use of the general concept of game theory as a way of assessing the
individual country's interests, which range from cooperative to
non-cooperative behaviour. OPEC stability, according to this study, will
depend upon the over-all effect of the individual countries's behaviour.
The oil game since 1970 has had the following stages:
Libya	 V	 International oil companies
OPEC	 V	 International oil companies
Nigeria, Iran or Libya 	 V	 Saudi Arabia
World cooperative producers V World non-cooperative producers
The main proposition of game theory is that two or more individual
players influence a situation (outcome of the game) and the interests of
the players (their utilities from the various possible outcomes) differ.
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Differences between the various interests of the players gives rise to
conflict, just as the identity of all utilities makes the game a pure
coordination problem where cooperation is the only rational behaviour.
In nonzero-sum games, elements of conflict provide the dramatic interest,
mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of
collaboration or mutual accommodation, tacit if not explicit, even if only
in the avoidance of mutual disaster. The mutual interdependence of OPEC
producers suggests a possible application of game theory to an analysis of
OPEC behaviour.
Nonzero-sum games are divided into two classes: cooperative, where
collusion occur, and non-cooperative, where collusion does not occur. In a
cooperative case the players are taken to cooperate on any and every action
which can increase the payoff of either player (provided it does not, at
the same time, reduce the payoff of the other). The objective of OPEC
producers is to maximize their revenues, either by increasing crude prices
or volume of output. Studies have shown that OPEC countries in the 1960s
increased their output in order to maximize their revenues. By the
mid-1970s, where cooperation between members was apparent, OPEC producers
increased their payoffs by raising crude prices, while in the 1980s it
seems neither output nor prices is to be increased, mainly for reasons of
non-cooperation. The problem is that the violation of an output agreement
or quota by any OPEC member necessitates a direct cut of some other
member's quota.	 This sort of action is really a step towards
non-cooperation, because it threatens the ability of the other members to
maximize their revenues. Non-cooperative behaviour is the natural
alternative to cooperative behaviour. Having reached an agreement on
prices and output quotas each OPEC member prefers to stick to the
agreement.	 That is, each member prefers others to pursue the group
-2-
interest rather their own parochial interests. On the other hand, the
member in question prefers to pursue his own self-interest and thus may
prefer to violate the price and production quota agreement. Some members,
such as Nigeria and Iran, have recently acted according to their individual
interests regardless of OPEC agreements. For example, Nigeria reduced the
price of its crude following the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC)
price reductions in March 1983 and October 1984, regardless of the OPEC
official price. At the same time, Nigeria was reported to have
overproduced at 1.5 mb/d in 1983, while its quota was only 1.3 mb/d.
Even though in recent years OPEC has not acted as a unified cartel,
because of the violations in price-output agreements by some members,
others have accommodated these violations in order to prevent unstable
situations. For example, when the demand for OPEC oil fell from about 23
mb/d in 1981 to 19 mb/d in 1982 some OPEC members, such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the UAE, reduced their production to prevent a fall in price.
Another example was in October 1984, when the North Sea oil price was
reduced and Nigeria followed; immediately Saudi Arabia announced that it
would cut its production in an attempt to limit further price reductions.
Thus while Nigeria violated the price-output agreement, Saudi Arabia tried
to protect the collective agreement. Shortly after that, on 29 October,
OPEC ministers agreed to reduce their production by 1.5 mb/d to 16 mb/d.
The result is that cooperation and non-cooperation do exist. And OPEC will
be stable as long as the group preference is maintained by the individual
members, or at least by a sufficient number of producers.
While OPEC success or failure depends on the individual members'
behaviour, these members depend to a great extent, especially in the Middle
East and North Africa, on oil revenues to develop their economies. Any
change upward or downward in oil prices would directly affect the progress
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of these economies. Thus the stability of OPEC and its strength to control
the market price is a significant factor in socio-economic growth in the
individual OPEC countries.
The economies of most OPEC countries are claimed to have risen from the
conditions of the rentier state; that is, countries which receive
substantial amounts of external rents on a regular basis, paid by foreign
governments or concerns. The distinguishing characteristic of the rentier
state is that: The oil revenues received by the governments of the oil
producing and exporting count rves have very little to do with the
production processes of their domestic economies. The inputs from the
local economies other than raw materials are insignificant. The public
sectors in the rentier states receive rents on a scale that affect the pace
and pattern of their economies. The governments could thus embark upon
large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation and
without running into drastic balance of payments or expenditure problems.
Since oil revenues typically increase at a spectacularly faster rate than
the gross national product of local economies, the public sectors of these
countries expanded rapidly. With this expansion the public sector become
the dominant factor in the economy.
The generation of a valuable product by an industry that employs very few
people and uses very few local resources, made participation in productive
economic activity in the modern sector extremely low. There is no nexus
between production and income distribution, since revenues accrue directly
to the government, not through any production but from oil taxes which come
from outside the economy. Government expenditures and development
programmes become totally dependent upon oil revenues and consumption
patterns become geared to the use of imported commodities.
Libya is seen as a good example of a rentier state; its economy is very
-4-
susceptible to changes in oil revemles, and any reduction in oil revenues
would reduce the country's economic growth. Part Two of this thesis sets
out to investigate such claims aid to measure the extent to which oil
revenues have affected the Libyan economy.
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1.1 The Pre-OPEC oil market
The crude oil market, before the creation of OPEC, differed from most
other markets of primary commodities in being an oligopolistic market. In
1950, seven oil companies virtually controlled the international oil
business.	 The producing group of which they were members was singularly
successful.	 The seven major oil companies were British, Dutch, and
American by nationality, but their interests and loyalties were
international.	 Each has gone through name changes, but by their present
designation the companies were: British Petroleum, a British company with
substantial government ownership; Royal Dutch/Shell, an Anglo-Dutch firm;
and Mobil, Exxon, Socal, Texaco, and Gulf of the United States. A small
French company with less influence is the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles
(CFP).
These companies controlled virtually all of the oil reserves in the
under-developed oil-exporting regions of the world. In 1960 these
companies were marketing, almost single-handedly, all the oil production of
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela, totalling almost 8 mb/d and
constituting nearly 86.7 per cent of world crude oil exports at that time
[Al-Otaiba 1975 p.11]. The t Majors" exercised joint maximizing behaviour
by programming production to reduce excess supplies and by honouring
marketing areas. Production programmes were implicitily suggested and
explicitily agreed upon; information on company plans and policies was
transmitted through the inevitable interchanges within the maze of
interlocking joint ventures in concession areas. This control over the
resource base made it possible for the companies to avoid the over
production that would have tempted price competition in world markets;
crude oil prices were fixed administratively rather than determined by
market conditions or by the forces of supply and demand. 	 It also
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restricted the bargaining power of the host governments which faced unified
or single bidders for concessions.
The later shift in the bargaining power between OPEC and the oil
companies came partly because of the skill and cohesiveness of OPEC, but
primarily because of erosion of the power of the international oil firms
caused by the presence of the "Independents" in the oil market. In 1940
the seven majors and CFP were the only significant producers in the Middle
East. The seven majors dominated refining and transport as well as crude
oil production; in 1950 they owned over 70 per cent of the world's refining
capacity, excluding the U.S. and the Communist countries, as well as every
important pipeline and about two-thirds of the world's privately owned
tanker fleet. Although some of these had been acquired by purchase, the
companies themselves made an overwhelming proportion of the investment
required for the rapid increase in world oil consumption which, even
excluding the U.S, had grown some three and a half times between the wars
[U.S Federal Trade Commission 1952 pp.25-28]. This powerful position of
the majors, together with their superior financial ability to withstand
bouts of price-cutting and depressed market conditions (such as those that
prevailed in the later 1920s and early 1930s),as well as the high cost of
creating a new distribution system, made the successful entry of newcomer
independents expensive and difficult, quite apart from any market-sharing
and cartel agreements that may have existed.
For over three decades, that is till the late 1960s, the major oil
companies were able to have and enjoy the sources of power to which
reference has been made thanks essentially to legal factors, that is, to
the concessions and other contractual arrangements in their hands, and the
security they felt as a result. But they also had all the other essentials
of power; finance, technological supremacy, organization, appropriate
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facilities, in addition to political support by their governments. 	 The
combined weight of all these components of power gave the companies the
added power to intimidate and later effectively to influence the
governments of the oil-producing countries.
This situation remained largely unchallenged until the mid 1950s. 	 By
this time ten U.S. independents or "newcomers" were present, though their
production was proportionately small. By 1955 seven more U.S. oil firms
were active, the majority of them brought in through the Iranian
Consortium.	 Table (1.1) shows that from 1950 to 1966 the share of the
seven majors in total crude-oil production outside of Canada, the U.S. and
the Communist countries fell from 85 per cent to 76 per cent, while that of
the new independent companies and of the State owned companies rose
correspondingly.	 Between 1965 and 1970, independents increased in number
and market share, but the majors continued to produce and market the bulk
of the oil.
-8-
Table 1.1
The Seven Sisters Crude Oil Production in the World (000 b/d):1950-66
(Excluding US, Canada, USSR, Eastern Europe and China)
Company	 1950	 %	 1960	 %	 1966	 %
1.Standard Oil(NJ) 	 1,020	 25	 1,920	 17	 3,150	 18
2.Royal Dutch/Shell	 770	 19	 1,600	 14	 2,390	 13
3.British Petroleum
	
800	 20	 1,500	 13	 2,500	 14
4.Gulf Oil
	
300	 7	 1,170	 10	 1,780	 10
5.Texaco	 240	 6	 790	 7	 1,440	 8
6.Standard Oil of
California	 180	 4	 560	 5	 1,480	 8
7.Mobil Oil	 140	 3	 570	 5	 950	 5
Total Seven Majors	 3,450	 85	 8,110	 72	 13,690	 76
Independent Companies
	
620	 15	 3,120	 28	 4,230	 24
Total	 4,070	 100	 11,230	 100	 17,920	 100
Source: Penrose [1968], p.78.
1.2 Price-basing points:
Until World War II, the oil companies fixed the oil prices throughout the
world to the prices prevailing in the Gulf of Mexico, regardless of the
crudets place of origin or cost of production. Under this single base
point pricing, also known as " Gulf-pius", the price of Arabian Gulf oil was
determined according to the oil prices at the ports of the Gulf of Mexico
in the United States, plus the freight charges of shipping that oil from
the Gulf of Mexico to the point of sale. Under this arrangement, the
Arabian Gulf oil buyer who was located near the area would pay more for the
oil than another buyer located near the Gulf of Mexico, since the first
buyer would be charged a fictitious shipping cost as if the oil originated
at the Gulf of Mexico. On the other hand, the buyer located near the Gulf
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of Mexico would pay for the Arabian Gulf oil the price prevailing at the
Gulf of Mexico plus a freight cost from the Gulf of Mexico. This pricing
system was used by the oil companies because, during that time and until
some time before World War II, Texas supplied the largest share of oil
exports as well as production, and thus, naturally, U.S.
	
oil prices
determined the World oil prices.
However, the Gulf-plus pricing system became invalid when the Middle
East's potential as an important producer and exporter of crude became
apparent. The Gulf-plus system came to an end when, in 1944, the British
government objected to paying "phantom freight", or fictitious freight
costs, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Middle East on fuel oil purchased by
the British Navy from a Middle East refinery. As a result of this British
protest, the Arabian Gulf became a second oil price basing point but at the
same level as Gulf of Mexico prices. Under that system "phantom freight"
to buyers closer to the Middle East was eliminated; however, the system
continued to yield identical delivered price for each destination
regardless of source of supply [Blair 1976].
With the elimination of the freight cost and the establishment of the two
basing point price system, the price of Middle East oil of the "marker
crude" (Arabian light, 34-34.9 gravity, f.o.b. Ras Tannura) became equal
to the Gulf of Mexico price at $1.05 per barrel. With the addition of
freight costs to the Middle East, oil from Ras Tannura and oil from the
Gulf of Mexico were priced equally at a point in the mid-Mediterranean.
Buyers to the east of this mid-point could buy their oil cheaper if they
bought it from the Middle East, while buyers to the West found it to their
advantage to buy U.S. oil. However, with increasing Middle East oil
production, and the growing importance of and rapid increase in the West
European market for oil, the oil companies moved the "equaii8ation pointt
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westward to England and then, in 1948, to the Eastern seaboard of the
United States, north of Cape Hatteras.
Despite the fact that oil prices remained low, the crude oil prices (and
to a lesser extent the price of refined petroleum products), mainly from
the Arabian Gulf region, continued to slump during the 1940s, 1950s and the
1960s [Issawi and Yeganeh 1962 p.651. The direct effect of the cuts in
posted prices was the decline in the revenue of the oil producing
countries. These reductions in crude oil prices were strongly criticised
by the Governments of the oil producing countries. This was the key point
which caused the formation of OPEC, as will be explained below.
1.3 The creation of OPEC:
OPEC was founded to safeguard the interests of the petroleum exporting
countries in the face of companies that controlled prices and had lowered
them several times.
OPEC was created in 1960, although the idea of combining within the
framework of such organization was not a thought which came overnight. It
had occupied the minds of experts and politicians in the oil-exporting
countries for several years before. In 1949 Venezuela, as a major oil
producer and exporter, decided to approach the oil-exporting countries in
the Middle East in order to make allies instead of competitors in an area
whose importance was rapidly increasing [Rouhani 1971 p.76]. Several
meetings followed the Venezuelan Government's dispatch of three delegations
to some Arab oil producing countries in 1949. Meetings were held between
Middle East producing countries and Venezuela on one hand, and between Arab
producers through the Arab league, or individually as in the case of
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, on the other hand. Member
countries were enthusiastic about co-ordination of oil policies and the
establishment of an alliance between the oil-exporting countries.
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The direct cause that led to the founding of OPEC was the large reduction
in posted prices that took place in 1959 and 1960 [Seymour 1980 p.25].
These reduction decisions, which were taken by oil companies independent of
the host governments' views, undermined the development plans of the
countries concerned in spite of the realisation of planned large increases
in production which had been expected to boost budget revenues. The
decrease in income per barrel thus came as a surprise and the first
reduction of February 1959 raised a wave of public protest in the
oil-exporting countries. Voices were raised demanding restraints on the
companies' ability to control prices, and therefore the oil revenues of the
producing countries.
Despite the strong position taken by the oil-exporting countries on this
issue, the major companies went ahead and cut prices again in August 1960.
The exporting countries responded by founding OPEC one month after this
reduction [Al-Chalabi 1980 p.67]. The 27 U.S. cents per barrel cut in
price in 1959 resulted in a loss of revenue by major Middle East
oil-exporting states in the ten year period 1961-1970 estimated at $4,000
million.
The objectives set by the OPEC founders (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Iraq and Kuwait) were designed to unify their oil policies, and to lay down
the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and
collectively, as well as to stabilise prices, with due consideration for
the interests of both producing and consuming nations [OPEC Resolutions 1
and 2 Sept. 1960]. These objectives show that OPEC was not created with a
view to raising prices by creating an artificial shortage in oil supplies
in world markets. It was designed to be a stable long-lived organization
concerned with the interests of its members and contributing to the
stability of world trade by considering international interests [AL-Otaiba
- 12 -
1975 p.60].
OPEC influence has grown, especially during the 1970s. OPEC has become a
force to contend with in the petroleum industry, illustrated by the
quadrupling of crude prices in 1973-74 and their doubling in 1979. Debates
erupt over very basic matters, such as the degree to which OPEC is a cartel
responsible for propping up world prices, or whether OPEC simply ratifies
prices determined in an environment which is approximately competitive.
1 • 4 Economic interpretations of OPEC behaviour:
Most Western economists such as Levy [1974], Adelman [1981], Kennedy
[1974], Kalymon [1975], Pindyck [19781 and many others, refer to OPEC as a
cartel, while OPEC representatives and Arab scholars commonly argue that
OPEC is not a cartel. However, the 1970s showed that OPEC undoubtedly
controlled the price of oil, while this could hardly be said for the first
half of the 1980s. Output quotas have been in practice since 1982, while
they were not important as such during the 1970s. I shall now assess the
above views on OPEC.
A- OPEC is not a cartel:
Teece [Griffin and Teece 1982] argues that several important OPEC
producers set oil production with reference to budgetary requirements and
internal and external political constraints. If export receipts plus
foreign earnings are such as to satisfy expenditure requirements, oil
production policies will be determined by conservation considerations,
where conservation involves shutting in production for future generations,
even if this is not consistent with maximizing the present value of oil
reserves. Conversely, if export receipts plus foreign earnings are such
that expenditure requirements are not being met, production and capacity
will be expanded, so long as technical conditions permit.	 Expenditure
requirements are determined by applying some percentage growth factor to
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last year's expenditure levels, where the growth factor is always positive,
or very nearly so.
For some important OPEC producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the relationship between current
price and current output is best represented by a backward bending supply
curve for the short run. Oil revenues can be considered as the source of
funding for potential investment projects, which can be arrayed along a
representive marginal efficiency of investment schedule (see Figure 1.1).
If a country is unwilling to invest for returns less than r*, then
investment needs are limited by 1*.
In Figure (1.2) below, if oil production decisions are made in order to
meet the investment objective represented by 1*, the increases in world
price (from P 0
 to P 1 ) in the current period will tend to result in reduced
production (Q 0
 to Qi in the current period, and conversely. The supply
schedule thereby generated will be backward bending, at least over the
relevant range. This indicates that the monopoly price level is not
exposed to the hazards of cheating, just so long as oil revenues (plus
other foreign earnings) meet budgetary needs. Budgetary needs are in turn
a function of absorptive capacity, which is limited where the GDP of the
economy is small in relation to oil revenues, or where the infrastructure
is inadequate to support rapid escalation in consumption and investment
levels.
The fact that oil prices increased from $3.36 per barrel in 1971 to
$17.69 per barrel in 1980 (1975 = 100) cannot be explained by this model.
The absorptive capacity, in the main producing region (the Gulf), would not
rise as fast as the oil prices.
- 14 -
Rate of
return
*
r
)f Investment (IVIEI)
Price of
oil
0
Figure j.j
f	 Investment
Figure 1.2
- 14A -
B- OPEC as a cartel:
A cartel is an open, formal collusive arrangement among firms in an
oligopolistic market to cooperate with regard to agreed procedures on such
variables as price and output . The result is diminished competition and
cooperation over such objectives as, for example, joint profit maximization
or avoidance of new entry. In general, side-payments must be made between
cartel members in order to induce adherence to these objectives.
In many countries in Europe, cartels are common and legally acceptable.
In the United States, most collusive arrangements, whether secret or open
cartels, were declared illegal by the Sherman Antitrust Act, which was
passed in 1890. However, this does not mean that such arrangements do not
exist. For example, widespread collusion to fix prices occurred among
American electrical equipment manufacturers during the 1950s, and when the
collusion was uncovered a number of high executives were tried, convicted,
and sent to jail. Moreover, collusion of this sort is not limited to a
single country; some cartels, like that in quinine in the early 1960s, are
international in scope [Mansfield 1971].
To illustrate how firms collude, consider the electrical equipment
manufacturers just mentioned above. During the 1950s there was widespread
collusion among about 30 firms selling turbine generators, switchgear,
transformers, and other products with total sales of about $1.5 billion per
year. Representatives of these firms got together and agreed upon prices
for many products. The available evidence indicates that both prices and
profits tended to be increased by the collusive agreements, or at least
until the firms were prosecuted under the antitrust laws by the Department
of Justice.
If a cartel is established to set a uniform price of a particular
product, the marginal cost curve must be estimated for the cartel as a
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whole. If input prices do not increase as the cartel expands its output,
this marginal cost curve is the horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves
of the individual firms. Suppose that the resulting marginal cost curve
for the cartel is MM' in Figure(1.3). If the demand curve for the
industry's product is DD', the relevant marginal revenue curve is RR', and
the output that maximizes the total profit of the cartel members is OQ.
Thus, if it maximizes cartel profits, the cartel will choose a price of
(0 P) 1 which, of course, is the monopoly price. The cartel, in fact, acts
like a monopolist with a number of plants or divisions, each of which is a
member firm [Mansfield 1974 p.508].
If the cartel aims to maximize its profits, it will allocate sales to
firms in such a way that the marginal costs of all firms are equal. But
this allocation is unlikely to occur in reality. The allocation process is
a bargaining process, and firms with the most influence and the shrewdest
negotiators are likely to receive the largest sales quotas, even though
this decreases the total profits of the cartel. Moreover, high-cost firms
are likely to receive larger sales quotas than would be the case if total
cartel profits were maximized, since they would be unwilling otherwise to
stay in the cartel. In practice, it appears that cartels often divide
markets geographically or in accordance with a firm's level of sales in the
past.
With reference to OPEC, Adelman [Resources and Energy 1978 p.7] for
example, suggested that the best approximation to a model of the OPEC
cartel was somewhere between two polar cases of cartel operation. One case
was the residual firm which lets everybody else maximize profits
individually, choosing their own production levels. The large seller then
makes up the difference, varying his production to control the price. The
larger the market share of the residual seller, the easier for him to carry
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the load. At the other extreme, the model proposes all the nations getting
together to agree to some kind of price and output combination which suited
nobody perfectly, but was accepted as the best compromise. The firms or
sellers may wobble from one model to the other in trying to escape as many
of the rigours of competition as possible. The number of expedients is
almost infinite.
The dominant producer, or the cartel core if it is a group of producers,
depends for success on cooperative behaviour within the core; the dominant
producer, on the other hand, does not depend on collusion, either explicit
or implicit, for the generation of rents. Moreover, the divergence in the
interests of the individual members, may lead to violation of the quota
agreement by some members within sub-groups, and some other members may
react in a way so as to accommodate the increase in other members output by
reducing their own output. These matters, where cartel interests oppose
individual interests, cannot be explained by cartelization theory. That is
why an alternative method is needed to clarify such paradoxical behaviour.
1.5 OPEC sub-groups:
Although most economists view OPEC as a cartel, they agree on dividing
the organization into groups. They generally view the Arab peninsula
states as a residual supplier, but they disagree on particular countries.
Considering Saudi Arabia or Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states as a
residual supplier, is the object of a number of models such as; Levy
[1974], FEA [1974], B-M-S [1975], Kalymon [1975], Adelman [1981] etc.
J-Tnyilicza and Pindyck [1976] divided OPEC into saver countries (Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar) that have
little immediate need for cash and would thus use a low rate of discount in
computing a sum of discounted profits from oil extraction, and a second
group of spender countries (Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria,
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and Ecuador) with large cash needs and a higher rate of discount.
Daly, together with Griffin and Steele [Griffin and Teece 1982], divided
OPEC countries according to their characteristics into the following three
groups:
(a)Output Maximizers (b)Price Maximizers and, (c)The cartel Core.
(a) The Output Maximizers subset of OPEC menthers consists of Nigeria,
Indonesia, Iraq, Ecuador and Gabon. These countries have relatively lower
total oil reserves, relatively higher populations, and greater pressures
for internal economic development. Table 1.2 shows that the share of these
countries in OPEC oil reserves in 1978 was only 15.89% of the total, while
their population was 76% of the total.
Table 1.2
OPEC Output Maximizers: 1978 Population and Reserves
Country	 Population(m)	 Proved Reserves (nth)
1.Nigeria	 91.17	 18,700
2.Indonesia	 141.28	 10,000
3.Iraq	 12.65	 34,500
4.Ecuador	 4•35	 5,675
5.Gabon	 0.54	 1,500
Share of Total OPEC 76.02% 	 15.89%
Source: World Energy Industry, Vol. 1 No.1 1978.
Nigeria, for example, with a population of 91 million, has only 18,700
million barrels proved reserves in 1978. Its economy experienced a rather
dramatic expansion following the petroleum boom of 1973-75. An important
factor in its economic recovery during fiscal year 1979 was the rapid
revival of oil exports due, first to more competitive pricing and second,
to the interruption of oil supplies from Iran. The Nigerian government
took a nunther of steps to bring expenditures into line with revenues.
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Those steps included a drastic reduction in public investments, the
imposition and tighter enforcement of import restrictions, and borrowing
$750 million in the Eurodollar market [World Bank, Annual Report 1979
p.39]. The cuts in public expenditures directly affected the construction
sector, particularly in urban areas, creating recessionary conditions and
threatening an increase in urban unemployment.
Another example is Indonesia, one of the poorest countries in East Asia,
and with the largest population within OPEC. This country has made large
strides since the economic dislocation of the mid-1960s. There is no doubt
that a large majority of the population has benefited from the rapid
economic growth that has occured, partly as a result of increased oil
revenues. Still, large problems remain, of which the uneven distribution
of the population, dependence on imports of food, a low level of industrial
development, and difficult transportation and communication problems in the
far-flung archipelago are only a few. In an attempt to make its own
non-oil (especially manufacturing) sectors more competitive, the government
has devalued the rupiah. While the need for investment capital is large,
Indonesia is watching its debt service carefully, the size of the foreign
inf lows it can absorb is, therefore, closely linked to the borrowing terms
it can obtain.
The countries of this group are motivated to increase production of crude
oil at the OPEC-determined price in order to further their economic
development. As long as the other members of OPEC, in particular the
Cartel Core, are willing to limit output in order to maintain high prices,
the OPEC Output Maximizers, according to Daly [1982], should have the same
incentive as non-OPEC producers to maximize output up to the point where
price equals marginal cost.
(b) The OPEC Price Maximizers are Iran, Algeria and Venezuela. According
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to this classification these are in an intermediate position between the
Cartel Core and the Output Maximizers. They constitute 20% of total OPEC
population, and about the same percentage of 1978 proven reserves (see
Table 1.3). These members, like the Output Maximizers, have relatively
large populations and considerable potential for economic development, but
unlike other OPEC members their reserves are neither high relative to
current production rates (1978) nor do they appear to be capable of
significant expansion in the future. The reserves to production ratio
(R/P) for Price Maximizers is only half that of the Cartel Core as shown in
Table 1.3. At the same time the Cartel Core constitutes only 3.6% of the
total OPEC population.
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Table 1.3
Some OPEC Countries Data; Population, Reserves and Production
as in 1978
Country	 Population(m) Reserves(mb) Production(mb/d (R/P)
Price Maximizers:
Iran	 36.64	 62,000	 5.200	 11.923
Algeria	 17.25	 6,000	 1.100	 5.454
Venezuela	 13.10	 18,200	 2.165	 8.406
Share of Total OPEC 	 20.37%	 19.47%	 8.465(mb.d)	 10.183
Cartel Core:
Saudi Arabia	 6.89	 153,100	 8.295	 18.456
Libya	 2.73	 25,000	 1.975	 12.658
Kuwait	 1.18	 70,100	 2.095	 33.460
Qatar	 0.23	 5,600	 0.480	 11.666
UAE	 0.83	 32,425	 1.831	 17.708
Share of Total OPEC	 3.61%	 64.64%	 14.676(mb.d)	 19.502
Source: US Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review, Feb.1980.
During periods of short supply, the activities of the Price Maximizers
aid the Cartel Core members since they can satisfy their target revenues at
the higher prices by reducing output. While the Price Maximizers tend to
produce close to full capacity, they do all that is in their power to avoid
reducing the price of their oil and thus promote price stability. But if
non-OPEC supply increases, the activities of the Price Maximizers can
become increasingly destabilizing to OPEC. Their output can become a
larger fraction of OPEC's total production as the Cartel Core cuts its own
production in order to prevent price declines, and if prices fall, the
Price Maximizers try to increase output in order to keep oil export
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revenues from declining. The point is that Price Maximizers are always
trying to reach their target incomes by decreasing production depending on
the current situation, and thus they move from being a factor promoting
Cartel stability (like the Cartel Core) to a factor promoting instability
(like the Output Maximizers) when prices decline.
(c) The Cartel Core consists of those OPEC members with vast oil reserves,
relatively small populations (see Table 1.3 above),and a physical geography
characterized by barren desert regions. The absorptive capacity of most of
these economies is quite limited and consequently these countries, facing
no internal development pressures, can accept much lower oil production
rates to sustain OPEC's price. Saudi Arabia, for example, with the largest
population in the group (6.89 million in 1978) has only 1/13 of Nigeria's
population and 1/20 of Indonesia's, while its production is twice that of
these producers. The Saudi economy is dominated by the oil sector, which
accounted for 60% of the nations GDP on average during 1973-78 [SAMA,
Annuai Report 1979]. The other 40% of the Saudi GDP is chiefly generated
through activities created and funded by oil revenues. Oil revenues rose
from $4,340 million during fiscal year 1973 to $22,573.5 million during
fiscal year 1974. No one expected the Saudi economy's absorptive capacity
to quadruple in one year simply because oil prices rose by more than 400%.
The government's total expenditure was about one-third of total revenue in
fiscal year 1974-75. The difference between revenue and expenditure for
that year ( Million Riyals 100,103 - 32,038 = 68,065) had to be invested
abroad. The country could not invest all of its financial capital within
its borders because the supply of other 'co-operant' factors could not be
augmented as easily as the supply of financial capital.
Johany [1980 p.63] argues that in the process of trying to adjust the
Saudi economy to the increased oil revenues two problems emerged. One was
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an increase in the rate of inflation, and the other was the awareness on
the part of the Saudis that investing their funds in foreign countries was,
and is, a very risky endeavour. Thus Saudi Arabia, as well as the other
Cartel Core members, can adjust their production levels to meet their
development requirements and other expenditure. This is exactly what Daly
ment by the Cartel Core. In practice, however, the Arabian peninsula
members (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates)
generally prefer to maintain prices during periods of slack demand for OPEC
oil by carrying more excess capacity. Their preferences are relatively
lower prices than are demanded by other OPEC members since, in part for
political reasons, they stand to lose more in the long run, due to their
large reserves, if profitable substitutes for OPEC oil are developed in the
future. Libya, however, has at various times in the past acted more like a
price maximizer, insisting upon excessively high prices for its own oil,
using its advantages of higher quality oil and greater proximity to
European markets. Libya is included with the Cartel Core since its use of
oil revenue for internal development has been very low, suggesting it can
easily reduce output to help stabilize the Cartel during periods of low
demand.
It is clear from the models mentioned, and which will be reviewed in some
detail that if OPEC is a real cartel, it will maximize its revenues if all
members adhere to the jointly agreed price structure and output quotas.
The problem is that the interests of each member may diverge from the
interests of the group. For example, Nigeria violated the OPEC price
agreement by reducing the price of its crude twice following the British
National Oil Corporation (BNOC) price reductions in March 1983 and October
1984, regardless of the OPEC official price. Another example showing the
difficulty in formulating any OPEC sub-group divisions, is that when the
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demand for OPEC oil fell from about 23 mb/d in 1981 to 19 mb/d in 1982, the
burden of reduction in output to prevent the fall in price was shouldered
by Saudi Arabia and to some extent Kuwait and the UAE, not by all
Cartel-Core members as assumed by Daly. Thus the problem is that the
individual interests may diverge from the organisation interests. In order
to maintain OPEC stability, the violation of price-output agreements must
be met by a sacrifice from another member or other members of the
organisation.	 This is the case where cartelisation theory can offer no
explanation.	 The aim of this thesis, as far as OPEC is concerned, is to
find an acceptable and more comprehensive interpretation of such
paradoxical behaviour. In order to develop a wide ranging discussion of
OPEC models and to introduce my assessment of OPEC behaviour, it is
essential to begin with a discussion of exhaustible resource theory. This
is the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMICS OF OIL WEALTH
The prime objective of the developing countries at the present time is to
attain the main goal of development, that is creating a mature and
diversified economic base capable of sustained economic growth. This
process of economic development is made possible when the means, namely
foreign exchange, for importing producer capital goods, services and
technical know-how are available.
Although most OPEC Countries have achieved very high per capita incomes,
they are essentially developing countries. They share with the rest of the
developing world the features of underdevelopment; they are economies
engaged mainly in primary production and have labour forces characterized
by low productivity, etc.. Although the economies of OPEC Countries have
experienced considerable growth in the oil export sector, the other sectors
of these economies remain largely underdeveloped.
Crude oil, which is the only source of foreign exchange in some OPEC
Countries, especially the OPEC-Core, is an exhaustible resource. The
revenue stream of oil ends with the last barrel produced. There is no
mechanism to generate a continuous revenue as in the case of renewable
resources, such as agriculture or natural forests. This fact calls for its
rational utilization so that the maximum benefit is obtained from it.
Since, as a result of underdevelopment, the economies of most OPEC
Countries are extremely skewed towards heavy dependence on the oil export
sector, rational utilization of crude oil necessitates linking the
production of this exhaustible resource with the needs for developing a
wide and diversified economic base.
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the theory of exhaustible
resources since its inception by Hotelling in 1931, with particular
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reference to the rate of depletion, user costs, and the price of the
resource. The second section will concentrate on the distribution of oil
wealth between present and future consumption, between the oil generations
and future non-oil generations with reference to Core-OPEC Countries (the
nations most highly dependent on the value of oil resources).
2.1 The economics of exhaustible resources
Most resources are so abundant that they are not classified as
depletable.	 Total exhaustion of salt, for example,
	 is almost
inconceivable. Similarly, lead, tin, zinc, and many other minerals will,
for all practical purposes, be available into perpetuity. Even coal will
be available for more than 500 years at present utilization rates
[Danjelsen 1982]. Other resources, however, are used so rapidly that they
cannot be replenished. These are classified as depletable resources, and
for some, such as oil and natural gas, the time profile of their exhaustion
is thought to be only two or three generations.
The theory of depletable resources is unique in that it arose almost
entirely from a single article "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources", in
1931, by the American economist Hotelling. His interest in depletable
resources was stimulated by the conservationist movement of the 1920s. The
conservationists	 were concerned that resources, renewable
	 and
non-renewable, were being used up too fast. Hotelling sympathised with the
conservationist point of view, but perceived that resources could be
extracted too slowly as well as too fast. In essence, he suggested that
there is an optimal rate of resource extraction. His great contribution
lay in specifying a methodology suitable for analysing optimal prices and
levels of output over time.
Hotelling's thesis underwent a number of refinements and extensions, but
for the most part his basic ideas remain intact. In essence, they are that
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(1) depletion causes a resource to become more scarce; (2) scarce resources
command higher prices than abundant ones; and (3) therefore the price of a
depletable resource will tend to rise over time [Hotelling 1931].
Hotelling further contended that a depletable resource would command a
lower current price under a competitive market structure than under a
monopolistic structure. However, he also recognized that since low prices
stimulate consumption, the resource would be depleted more rapidly under
competition. Thus, the extraction period and price path followed under a
monopolistic system would be fundamentally different from the outcome of
competition.
Oil, of course, is exhaustible in the sense that society's stock of the
reserve is not physically replenishable. Potential reserves are equal to
proved reserves plus secondary and tertiary recoverable reserves.
Technology has been used, and will be used, probably more efficiently, to
increase the potential reserves. Since actual reserves are subject to
search and technology level, then potential reserves, which is the visible
part of actual reserves, is used instead. The difficulty in the concept of
exhaustion is that geologists estimate the "stock" of oil in terms of
"recoverable" reserves. But what is recoverable depends on the cost of
extraction relative to the price of oil. Every increase in the price of
oil or decrease in the cost of its extraction increases the world's stock
of recoverable oil. In addition, an increase in price will lead to more
search, and that usually results in increasing reserves.
2.1.1 Basic theory:
The problem that an owner of an exhaustible resource faces, both under
competition or monopoly, is how much output should be produced in each
period of time until marginal costs of production equals marginal revenues.
To answer this question we have to make some simplifying assumptions. The
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mathematics could be challenging and might involve multivariate control
problems which are very difficult to solve. However, the important results
can be derived by using simple algebra.
Pure competition.
Where market prices are initially determined by competitive forces, they
may be expected to rise over time. There are two reasons why this is so.
First, extraction costs will rise as the giant and super-giant fields are
depleted; second, resource owners must be paid a rate of return on money
invested in oil reserves which is comparable to the real rate of interest.
Among the offsetting considerations is innovative technology that lowers
marginal costs and thereby mitigates price increases. Hotelling's classic
theory dealt with only one of these determinants of market prices. He was
concerned with the net price, and thus abstracted from extraction costs and
technology.
Given prices of oil and substitutes and a state of technology in period
t, the oil reserves R at (t+1) are equal to reserves at the beginning of
period t minus output (q) in period t ie.
R(t+1) = R(t) - q(t)
Now assume that:
(1) There are many producers and each acts as a perfect competitor.
(2) Marginal cost (Mc) is positive.
(3) Marginal cost increases as the stock is depleted. New discoveries
may occur, especially costly offshore oil, and thus (MC) is likely to rise.
The point is that producers must have some estimate of such events and
eventually (MC) must rise.
We assume that the owner of any resource, such as oil, will manage his
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stock so as to maximize the discounted present value (DPV) of the time
stream of income from his holdings of the stock [Johany 1982 p.34]:
DPV = P 1 q 1 -C(q 1 , R1) + P2q2-C(q2 , R2) + ......+ PqC(q, Rn)
1+r	 (1+r)2	 (1+r)r
where	 and	 stand for price and output; Rt is the estimated and
probable reserves; C(q, Rt) are the total costs of mining (not just the
extraction costs);and r is the discount rate. The owner of the resource
wishes to maximize DPV subject to the constraint that
T	 t -
=R
Here R is the given stock of the resource, and T is the time horizon
which we assume to be exogenously determined. We now form the Lagrangean
expression
L = E 1
 (pq-cq)(1+rY t + X(P-E0q)
Differentiating with respect to
	 we then obtain the T first-order
conditions [Webb and Ricketts 1980];
(pt_c)(1+r)_t - A = 0
or t = c+X(1+r)t
Price in period t must equal marginal extraction costs (c) plus an
expression X(1+r)t. Scott [Gaffney 1967 p.34] has suggested that this be
termed a 'user cost' since it arises from the fact that using the resource
in the present eliminates the possibility of its use in the future.
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To find the maximum profit or rent for an exhaustible resource we proceed
as follows: We select an arbitrary output path (q1, q 2 , ......, q) which
satisfies the constraint ET	 = , and then construct an alternative
path such as (q 1 , ....., q+dq, q 1 dq,	 ....... ), We now ask the
question "When would the producer be indifferent between the two paths?"
The gain in revenue by an increase in production by (dq) is
(p-c)dq
and the loss in revenue is;
(1 +r)
To Hotelling, the choice of the appropriate discount rate was obvious;
the market rate of interest. Since inflation was not a problem in 1932,
Hotelling was content to state his results in nominal or non-inflation
adjusted prices. Today, inflation rates are perhaps more uncertain than
oil prices, causing practitioners to favour stating oil price forecasts
expressed in dollars of constant purchasing power.
The fact that variable costs are positive complicates things, but the
basic idea holds. Mining costs consist of two components:(1) extraction
costs or operating costs, and (2) user cost.
Extraction costs are the familiar costs of production. User cost is the
opportunity cost to the resource owner of the reduction of the total stock
of the resource. That is, the total stock of resources remaining affects
the opportunity costs of mining. Since production typically takes place
over many periods of time, user cost is determined by the whole future path
of costs and prices and not just by current conditions.
In the case of oil, marginal production costs (Mc) are close to zero, but
user cost, X(1+r)t, is positive. This means that positive output in each
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period implies that price must rise faster than the rate of interest, since
- P(l+r) = X(1+r)t
when MCt
 MCt+i = 0
Monopoly.
For the monopolist facing zero production costs, Hotelling noted that
marginal revenue, which will be less than price, will rise over time at the
rate of interest [Griffin and Teece 19821:
MRt+i = MRt( 1 +r) and MRt+2 = MRt^i(1+r)
But user cost X(1+r)t is positive so that,
MRb^l - MRt(l+r)	 X(1r)t
This is under the assumption that MC=0. Obviously with marginal revenues
rising, prices will rise, but the rate of increase depends on the nature of
the demand curve. In the usual textbook case of the linear demand curve,
the initial price will be higher under monopoly and rise at a slower rate
than under competition. Figure 2.1 contrasts the competitive price path
with the monopolist's.	 High initial price promotes more initial
conservation, enabling relatively more production and lower prices in the
future. This example supports the claim, "the monopolist is the
conservationist's best friend" [Dasgupta and Heal 1979 p.329]. while this
may be true, I simply note that the monopolist exacts a huge fee for
performing this rationing function and that the monopolist's price path
distorts intertemporal resource allocation.
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Figure 2.i Possi11e monopolistic versus competitive price paths.
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2.1.2 User costs:
User costs, as defined above, play an influential role in oil price
determination, irrespective of whether one posits monopoly or competition.
The increase in user costs leads to the increase in the resource price.
This is easily derived from the equation: Pt^i_Pt(l+r) = A(1+r)t. 	 Since
user costs are based on expectations of present and future supply and
demand conditions, it is important to look at four such factors which
influence producers' perception of user costs.
(1)Rates of discount: The market rate of interest or nominal rate of
interest is the percentage increase of the number of dollars invested,
making no allowance for inflation. The real rate of interest is the
percentage of increased (or decreased) purchasing power earned as a result
of the investment. For example, if the nominal interest rate (the price of
borrowing money) is 15 percent per year, and the general price level rises
at an annual rate of only 12 percent, then the real rate of interest (the
earned increase in purchasing power) is 3 percent. There are problems in
deciding which nominal interest rate and which price index to use in making
actual adjustments for inflation, but investors are naturally interested in
the real rate of interest, not the nominal rate, so it is important to make
some adjustment. The long-term historical real rate of interest is thought
to be on the order of 3 percent per year [Griffin and Teece 1982 p.17].
However, short-term inflation-adjusted real rates of return may vary from
negative rates to positive rates as high as 10 or 12 percent, or more.
To illustrate the effects of changes in the real discount rate, Figure
2.2 describes price paths under three alternative discount rates. 	 From
period 0 to t0 , producers employ a very high discount rate of 25 percent in
anticipation of nationalisation. This means high rates of production and
low prices.	 Now suppose the risk of nationalisation abates and the
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Figure 2.2 Price paths under alternative discount rates.
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discount rate is reduced to 5 percent. Finally, in period t 1
 the state
obtains control and adopts a zero discount rate. With a zero discount
rate, the user costs are equal over time
(2)Backstop technology: The reason a particular good is used, and the
reason for the extent to which it is used, depends on its cost relative to
that of more and less viable alternatives. Because of the vast potential
supplies of crude oil from tar sands, oil shales, and coal, economists have
been prompted to consider what their impact will be on the price of
petroleum.	 This is the essential idea concerning the concept of backstop
technology. This factor will be in effect when Pt* = t** where	 is the
price of oil and t** is the price of the backstop fuel.
Backstop technology, therefore, refers to technology developed for
resources that are available in super-abundance. Solar, wind, and tidal
power are good examples of renewable resources which may provide a basis
for the backstop to petroleum [Danielsen 1982].
We may assume that the reserves of oil substitutes, such as coal and
nuclear energy, become infinitely elastic at some price P ' . Obviously,
these resources are non-renewable, but the reserves base is assumed so
large that their user costs are effectively zero. Thus at price P
virtually unlimited supplies will be available. As Figure 2.3 indicates,
the price paths of oil are substantially altered over time by the existence
of a backstop. No longer does the price continue to rise indefinitely at
the rate of interest. The solid line price path depicts a world of perfect
foresight. The price increases at rate r until it reaches P, at which
time the backstop fuel would meet all demand at the price P. The dotted
line occurring after t 0 shows how prices might overshoot while the backstop
fuel industry is adjusting to meet demand (period to
 to t1). After t 1 , oil
prices are constrained to price P whether or not there is a price
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Figure 2.3 Oil prices with a backstop fuel.
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overshoot.
(3)The scarcity of resources: Existing oil reserves may be a poor indicator
to future user costs, since these are only the reserves found to date and
surely future exploration will result in new finds. If the new discoveries
matched expectations, producers will not need to revise their estimates of
user costs so the oil price rises at the rate of interest. 	 Suppose
geologists sharply increased their estimate of the reserve base. The
scarcity value of oil being thus reduced, user costs will be revised down
sharply.
(4)Price elasticity of demand: Since demand conditions affect marginal
revenues and thereby the user costs, the price path even in a competitive
market depends on the price elasticity of demand. In the short run, the
price elasticity for crude oil is generally known to be quite low. The
magnitude of the long run elasticity is known with much less certainty
since previous history provides little evidence for estimating consumer
responses over current price ranges. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that a substantial adjustment period is required to alter the energy
efficiency of the existing capital stock. However, the higher the price
elasticity of demand the lower the user costs and price path.
The growth in oil demand resulting from world economic growth is another
factor influencing the calculation of user costs. If producers expect
rapid long run growth rates, user costs will be high.
4 • 1 • 3 Future uncertainty
User costs, like extraction costs, constitute a component of costs which
in turn affect prices and the movement of prices over time. The intriguing
aspects about user costs is that they are not directly observable, unlike a
firm's labour or capital costs. Rather they depend on the producerts
expectations about present and future supply/demand expectations.
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On any one price path the producer requires explicit expectations
regarding the discount rate, backstop fuel prices, resource base, and price
elasticities of demand and the rate of economic growth. Changes in any one
of these factors can cause substantial shifts in the price path. Moreover,
changes in expectations regarding one of these factors are seldom made
independently. For example, downward revisions of oil reserves, which
means lower user costs and lower prices for oil, are frequently associated
with a period of rapid economic growth, which places pressure on existing
reserves and productive capacity. These effects may also be coupled with
falling real interest rates. In effect, to the extent that revisions in
one factor are correlated with reinforcing revisions in other expectations,
price uncertainty is exacerbated.
Thus, oil producers are faced with price uncertainties, which in turn
influence their revenues. This is not the only problem they have to face,
as there is also a problem of distribution and substitution of oil revenues
over time, especially in the Cartel Core Countries. This problem is the
build up of an economic base to generate a continuous flow of income after
the oil resource has depleted, and the distribution of revenues though
consumption and investment for a number of generations. This latter point
will be discussed in the next section, with particular attention to a
statistical analysis of the behaviour of the OPEC-Core Countries.
2.2 The utilization of oil revenues:
The discovery of oil reserves in an economy is a form of windfall, and it
inevitably raises the question of the uses of oil revenues and
intergenerational equity. Obviously one option is that the generation
discovering oil reserves consumes all revenues, leaving nothing for future
generations.	 Although this is a purely theoretical conjecture, since no
nation on earth would exploit a non-renewable resource in this manner, it
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is partially happening. All OPEC Countries, to varying degrees, do
allocate part of their oil revenues to subsidise current consumption using
various means and methods. Oil production for current consumption, other
than for investment, could be justified (in terms of profitability only) if
investment of an extra $1 will produce a future consumption stream with the
present value of $1, which implies of course that the producer's good
purchased with this extra dollar also has the same value as a present
consumption good sold for $1. Under these conditions society is
indifferent as to whether it gets a little more consumption or a little
more investment [Little and Mirrlees 1980 p.23].
The effect on the development of the economy of purely consuming the
natural resource is apparent. This act, apart from the effects of
immediate satisfaction, does not lead to economic development in the sense
of creating a diversified economy. The absence of capital formation means
that this non-renewable resource is being exhausted without actually being
replaced by an economic base for the production of goods and services.
This state of affairs would resemble the case of a man who sells his only
house and consumes its value rather than substituting it with a productive
asset to act as a source of continuing income. To take an extra example,
imagine a country like Libya, producing oil and spending all the oil
revenues on imported consumer goods, non-productive public woi'ks, and
salaries of government empLoyees. No part of the oil revenues is invested
in productive projects which can act as alternative sources of income in
the future. In this case, in the absence of any endeavour for economic
development, the Libyan society will collapse to the state of a subsistence
economy as soon as the oil resource base is depleted.
Absence of capital formation is not the only problem facing this policy.
Lack of inter-generational equity is another problem. This policy would
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allow the consuming generation to enjoy the total utility of this
consumption while in the meantime denying it to other generations. Social
welfare can be judged to be a function not only of utilities of the
individuals who are members of society at present, but the utilities of all
future members of society as well [Pigou 1948 p.29].
Hence, the strict allocation of oil revenues for current consumption does
not help the process of economic development, and ignores the rights of
future generations to consume part of it. OPEC-Core countries (the nations
most dependent on oil revenues) are the sole owners of their oil resources.
They are fully responsible for the design of their oil production policies
and for the disposition of their oil revenues. They are expected,
therefore, to avoid wasteful use of this resource, and to minimize the
amount of oil revenues allocated for that current consumption which is
socially uneconomical.
One way of taking into account the interests of future generations is to
consider Rawls' rules of a just society [Rawls 19721, especially his
max-mm criterion. He suggests that we can gain insights into the nature
of justice by envisaging individuals behind a 'veil of ignorance' drawing
up an agreed contract or set of rules for the operation of a just society.
Since individuals can not know the characteristics of the state into which
they will be born, or personal characteristics such as colour, sex,
intelligence and so forth, they will have no incentive to make choices in
favour of narrow personal interests (since they will not know what they
are). Personal interests can be pursued only by agreeing to just rules for
the conduct of society. One of the important rules which Rawis asserts
would be adopted is the max-mm criterion for assessing the justice of
inequality. He argues that inequality in the distribution of wealth or
utility is justified only if it is a necessary condition for improvement in
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the position of the poorest individual or individuals.
Given various states of nature and various courses of action that could
be taken, the max-mm principle dictates that we should first observe all
the minimum pay-off s and then select the highest of these. To use the
maximin principle we circle the minimum pay-off s from each course of
action. Then we select the highest minimum pay-off. This is 4 and entails
that we would select course of action 3.
State of nature
1	 2	 3
	
4
1
0
4-
C-)
4-
0
a)	 3
U,
0
L)	 4
5	 5
1	 2	 1
5	 6	 5
1	 4	 7
In other words, if social welfare, W, is to be written as a function of
utilities U1, ..., U, then Pawis argues for the particular function W =
min(U1, ..., Un), so that maximizing social welfare amounts to maximizing
the smallest U1. This welfare function is sensitive only to gains and
losses of utility by the poorest person. It should be clear that we hold
to the standard assumption that at each instant of time consumption is
shared equally by the population of the moment. The only equity problem
that arises is that between instants of time (i.e "generations").
According to this criterion, Solow argues [Solow 1974] that if
consumption per head were higher for a later than for an earlier
generation, then social welfare would be increased if the early generation
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were to save and invest less, or to consume capital, so as to increase its
own consumption at the expense of the later generation. If consumption per
head were higher for an earlier than for a later generation, then social
welfare would be increased if the early generation were to consume less
and, correspondingly, save and invest more, so as to permit higher
consumption in the future. Thus the max-mm principle tells us that
consumption per head should be the same for all generations.
Suppose population is constant and there is no technical progress, then
the max-mm criterion implies constant consumption per head and keeping the
value of oil reserves constant. If P is the price per unit of the resource
and R the total reserves, then the criterion calls for a consumption of C0
= rP0R0 , where r is the rate of interest. Thus one option is to draw
enough oil from the ground so as to maintain that level of consumption.
If the price of oil rises at the rate of discount, then
Pt =
and Rt = R0et
Then PtR = P0ertR0et
= P0R0
This is a feasible strategy for a marginal producer where he can keep a
constant level of consumption over time at lower rate of depletion. This
case is shown graphically in Figure 2.4 below.
Now suppose population N is growing at a rate n, then consumption per
head (c) is:
C0 = C 0/N0 = (r-n)P0R0
Now Rt = R0et
= P0e
Nt = N0e11t
So c = (n_r)RtPt/Nt = (n_r)ROeP0e/'0
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=(n-r)R0P0/N0
and PtRt = R0etP0et
PtRt = P0R0ent
Even though the value of reserves increases in effect to the increase in
population, as shown in Figure 2.5, consumption per head is decreasing.
Here the max-mm rule, as Solow [1974 p.32] put it, says: t the initial
generation should invest only enough to provide capital for the increase in
population, over time, at the initial capital-labour ratio".
However, an economy can do better than that. Leaving oil in the ground
is a form of investment. This policy alternative entails deferring
production until some future time, which I previously expressed as	 >
Pt( l+r ) .	 This kind of postponement is one way of accomplishing physical
conservation, and scarcely happens in practice in its pure form.
That the act of physical conservation of the oil resource, or for that
matter any natural resource, is unjust to current generations is very
clear. This policy simply means depriving those generations of the
benefits that might accrue to them as a result of exploiting the oil
resource. However, since physical conservation involves abstention from
production now, and exploitation by future generations, it is difficult to
conceive how this policy is also not entirely favourable to future
generations. It is true that the oil resource is being entirely shifted,
in this instance for the disposition of future generations. This leads to
increasing the utility of future generations at the expense of current
generations. The desirability of leaving oil in the ground should be
judged in relation to the rate of return on alternative investment
projects. Moreover, the advantage of investments other than keeping oil in
the ground is that it benefits all varieties of technical progress. Here
the following considerations are relevant:
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(a) Technical change, in particular those which augment energy resources,
would adversely affect the price of oil, thus the rate of return from
leaving oil in the ground may well be less than what it would be in the
absence of technical change. Moreover, a technical change which reduces
the value of oil would also increase the rate of return on reproducible
capital goods.
(b) Leaving aside the considerations of economic development, the
uncertainty about the future course of oil prices calls for a
diversification of investment. In general, the alternatives to keeping oil
in the ground are: (1) foreign financial investment, and (2) domestic
investment.
(1) Foreign financial investment:
Even though financial surplus is subject to erosion in real terms,
through the depredations of inflation and the depreciating dollar,
investment abroad offers another option for diversified investment and
probably high rates of return. Moreover, domestic consumption and
investment policies may suit a large Core Country like Saudi Arabia. This
kind of policy may not be appropriate for smaller states with small
populations, such as Kuwait or Qatar. In this case it might be wise to
invest oil revenues abroad as long as its profitability is higher than the
expected rate of interest. The fact that the Core Countries continue to
produce oil at rates far above what is necessary to meet their financial
requirements is a function of their concern for the world economy rather
than their own individual interests. It shows a recognition that they
cannot develop properly except within the context of a healthy world
economy, but that does not make the financial sacrifice any less
unpalatable to public opinion in the countries concerned.
Another perhaps even more important lesson learned by the oil producers
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is that the pace of development should not be accelerated beyond the
capacity of the country to absorb it in a fruitful way, whether
economically, politically or socially. The oil producers, particularly the
Cartel Core Countries, are coming to feel that their developmental
transformation should proceed at a more measured pace, and cannot possibly
be completed in the span of a few five-year plans.
Besides, physical or financial assets in the hands of a host country
abroad are always subject to the risks of nationalisation, expropriation,
freezing, or depreciation [the freezing of Iranian assets in the U.S.A., at
the time of American Empassy crises in Iran, served as a vivid example of
the vulnerability of these investments]. On the other hand, for a private
investor who is not concerned with economic development, non-pecuniary
benefits are immaterial to him and he is always willing to invest abroad if
the rate of return is worth the risk. But it must be mentioned here that I
do not consider as "investment abroad" any investment carried out within a
single family of countries which are seeking economic integration and
eventually unity, such as investment in the Arab Countries. However,
besides the accruing pecuniary benefits, domestic investment yields
significant non-pecuniary benefits in the form of external economies, while
investment abroad yields pecuniary benefits only.
(2) Oil production and domestic investment of oil revenues:
Now production for immediate satisfaction by consumption does not provide
any future satisfaction to future generations, and complete physical
conservation ignores the welfare of the present generation. An alternative
policy (bearing in mind the problems of investment abroad) is domestic
investment which transforms the natural resource into physical and human
capital for the benefit of present and future generations. For this reason
I will assume at this stage that domestic investment needs provide the
- 42 -
Cartel-Core Countries with the least production level (floor production).
This will vary with the price level. If the investment requirement is I.
and the price level 	 floor production is defined by =
The production at the level of domestic investment (as a lower bound),
together with the maximum attainable capacity (as a higher bound)
constitute the limits of which OPEC-Core and OPEC as a whole can be
stabilised.
Governments can reduce aggregate private consumption, and thus increase
savings, by taxation. On the other hand, taxation has administrative and
political costs, so perhaps it is money in the hands of the government
which should be considered to be more valuable than private consumption.
This view is strengthened by the fact that a rational government should see
that the value of its expenditure at the margin is equal in all lines,
whether it be defence, agricultural extension, education, or investing in
industry.
The most socially acceptable policy in Core Countries, as defined in
Chapter 1 (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Libya and Qatar), is to produce
oil at the maximum absorption capacity level. I will argue in Chapter 3
that some economists such as David Teece adopted this view to formulate
their models of OPEC behaviour. Oil production and investment of oil
revenues should serve as a basis for formulating government policies
concerning the utilization of oil in OPEC Countries. The reason is that
this policy serves best the interests of present and future generations on
the one hand, and acts as the prime initiator of economic development in
these countries on the other [Zainy 1981 p.56].
To illustrate the connection between oil production and absorptive
capacity in a Core Country, let us examine Figure 2.6. First, Figure
2.6-(a) shows a graphical relationship between aggregate investment (I) in
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one year and the corresponding social rate of return on investment (r) in
that year. The period of one year is taken arbitrarily. The social rate
of return is a function of many variables such as investment level (I),
labour supply (L), technology (T), management (M), etc. 	 In functional
notation: r = f(I, L, T, M, ...). As the investment level is raised,
putting further strain on the other input variables which are assumed to be
fixed during this period of time, the rate of return after a certain
investment level starts declining. This is in effect the law of
diminishing returns or variable proportion. The graphical relationship
between r and I is a curve with a negative slope indicating declining rate
of return with higher investment. Each additional amount of investment has
a corresponding rate of return. If the socially acceptable rate of return
is r 1 , then the allowable level of investment in that year is Ii.	 Any
further investment beyond I will be socially unprofitable. However, if
the socially acceptable rate of return is lowered to r 2 , the level of
investment that can be absorbed profitably in that year will increase to
12•
Figure 2.6-(b) shows the level of aggregate investment in a particular
year and the amount of oil production Q in this year required to finance
this investment. The curve is a straight line passing through the origin
assuming fixed oil prices during the year (this assumption is only to
simplify the presentation of the argument), and that oil is produced only
to finance investment. If investment levels I. and 12 from Figure 2.6-(a)
are projected on Figure 2.6-(b), the corresponding required amount Q 1 and
of oil production can be determined.
If an OPEC-Core Country can market as much oil as it can produce, the
proposed scenario of oil production as constrained by investment
requirements will be the following. Suppose the socially acceptable rate
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of return is r 1
 as in Figure 2.6-(a). Any investment more than
	 will
entail a social loss corresponding to what additional costs might have been
avoided by the Country had the amount of investment been and not more.
The optimum amount of investment which maximizes the social benefits of the
Country is I. Thus there is a maximum capacity of the Country to absorb
investment capital, commensurate with a specified acceptable social rate of
return. The corresponding optimum oil production rate will be Q2.
It is assumed above that domestic investment needs provides the OPEC-Core
Countries with the least production level (floor production). The next
section provides a statistical analysis to this assumption in relation to
oil revenues.	 It will also be revealed that neither consumption nor
investment determine the level of oil revenues. The problem is far more
complicated than these simple assumptions.
An empirical analysis of OPEC-Core domestic investment and oil revenues
Oil revenues in OPEC-Core Countries increased substantially during the
1970s. This increase in oil revenues increased both consumption and
investment (domestic and foreign). Table 2.1 shows that the annual rate of
growth of domestic investment in the Core Countries were increasing
steadily, at first, until it reached the peak of 68.83% in 1975, then it
continued to rise but at a lower rate than the experienced hitherto.
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Table 2.1
Oil Revenues Versus Domestic Investment
in OPEC-Core Countries in $M(1971-1982)
Year	 Oil Revenues1	 R*	 Domestic	 R*	 hR Ratio
Investment2
1971	 5144	 2209	 0.43
1972	 6518	 26.71	 3138	 42.06	 0.48
1973	 9661	 48.22	 5121	 63.19	 0.53
1974	 42501	 339.92	 8392	 63.87	 0.20
1975	 44855	 5.54	 14168	 68.83	 0.32
1976	 54217	 20.87	 20849	 47.16	 0.38
1977	 63928	 17.91	 29309	 40.58	 0.46
1978	 58734	 -8.12	 36920	 25.97	 0.63
1979	 105552	 79.71	 40422	 9.49	 0.38
1980	 167007	 58.22	 50553	 25.06	 0.30
1981	 167122	 0.07	 61503	 21.66	 0.37
1982	 118622	 -29.02	 68269	 11.00	 0.58
(*) Annual rate of growth.
Sources:
(1) OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. 1982, Table 30 p.30.
(2) Arab Monetary Fund [1983].
Table 2.1 also shows that Domestic Investment/Revenue (I/R) Ratio was
increasing steadily until the first oil shock in 1973-74, when this ratio
suddenly dropped from 53% in 1973 to 20% in 1974. In 1978 the hR ratio
dropped again from 63% to 38% in 1979, and 30% in 1980 due to the effects
of the second oil shock of 1979-80. Once more the I/R ratio increased in
1981 and 1982 because of the decline in oil prices coupled with the
reduction in output due to the recession of early 1980s. Oil revenues
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declined while domestic investment carried on its steady increase. This is
shown in Figure 2.7 for each OPEC-Core mexnbeer. As a result the hR ratio
increased from 30% in 1980 to 58% in 1982.
Since according to the assumption that domestic investment constitutes
the minimum required production for the Core Countries, then the Core
financial difficulties would not occur till domestic investment plus some
acceptable level for current consumption exceeds oil revenues. In other
words [hR > 1].
Empirically, throughout the period (1971-1982) OPEC-Core stability has
never been threatened, simply because the hR ratio has never reached
unity. The highest hR ratio of 63% in 1978 was far away from unity. The
best time for OPEC, when it was really strong, was in 1974 where (I/R) was
20%.
However, the rise in prices has had a direct effect on oil revenues
causing a reduction in the domestic investment/revenues hR ratio, which
suggests a high level of stability. Conversely, the first half of the
1980s showed that both oil prices and output for OPEC-Core producers have
been reduced. This resulted in substantial reductions in oil revenues and
probably a high I/R ratio.
Oil revenues Rt at any time is equal to tt , and the change in oil
revenues is given by:
dRt = PtdQt +
Where PtdQt is the effect of the change in oil production on the change
in oil revenues, and QtdPt is the effect of the change in oil prices on the
change in oil revenues. This can be approximated by:
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Rt
=	
+	 and	
=	 - Pt
=	 +	 and AQt =
	
-
Then, the above equation takes the following form;
Rt =
	 +	 - Qt +	 +	 -
The results of applying the above equation are shown as percentages of
in Figure 2.8. The Figure shows that during both price shocks of 1973-74
and 1979-80, OPEC-Core revenues were affected by the increase in crude oil
prices, but the extent of these effects varies from one country to another.
The Gulf States generally followed a similar pattern. They increased their
production (except Qatar) after the 1973-74 price rises in an attempt to
prevent further price increases and thus stabilise the oil market.
Henceforth they reduced their production in turn. First, Kuwait in 1976
and then Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE in 1977. Once more Saudi Arabia
in 1979 and 1980 increased its production to compensate for the loss of
Iranian oil. On the other hand, Libya reduced its production level
throughout the 1973-75 period. This behaviour increased the price effect
on the increase in its oil revenues as shown in the Figure. The QP/R for
Libya was the highest in the Core Countries 260% in 1974, while in the same
year it was 217% for Kuwait, 157% for Qatar and 109% for Saudi Arabia. For
the following four years (1975-78), Libya (contrary of the Gulf States)
increased its production steadily reducing the price effect on oil
revenues. By 1981 neither oil prices nor OPEC-Core production increased,
and hence neither did oil revenues. This is clear from the negativity of
the change in oil revenues in Libya and Kuwait in 1980, and the negativity
of this change in revenues in all OPEC-Core Countries in 1981. The QP/AR
ratio ranged from -20% for Kuwait to -80% for the tJAE. This result
confirms that the decline in oil prices had a great effect on reducing the
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OPEC-Core oil revenues. This effect was smaller in Kuwait and Libya than
the rest of the Core Countries, because these two countries reduced their
production by a proportionally greater amount than the others during
1979-1981.
The above analysis indicates that even the OPEC-Core Countries, which are
theoretically expected to behave collectively, in reality behave
differently. This is one case where cartelisation theory cannot provide a
satisfactory explanation. Other cases concerning the paradoxical behaviour
of oil producers will be discussed in the next Chapter.
Furthermore, considering the option of producing oil at the level of
domestic investment only is also unrealistic. This policy assumes that
OPEC-Core Governments draw a target for investment and a target for
consumption. In other words they have a clear target of the form;
I+C=Aet
But actual oil revenues are Rt =
If OPEC-Core Countries are actually producing oil according to the
revenue target then;
= A et
or log	 = log A - log Pt + t
By regressing this model for each OPEC-Core Country I obtained the
following results:
Ct-values in parentheses).
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1- Saudi Arabia log	 = 7.5649 + 0.2509 log P - 0.0298 t
R2 = 0.5228	 (1.7171)	 (0.7138)
2- The tJAE	 log	 = 6.0476 + 0.3025 log P. - 0.0626 t
R2 = 0.4077	 (2. 1052)	 (1.5237)
3- Qatar	 log	 = 5.2095 + 0.0723 log P - 0.0383 t
R2 = 0.2719	 (0.6414)	 (1.1903)
4- Kuwait	 log	 = 7.3080 - 0.0499 log t - 0.0876 t
R2 = 0.7683	 (0.2637)	 (1.6192)
5- Libya	 log	 = 6.9662 - 0.2782 log Pt ^ 0.0271 t
R2 = 0.5711	 (1.7186)	 (0.5867)
6- OPEC-Core	 log	 = 8.4884 + 0.0981 log t - 0.0273 t
R2 = 0.0642	 (0.7820)	 (0.7612)
(10 observations, 1972 to 1981).
The above results show that at the 5% level	 and t arenot significant
explanatory variables. Further, the coefficients of log P are all
significantly different from unity, the value suggested by the model.
Also, apart from Libya, the coefficient of the time trend has the opposite
sign to that in the model. Considering the target equation above, these
results mean that the target revenue cannot be said to depend on target
investment plus target consumption. This is because of the OPEC internal
problems and the problems of the oil producing community at large, as will
be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: MODELLING OPEC BEHAVIOUR
In the previous Chapter I showed the importance of exhaustible resource
theory in predicting the price paths for a depletable resource, under both
monopoly and competition. This theory was applied to the oil industry by
modeling OPEC Behaviour where the initial price is given exogenously.
Unfortunately most of these studies were done for the period 1974-1975
where OPEC acted as a real cartel. The model's predictions were therefore
as suggested by Hotelling for monopoly price behaviour. Because of the
assumption of cartelisation, the models which will be discussed below
cannot provide a precise explanation of OPEC behaviour. This is because
the cartel members are only interested in profits, but none of them is
willing to sacrifice, by reducing production, to prevent a drop in prices
and consequently the cartel must collapse.
This thesis departs from the usual way of modeling OPEC behaviour, as
stated above, and instead it provides an alternative explanation of OPEC
behaviour through the application of Game Theory, where the individual
country interests may coincide with or be opposed to the interests of the
others in the group. This sort of game suggests a possibility of sacrifice
by a number of producers to prevent mutual disaster. This, certainly, is
not acceptable to a monopolist, whose main function is pure profits.
Accordingly, this Chapter has two main aims. First, to review selected
OPEC behaviour models. Since my purpose is the assessment of OPEC
behaviour, I provide a relatively longer discussion for the cartelisation
models. Some of the other political, property rights and development needs
explanations will also be reviewed. Second, I discuss game theory
concepts, with more concentration on non zero-sum games, where the notion
of mutual interdependence of the players provides a concrete ground for the
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application of the theory to OPEC members. Fortunately, the Hnyilicza and
Pindyck [1976] model of Section One, provides a useful argument on the
cooperative side, of which I make use in a more comprehensive cooperative
and non-cooperative assessment.
3.1 Models of OPEC and the world oil market:
Several important attempts to model and evaluate the prospects for OPEC,
and the likely future path of world oil prices, are surveyed and critically
reviewed. The first group of models were either simulation models or
optimization models. The other group of models were concerned with OPEC
being (1) a unified cartel, (2) behaving in a way to satisfy its domestic
requirements, (3) politically motivated. There is one model (Hnyilicza and
Pindyck, 1976), which departed from the usual approach in viewing OPEC
behaviour. This model introduced game theory, with Nash Cooperative
Solutions being used to explain the likely outcome of future OPEC
behaviour.
The models surveyed are, to a great extent, influenced by the evolution
of oil prices in the 1970s, where the sharp rise in prices suggested that
there was no other explanation of oil markets other than OPEC
cartelisation. Further, as we saw earlier in Chapter Two on the economics
of exhaustible resources, rising prices for an exhaustible resource is
quite compatible with perfect competition. This view cannot be taken for
granted, especially in the 1980s, where some OPEC members have shown an
intention to violate the collective agreements to satisfy their individual
interests. On the other hand there were signs of cooperation and readiness
for sacrifice by other members. In my assessment of OPEC behaviour, which
will be explained later on in the present Chapter, I attempt to introduce
the non-cooperative solutions as well as the cooperative ones. This is
because, although we might expect the parties to cooperate, we must
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recognise the possibility , for one reason or another, for them not to
cooperate. The idea of threat is particularly useful in this assessment,
because the threatener (usually) thinks the threat is successful. But the
threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and the
threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his
own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have an
incentive to carry it out.
The models of OPEC behaviour briefly discussed, before the presentation
of our own explanation, are: Blitzer-Meeraus-Stoutjesdijk (B-M-S) (1975],
Bohi- Russell(B-R) (1975], the U.S. Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
(1974], Kennedy(1974], Kalymon [1975], Levy[1974], Nordhaus (1973], Adelman
(1981], Johany [1978], Teece [1981], Moran [19811 and Hnyilicza and Pindyck
[1976]. Particular attention will be given to the Hnyilicza and Pindyck
model, because of its relevance to the explanation of OPEC behaviour
through the use of game theory, which is the focus of our interest. First,
I shall discuss the basic approaches to the problem, identify their
principal contributions and conclusions and discuss their main
shortcomings. Second, I present an explanation of OPEC behaviour through
Game Theory, showing the coexistence of the cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviour of OPEC members of which accordingly, the likely outcome can be
determined. Third, building upon the latter point, I attempt to analyse
the oil market as a whole. OPEC and non-OPEC producers (the competitive
fringe) will be reviewed by scrutinising cooperative and non-cooperative
solutions.
Although the specific details of the models differ considerably, it seems
fair to say that two basic approaches have been used to analyse OPEC
behaviour:
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1-Simulation models: In most simulation studies, excepting the model of
Hnyilicza and Pindyck, the basic technique is the same: given the basic
model, and assuming values for the various parameters (price elasticities
of demand and non-OPEC supply, demand growth rates, and the like), a
variety of possible price-path strategies are postulated, and the
implications evaluated over the time horizon. Of the price paths
considered, one or more are selected, according to some prespecified
criterion, as the best or as most likely. In the B-M-S model, for example,
several criterion functions were examined but the ranking of policies was
not especially sensitive to the function utilized. Among those considered
were the following two: (1) the present value of the net revenue stream
obtained from oil sales over the planning period, plus the present value of
oil still left in the ground at the end of the planning period; and (2) the
present value of net foreign asset holdings in each period, plus the
present value of the oil left in the ground at the end of the planning
period.
In the comparative static simulation models (FEA, Kennedy, Levy), the
basic question asked is: if OPEC sets its price at a certain level, then
maintains that price through the year (T), what are the implications for
its output level and profits in that year? In this case, the focus is upon
the new (static) equilibrium that would result from any maintained price
after sufficient time has elapsed for demand and non-OPEC supply to adjust
fully to the new price. Not explicitly considered in these analyses are
the dynamics of the system or the characteristics of the transition period
before the new equilibrium is reached. The essential feature of all these
analyses is that they consider only constant-price paths over the time
horizon of the model.
Dynamic simulation models (B-M-S and Kalymon), on the other hand, trace
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the year-to-year movements towards an equilibrium, rather than just the
final equilibrium position. Furthermore, they consider the implications of
non-constant price-path strategies, tracing the effects of changing the
price again (and again) before the equilibrium adjustments to the initial
price change have had time to work themselves out.
2-Optimization models: Unlike the simulation models, in which a finite
number of prespecified price paths are investigated, the optimization
models (in principle, at least) evaluate all of the infinite variety of
price paths possible. By specifying some criterion function, then deriving
the characteristics of the price-output path that maximizes this function,
the optimizing models seek to identify the best of all possible
trajectories. Of course, in general the computation of the optimal price
trajectory can be fairly complex; thus in examining the actual price paths
only a few relatively simple specifications of demand and supply have been
employed, thereby limiting the generality of the conclusions on optimal
price paths to only those functional forms.
In specifying an optimizing model, three approaches have been used.
First, Kalymon has specified a criterion function (the present value of the
total net profit stream) which must be satisfied by export and domestic
prices, which automatically yields a numerical objective to be maximized.
Second, B-R identify the principal variables that would enter the utility
function, then make a judgemental decision as to how these variables will,
on balance, affect the country's preferences regarding prices and output
levels. Third, Hnyilicza and Pindyck used the Nash Cooperative Solution to
analyse the relative gains to saver and spender countries of OPEC.
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3.1.1 IYhe models:
A- Kennedy, Levy, FEA. In terms of the classification scheme outlined
above, Kennedy, Levy, and the FEA report fall under the heading of
comparative static simulation analyses. In all three studies, the basic
question being asked is whether or not OPEC could sustain the then current
price of oil through 1980 or 1985; if not, the question is what price is
sustainable. However, one may ask whether or not the price-output
combination chosen by OPEC countries is consistent with the underlying
demand function.	 Both Kennedy and Levy assume from the start that any
production cutbacks will have to be ehard b o'ril'j sozte, not afl., mexrers
of OPEC.	 They thus consider only the price sustainable by these
sub-groups.
Kennedy [19741 concludes that in the base case (with non-OPEC supply
elasticity of 0.33 and unitary income elasticity of demand) 1980 revenues
are maximized at roughly $30 billion for royalty levels between $3.50 and
$7.00/bbl. With higher non-OPEC supply elasticity (0.67), 1980 revenues
can reach only $25 billion, for royalty levels between $3.50 and $5.25/bbl.
For higher income elasticity of demand (1.5) 1980 revenues reach $35
billion, at royalty levels between $3.50 and $7/bbl. The general
conclusion is that $3.50/bbl royalty, half the current level (1974), is
most likely to occur in the long run; even with more favorable assumptions
for OPEC it should not exceed $5.00/bbl.
Levy [1974] concludes that with Saudi Arabia/Kuwait/Abu Dhabi acting as
residual supplier, then current price levels (1974) were likely to be
sustainable through 1980 if the demand growth rate is at or slightly less
than recent historical rates. At much lower growth rates (2.7 percent per
annum), however, the supply restriction and revenue reduction for these
three countries would be so great that current price levels would not be
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maintainable. The FEA, on the other hand, considers two possibilities:
one, that OPEC will act as a unified bloc, and second, that only a six
country sub-group (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, the tJAE and Qatar)
will be willing to restrict output.
Considering OPEC as a monolith, each OPEC member restricting output to
the same percentage of capacity, sustaining a price of $9/bbl would imply
by 1985 that each would have enormous surplus capacity (46 percent). To
sustain $6/bbl, all members must share a 7 percent surplus. With $3/bbl, a
shortage would exist by 1985. This is under the assumption that the six
mentioned members are restricting output by an equal percentage of
capacity. To sustain $9/bbl the residual suppliers must have 52 percent
surplus capacity by 1985. For $6/bbl a 12 percent surplus would have to be
shared. $3/bbl is not feasible [Federal Energy Administration 1974].
B- Blitzer-Meeraus-Stoutjesdijk (B-M-S) [1975]. According to B-M-S, the
problem facing OPEC, or any subgroup thereof, is straight forward: an
inelastic short-run demand curve permits high prices and revenue today but
at the expense of revenue in the future, as OPEC market share is lost to
other producers and to alternate fuels. The actual demand for world oil
(Dt) is defined as;
Dt = D 0 (1+g) P where -O.05<c<O
Dt =actual level of demand for world oil in year (t),
=world demand in year (t ),
g =demand growth rate,
P =oil price in year (t), Cc) is constant elasticity which is somewhere
between 0 and -0.05.
Where the demand for OPEC oil is;
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X = D _SN0OPt	 t t
Thus, their basic objective is to identify the price pattern over time
which best satisfies the dual objectives of maintenance of market share and
high current revenue, as apposed to simply a maintainable constant price.
Obviously, 'best' implies some objective criterion, which in this case is
the value of net foreign asset holdings in 1995 (defined as the accumulated
difference between export revenues and import spending) plus the
(undiscounted) value of oil still in the ground at that time.
B-M-S evaluate the relative merits of the price trajectories considered
under two assumed states of the world. First, OPEC as a whole agrees to
any necessary prorationing (as a monolith). The result is that OPEC should
reduce the price from its current (1975) level • The main reason for the
optimality of price reduction strategies is the necessity of discouraging
investment in alternatives and preserving market share.
Second, using a hypothetical example of a sub-OPEC cartel for
illustrative purposes, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi are assumed to
act as the price-maintaining residual suppliers, with other OPEC members
producing at currently projected capacity, exactly as non-OPEC producers.
The results of this case would seem to confirm the results of the basic
case, that a price-reduction, output-increasing strategy is optimal. Such
strategies would be especially attractive for the three countries acting as
residual suppliers. Price-maintenance or price-increase policies, on the
other hand, would imply such unreasonably large restrictions in output by
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait/Abu Dhabi that they would not be likely to cooperate.
These results depend upon the assumed value of the zero-export-growth
price. I will prove the notion of price-maintaining residual suppliers
using cooperative solutions to enlarge the mutual benefits to the members.
However, although a criterion is used to evaluate the price paths
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explicitly postulated, there is no optimization involved in the selection
of price paths to be simulated. Thus, although the B-M-S results are more
general than those of Kennedy, Levy or the FEA, there is no guarantee that
they actually found the t best' strategy for either OPEC or the Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi sub-cartel.
C- Kalymon [1975]. In recognition of this problem with simulation models,
Kalymon has proposed a model which is explicitly optimizing in structure.
In this model, optimal price trajectories over time are calculated for both
OPEC as a monolith and for several sub-OPEC coalitions. In each case, the
criterion to be maximized is the total discounted benefits from oil
production and sales accruing to the price-setting residual supplier. OPEC
as a whole or a sub-OPEC group such as Saudi Arabia/Iran or Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. The model assumes the total demand equals
export demand tete1 plus domestic demand The objective is
to maximize total benefits to producers, which is equal to total revenues
(export and domestic) - total cost. The resource exhaustion constraints
q=Q assures that the total production over the years of oil utilization
does not exceed the total reserves (Q).
By obtaining the price trajectory from an optimising model, Kalymon seeks
to avoid (or at least reduce) the possibility that a complex, but optimal,
price strategy will be overlooked. In addition, the specification of the
model permits optimal strategies for sub-groups of the cartel to be
examined merely by altering a few key parameters.
Kalymon's conclusion is that the optimal price path for the basic
parametric values requires an immediate price reduction to $8.68./bbl, then
a 1 percent per year price increase until a price of $15/bbl is reached in
the year 2027, and reserves are exhausted. The strategy requires a large
measure of production restriction.
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As with the B-M-S model, Kalymon's model can be viewed as more
OPEC-oriented, insofar as the model strives to identify price trajectories
that are best from the producers' point of view. Obviously, however, the
results are of interest to policy makers within the importing countries,
since rational responses and policies cannot be devised without adequate
knowledge of the viable options available to the exporting countries.
D- Bohi-Russell. An alternate approach to an optimizing model can be found
in the work of B-R [1975]. The dual objectives of the authors are to
forecast the actual price (or range of prices) for OPEC oil in the future,
and to evaluate the log-run stability of the OPEC cartel. However,
although a utility-maximization process is assumed for each member country,
the model is only implicit and judgemental. Rather than specifying
explicit functions, B-R identify the key variables and constraints entering
the optimization problem facing each member of OPEC, then provide an
intuitive assessment of the likely net impact of these variables on each
country's behaviour. While explicitly assuming that collusion on a
prorationing scheme will not take place, what B-R seek to identify are the
conditions under which prices will remain high despite the lack of such
cooperation. OPEC is not likely to break down. The countries with the
power to disrupt the cartel do not have the incentive; those that have the
incentive (the will to increase their output) do not have sufficient
reserves to threaten the cartel. As in the FEA report, an avowed objective
of B-R is to identify the likely OPEC behavior, with a view towards
appropriate U.S policy responses.
E- Nordhaus. Although not really a model of OPEC, but rather an answer to
the "limits to growth" literature, Nordhaus's model of the world energy
market also must be included in any survey of OPEC behavior. The reason
for this is that Nordhaus's simulation study remains the only model which
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is both global in scope and which permits explicit substitution between
several alternate forms of energy. Moreover, by basing his simulation on
an assumption of a competitive market, Nordhaus's results provide a useful
point of comparison with the non-competitive models just discussed.
In Nordhaus's model the world energy industry is simulated over a 200
year time horizon, for five ten-year periods, two twenty-five-year periods
and two fifty-year periods. The objective is to meet given final demands
in various locations in each time period at minimum cost, assuming
competitive supply conditions. Since the model looks at several distinct
intervals, and assumes that demand and supply fully adjust to the price
prevailing in each period, it has been categorized here as a dynamic
optimization model. Its principal output are competitive (shadow) prices
for each fuel over the planning horizon, as well as a time profile of
consumption of each fuel. Nordhaus concludes that the long-run shadow
price for oil is not optimistic, the competitive oil prices do not rise
above $3.20/bbl throughout the remainder of this century. A high interest
rate keeps royalties low initially, but when they rise they really take
off. Thus, in addition to providing competitive prices against which the
results of the previous models can be compared, Nordhaus also provides a
careful look at possible patterns of energy use in the future. In
Nordhaus's model as well as Kalymon's model, the price trajectory is
exactly of the form predicted by Hotelling (1931) in his classic
theoretical study of depletable resources.
3 • 1 • 2 OPEC stability so far:
In many cases, no clear criterion is given to determine conditions under
which OPEC would be stable. For example, the FEA study finds that with an
oil price of $6 OPEC would have a "substanial" excess capacity of 7% in
1985, but it leaves it open whether this would be acceptable to OPEC
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meitthers or not. This case is typical of all the models, with the exception
of B-R. No explicit optimizing models for individual members of OPEC are
specified and therefore no way exists to determine whether each individual
country would be better off in accepting the necessary export restrictions
or in producing at full capacity and taking into account the likely
reactions of other OPEC members. The individual country's actions and
reactions can only be observed within the scope of cooperative and
non-cooperative behaviour, as will be discussed later on in the Chapter.
Only a small number of market restriction schemes for OPEC or some
sub-OPEC cartel are considered: (1) each member restricts or expands output
so as to maintain 1975 market shares, up to capacity (Kalyinon); (2)
restrictions proportional to current capacity (FEA). In many cases, the
supply-restricting group, the group of producers who are likely to reduce
their current production in order to prevent a price fall, is treated as a
monolith, without specification of a mechanism for sharing excess capacity.
There is no distinction between the willingness of cooperation of the
members. No formal investigation is undertaken concerning which schemes
(if any) would be mutually acceptable to all of the supply-restriction
group. It seems clear to me that a proportional distribution of excess
capacity would not necessarily elicit the agreement of all members and thus
is not the most likely outcome. Agreement might be reached, however, if
countries with a high time-preference are assigned little or no supply
restriction, while countries with a low time-preference are compensated for
output restrictions in the near future by enjoying a larger market share in
the more distant future. This aspect is taken into account to some extent
by the consideration of various subcartels, especially of countries with a
low time-preference, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi (Levy,
B-M-S, Kalymon). However, even in these cases there is no formal search
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possible over the various sub-groups or over the variety of schemes to
share output restrictions within each subgroup.
Even the most explicit model of OPEC stability, the B-R model, does not
hold up under closer scrutiny. From the fact that Saudi Arabia is
indifferent between selling oil at $7.33/bbl today and at $10.00/bbl in 15
years, they conclude that Saudi Arabia would reduce its exports at prices
below $7.33/bbl, as long as it expects to be able to sell it at $10.00 in
15 years. But this conclusion is not warranted. Even if Saudi Arabia
would sell the marginal barrel of oil at $ 7.33/bbl today, it would still
have plenty of oil to sell at $ 10.00/bbl in 15 years. The result of
deferring sale of that barrel will be to defer exhaustion of reserves, for
example, until 51 years in the future instead of 50 years (to use B-R's
reserve estimates for the Gulf region). But the discounted value of a
barrel of oil sold 50 years later at $10, even at a very low discount rate
of 3%, is only $2.23/bbl. Hence, Saudi Arabia's "trigger price" would be
$2.23/bbl, not $7.33/bbl [Fisher 1975].
There may well be other reasons for expecting OPEC to be stable, but they
will hardly be found in optimization by individual countries, without
taking the likely reactions of other countries into account. The proper
framework to analyse the stability of a coalition is cooperative and
non-cooperative n-person game theory, which explicitly considers bargaining
situations, introduces thteat points, allows for side-payments to reluctant
coalition members who are tempted to disrupt an agreement, etc.. None of
the models surveyed goes into these aspects. The assumptions made by B-R
are quite restrictive, and any policy conclusions based on them are
speculative at best. At this point the Hnyilicza and Pindyck (H-P) model,
in which the Nash cooperative solution is used, casts more light on the
question of OPEC behavior and stability. There follows a review of some of
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these models:
A— Adelman [1982]. According to this model, each OPEC menther is quite
aware of the mutual interdependencies that exist among producers and, for
the common good, producers are willing to share the burden of output
reductions by adhering to some kind of formal or informal prorationing
scheme. In any event, widespread cheating is unlikely since all
participants are aware of the disastrous outcomes if cartel discipline were
to evaporate. Accordingly, a collapse of the cartel price seems unlikely
and real price increases, even in the face of flat or declining OPEC
exports, are quite possible.
Adelmans's view is that OPEC will attempt to raise the price even higher,
because of internal pressures within OPEC from producers outside the Gulf.
As these producers begin to run budget deficits, they will demand that the
Saudis and others in the Gulf Core go along with higher prices. While the
Saudis are anxious to avoid these pressures and are seeking agreement on
long range pricing objectives on this account, they are nevertheless likely
to submit to these pressures because the value of the OPEC states outside
the Gulf is considerable. Providing the real price increases were not
large and production in the Cartel Core does not fall below certain
thresholds, this model would seem to predict price stability and continued
OPEC vitality. Unfortunately, this model is very much assigned to oil
market developments in the#1970s, where there had been no stop to oil price
increases.	 Oil business seemed to have functioned differently in the
1980s, as will be shown in the next section.
B— Teece and Johany. The model by Teece rests on the assumption that
absorptive capacity is limited in the short run and that artificially low
discount rates are used, at least implicitly, in production planning. Both
factors result in very conservative production policies, so long as oil
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*revenues meet budgetary requirements (which in turn depend on absorptive
capacity), and so long as low real returns on liquid financial assets
reinforce (myopic) expectations that oil in the ground is a better
investment than money in the bank.
However, a prolonged period of soft crude prices can permit the growth in
absorptive capacity to outstrip current revenues. This will induce a
tendency toward output expansion. Additionally, if real returns on foreign
financial assets continue at historically high levels, many countries may
decide that foreign assets are a desirable component of their investment
portfolios, and will expand production simply to build foreign assets.
Both factors will tilt production decisions toward expansion, with
additional capacity being added if necessary [Teece 1982].
In Johany's view production policies are considered matters of national
sovereignty; it will not be easy for OPEC to hold the line through
collective action.	 The Saudis might well be pressed to cut back
production, at least until production is down to about 7mb/d. 	 However,
Saudi resistance to further reductions would be met at about this level.
Since OPEC will have difficulty achieving formal prorationing, the price
might very well fall dramatically. This is all the more likely if
Iran-Iraq relations are improved. Such a development would create
budgetary demands in both countries. While this rather optimistic scenario
could of course be upset by political turmoil, the implication is clear:
Teece's model suggests that substantial downward price movements are likely
in the event of a prolonged soft market.
C- Moran [1982]. This is not an economic model, but rather a political
view. It argues that twentieth century history is replete with examples of
the important security and political ramifications of oil. Thus it seems
likely that nation states are simultaneously concerned with extending their
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political influence, assuring their own security, as well as maximizing the
wealth from their oil reserves. The critical question is the degree to
which these goals are mutually compatible or in conflict.
If these gaols are mutually compatible, or complementary, there is really
little need for political models of OPEC behavior. Even though "wealth
maximization" is merely serving as a surrogate for security and power
goals, the predictions of the model should be accurate. Moreover, since
wealth-maximizing behavior does involve an empirically measurable
phenomenon and economic theory has isolated the factors influencing the
choice, the model gives neat, explicit interpretations of the present and
predictions of the future. In contrast, once political scientists begin to
talk of security or political influence, the model necessarily becomes
qualitative instead of quantitative. The predictions necessarily become
more ambiguous. Thus, in this case, explicit political models may provide
more intuitively pleasing assumptions, but a much weaker predictive model.
The more interesting case is one in which wealth maximization, security,
and political influence, etc., are substitutes to some degree. Thus the
decision to choose, for example, more security necessarily implies less
wealth and/or influence. In this case, political models and wealth
maximization models offer divergent interpretations and predictions.
D- Hnyilicza and Pindyck (H-p ) [1976]. In 1976 Pindyck developed an
optimal pricing mode] in which OPEC, facing a net demand for oil that is
the difference between a dynamic total demand function and a dynamic supply
function for 'competitive fringe' countries, and subject to production
costs that rise as reserves as depleted, sets price over time to maximize
its sum of discounted profits [Pindyck 1976]. While studies such as this,
and others constructed by Cremer and Weitzman (1976) and Kalymon (1975),
provide a useful first approximation to cartel behavior in that they
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describe how pricing policies depend on the inherent dynamics of reserve
depletion and short-term lag adjustment, they do not account for the fact
that many cartels are composed of producers with different objectives and
different degrees of bargaining power. Cartel policy in fact represents a
negotiated agreement that reflect the different interests of the member
producers.
In his model Pindyck [19781 calculated the relative gains to OPEC
producers from cartelisation. In this approach, the cartel, even acting as
a unit, is not the only seller in the market. Some production comes from a
'competitive fringe', small producers who take the price set by the cartel
in each period. The cartel, in turn, takes account of fringe supply in
setting prices. With the additional (and crucial) assumption that fringe
supply adjusts with a lag, a price path can be determined to maximize the
present value of cartel profits. He concluded that OPEC gains from
cartelisation are quite large, hence there would be sufficient incentive
for OPEC producers to over-come the problems typical of cartelisation.
In the model of Pindyck and Hnyilicza [1976], OPEC was assessed as two
groups. It consists of one group of saver countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar) that have little immediate
need for cash and would thus use a low rate of discount in computing a sum
of discounted profits, and a second group of spender countries (Iran,
Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Ecuador) with large cash needs
and a higher rate of discount. These groups also happen to differ with
respect to the proven reserves available to be depleted over time; saver
countries as a group have considerably greater proven reserves than do the
spender countries. The differences in discount rates and reserves will
reinforce each other in terms of creating differences in desired policies
for each group. Actual cartel policy depends on an agreement between the
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two groups that reflects both differences in objectives and in bargaining
power.
The model seeks a bargaining solution for the two-part cartel based on
the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash [1950]. First, they find
optimal trajectories for both price and the ratio of output shares,
assuming the cartel maximizes a weighted sum of the objectives (sum of
discounted profits) for each of the two groups of countries. Second, by
repeatedly changing the weights, resolving and recomputing optimal sums of
discounted profits for each group, they compute an efficient
(Pareto-Optimal) frontier in the space of realised objectives for the two
groups of countries. Next, that set of weights which corresponds to a Nash
cooperative solution is found. This corresponds to the bargaining
solution, and gives the optimal trajectories for price and market shares.
The study assumes that a cooperative agreement is worked out whereby
price and output shares are set to maximize a weighted sum of the
objectives of each group of countries;
Max. W = a W 1 + (1-a)W2 , where 0< Bt<1
By varying a between 0 and 1 and solving the resulting set of parametric
optimization problems, the Pareto-optimal frontier is obtained in the space
of realised outcomes (W1,w2 ), as in Figure 3.1. Clearly, each point on the
frontier corresponds to a different trade-off between the relative
objectives of the two groups of countries. The frontier need not touch the
W 1 or W2 axes. When a = 1, for example, no weight is assigned to W 2 , but
the policy that maximizes W 1
 might result in a W2 greater than zero.
Determining the value of a that is most likely to prevail as a result of
a negotiated agreement between the two groups of countries requires the
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Figure 3..i. Efficient frontier
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solution of a cooperative two-person game, introduced by Nash in 1953 [Nash
1953].
The idea is that the two parties in a bargaining game attempt to move
along the set of bargaining outcomes in opposite directions, the problem is
to determine a meaningful measure of bargaining power for the two parties.
Nash's approach, for a non-cooperative solution [Nash 1951], was to
introduce the notion of a threat point which I will attempt to develop,
i.e. the outcome that would result if negotiations were to break down and
non-cooperative behavior were to ensue.
The model concludes that if output shares are fixed the two-part cartel
will choose the same pricing policy as the monopolistic cartel. This
policy was stated by the exhaustible resource theory discussed in the
previous Chapter. However, the model also stresses that output allocation
is likely to be an important aspect of OPEC policy, particularly in the
future as the supply of oil from the competitive fringe countries increases
and OPEC is forced to cut back its production. The H-P model stood short
of tackling the notion of non-cooperation behaviour. To foresee the likely
outcome of OPEC stability, we should trace the non-cooperative behaviour as
well as the cooperative.
In a cooperative solution it would be irrational for either party to
accept a payoff less than that resulting from non-cooperative behavior. In
broad terms, Nash's Solution is based on the premise that the relevant
measure of "relative power" which determines the outcome of the bargaining
process is given by the relative utilities at the status quo, or point of
no agreement. This is plausible, since the reason each party is willing to
bargain is that it expects to accrue a payoff over and above the payoff
attained at the threat point. It seems reasonable that both parties should
be willing to accept a division of the net incremental gains in a
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proportion directly related to the losses incurred by not making an
agreement.
Nash demonstrated that his proposed solution to the bargaining problem is
in fact the only solution (W, W), see Figure 3.2, that satisfies axioms
of rationality, Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
symmetry, and independence with respect to linear transformations of the
set of payoffs. Furthermore, that solution is such that (w-W)(W-W) is
maximized.
The model shows that pricing strategy follows almost directly from output
strategy, by means of changing output shares between saver and spender
countries increasing the profits for both countries. The Nash solution for
fixed output shares results in total discounted profits of $2439 billion
and $407 billion for saver and spender countries, respectively, as compared
to $2778 and $698 billion for the Nash solution with time-varying output
shares.
This model assumes that none of the members is reluctant to cooperate,
every member is assumed to have chosen to pursue the group interests
regardless of his individual interests. Resulting from this assumption,
the two subgroups might only disagree; if there is any disagreement at all,
at one point, the point of no agreement (threat point), at which both
parties would be worse off. The fact is that individual members have to
fulfill their individual interests as well as the subgroup interests, and
they may value their individual interests as much as the group interests
and perhaps more. Thus the individual member may not only be unaware of
the consequences of non cooperation, they may willingly choose not to
cooperate within one particular group or another. Any movement of this
kind may change the threat point position and shift the Nash cooperative
solution point (see Figure 3.3).
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In the ideal situations, such as two person games, there exists a Nash
solution or a threat point depending on agreement or disagreement of the
players.	 In organisation games, such as OPEC, the interrelations between
members is rather complex and unsettled. Members interests are divided
between their individual interests and the organisation or subgroup
interests. Thus, in considering such organisations, neither the Nash
solution nor the threat point is quite clear. The solution can only be an
approximate solution at best, but not definite.
Again the proper framework to analyse OPEC stability is by applying game
theory. Non-cooperative solutions together with cooperative solutions can
provide a more comprehensive explanation of OPEC behaviour than described
hitherto.
S
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3 • 2 Game theory and OPEC behaviour:
Game theory, like any other mathematical theory, is essentially a
collection of theorems derived from axioms [Rapoport 1970 p.11]. Two or
more individual players influence a situation (outcome of the game) whereas
the interest of the players (their utility for the various possible
situations) differ. Differences of the various utilities between the
players raises conflictual behaviour just as identity of all utilities
makes the game a pure coordination problem where cooperation is the only
rational behaviour [Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947 p.32]. In most games
derived from politics and/or economics, the configuration of utilities is
neither strict antagonism nor mere identity. The seller and the buyer both
agree that their common interest dictates that they reach agreement on
exchange, so long as no one is made worse off by the deal; but they eagerly
compete for the choice of a particular price within these limits.
Similarly two moderate voters typically agree to destroy the extremist but
struggle fiercely to support one of the two prominent middle-of-the road
candidates. A moment's reflection will convince all of us that most social
game-like situations generate tendencies to both conflictual and
cooperative behaviour. Game theory, in fact, tries to predict what stable
institutional form will emerge from a given economic background and what
the resulting value relationships will be.
My aim, from a study ,to OPEC behaviour, is to show that game theory is a
useful logical device to explore these mixed situations. Cooperative and
non-cooperative equilibrium concepts will typically coexist.
On the strategy of pure conflict the zero-sum game theory has yielded
important insights and advice. But on the strategy of action where
conflict is mixed with mutual dependence the zero-sum games involved in
wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class
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war, race war, price war, and blackmail; manoeuvering in a bureaucracy or
in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one's own children, traditional game
theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the games
in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest,
mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of
collaboration or mutual accommodation, tacit if not explicit, even if only
in the avoidance of mutual disaster. There are also games in which, though
secrecy play a strategic role, there is some essential need for the
signaling of intentions and the meeting of minds. Finally, they are games
in which what one player can do to avert mutual damage affects what another
player will do to avert it, so that it is not always an advantage to
possess initiative, knowledge, or freedom of choice.
Traditional game theory has, for the most part, applied to these
mutual-dependence games (nonzero-sum games) the methods and concepts that
proved successful in studying the strategy of pure conflict.
Real economic problems are usually of the non-constant-sum variety. For
example, collusion can normally increase the total profits of a pair of
duopolists [Bacharach 1976 p.67], and two countries can usually do better
by getting together than by declaring war on one another.
The mutual interdependence of OPEC producers suggests a possible
application of game theory to an analysis of OPEC. Game theory may not
provide a definite soli,tion to the price and output policies of OPEC, but,
as I hope to show, it provides a framework for structuring an analysis of
OPEC.
It is obvious that it is the non-zero sum game which is applicable to
OPEC. As will emerge from the analysis, OPEC price-output strategies
conform neither to a cooperative or a non-cooperative non-zero sum game.
Generally speaking OPEC countries resort to both cooperative and
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non-cooperative strategies.
In the literature, non-constant-sum games are divided into two classes:
cooperative and non-cooperative, i.e., into games where collusion occurs
and those where it does not occur.
In the cooperative case the game theorists have tended to argue that the
players will be sufficiently rational to discover and make full use of all
opportunities which can mutually be advantageous. That is, the players are
taken to cooperate on any and every action which can increase the payoff of
either player (provided it does not, at the same time, reduce the payoff of
the other). In economic terminology, they will always end up somewhere on
the contract curve of the Edgeworth box [Bacharach 1976 p.144].
Of course, it is doubtful whether players are really so rational in
practice. Moreover, the problems involved in arriving at an acceptable
division of the tttake u may well prevent the players from maximizing their
total gain as this rationality assumption requires. It is note-worthy that
most of the novelty in the cooperative-case analysis occurs in
investigation of the division of the spoils between colluding players. The
objective of OPEC producers is to maximize their revenues, but where the
price is fixed this can only be done by increasing output. The problem is
that the violation of an output agreement or quota by any member
necessitates a direct cut of some other member's quota. This sort of
action is really a step towards non-cooperation, because it threatens the
others with being unable to maximize their revenues. Nash has supplied a
criterion for a reasonable or "fair" division which has been the subject of
considerable attention [Nash 1953]. The application of the cooperative
solution was discussed in the previous section from the work of Hnyilicza
and Pindyck. Their model is centred on the concept of cartelisation. The
main goal of the members is to maximize their revenues. To do this they
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need to cooperate with each other, leaving aside the possibility of
non-cooperation behaviour. However, the game would be better understood if
non-cooperation elements were also considered, because as I have discussed
earlier in the Chapter the change in the threat point would affect the
ultimate solution.
In general, a cooperative solution is at least as good as a
non-cooperative solution for the simple reason that a non-cooperative
solution is always a cooperative solution (an agreement to disagree). The
OPEC countries will always have a higher revenue if they act as a unified
cartel. But a cooperative solution raises the problems of:
(1) The division of the overall pay-off among participants.
(2) The monitoring and policing of agreements on output quotas and
prices.
(3) The non-cooperative alternative to a cooperative solution.
In recent years OPEC has not acted as a unified cartel. For example
African producers, competitors to North Sea oil, especially Nigeria,
reduced the price of their crude following the British National Oil
Corporation (BNOC) price reductions in March 1983 and October 1984,
regardless of the OPEC official price. A message delivered by Nigeria's
Minister David West, attending the Vienna meeting as an observer, indicated
that the previous Lagos regime had overproduced at 1.5 million b/d,
(Nigeria's quota was .1.3 mb/d) [Petroleum Economist, April 1983]. But
non-compliance with the collective decisions of OPEC is not the only
feature of OPEC. Members have kept violations within certain limits and
despite the frequent non-compliance with the collective agreement on prices
and output quotas, no OPEC member has in fact pulled out of the
organisation and all members have continued to participate in price-output
agreements.	 Thus, what is interesting about OPEC is not simply the
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non-compliance with collective price and output quota agreements but that
this is in conjunction with the survival of the organisation.
Now I turn to the discussion of non-cooperative non-constant-sum games.
They posses a number of interesting features:
1. If such a game possesses several equilibrium pairs of strategies,
they need not all yield the same payoff. Moreover, if (a,b) and (a11b1)
are equilibrium pairs, neither (a,b 1 ) nor (a 11 b) need be equilibrium pairs.
This can greatly complicate the planning problems of both players since, if
they do not aim for the same equilibrium pairs, both may lose out.
2. The second peculiarity of the nonzero-sum, non-cooperative case is
that both players will often be led by self-interest to take decisions
which are mutually disadvantageous. This has been illustrated sharply by
the well-known game of the pri8oners' dilemma, which is attributed to A.
W.	 Tucker (Kuhn and Tucker 1950]. Two prisoners are brought in and
interrogated separately. Each knows they will both get off if neither
person "talks". However, they are both told that if one confesses and the
other does not the one who fails to confess will receive a particularly
heavy penalty. In this situation both players may well decide to protect
themselves by confessing.
This point is of considerable economic importance. It shows why citizens
may not contribute taxes voluntarily even though each wants the government
to function. The citizen sees nothing to be gained by paying taxes unless
there is some guarantee that others will contribute too, just as one
prisoner will confess unless he has some assurance that his fellow prisoner
will not do so. Similarly, where it is legally possible, many storekeepers
will keep their shops open on Sunday although they all prefer a holiday,
each fearing that if he does not do so he will lose customers to his
competitors.	 This argument is involved in the logic behind conscription
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and rationing in wartime, governmental anti-inflationary measures, etc.
All of these measures are designed, at least in part, to achieve the
cooperation which alone can prevent the loss to each player from his trying
to protect himself when he has no assurance that others will behave as
required for their mutual interest (Baumol 1965].
Furthermore, in Chapter 7 I will present a case of what I might call the
"Libyan producer8' game". In this game the foreign oil companies working
in Libya, had actually mistrusted each other's behaviour and thus
eliminated a possibility of a cooperative outcome of the game. They, in a
sense, had been in a similar dilemma to that faced by the prisoners. The
non-communication problem of the prisoners had eventually, in the mind of
each prisoner, been transformed to a mistrust problem as we will see below
from their choice of strategies.
Because there is no communication between the prisoners, strategy 1,
which is best for both players, cannot be chosen. For both players
strategy 2 dominates strategy 1 (see matrix below). Hence, strategy 2,
(10,10)	 is the unique dominating strategy equilibrium, therefore a
non-cooperative solution is the eventual outcome. However strategy 1
(cooperation) provides less imprisonment to both prisoners. Therefore
non-cooperative selfish rationality conflicts with collective interest
arguments. Collective interests demand sticking to cooperative strategy 1
(Moulin 1981].
	 Prisoner B
0	 1	 2
	
2	 6
Prisoner A
	
1 2	 12
	
12	 10
2 6	 10
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In the absence of disclosure, there is little room for manoeuvering, but
the solution certainly would not be the cooperative one. On the other hand
the solution cannot be the extreme non-cooperative one (12,12). That is
the authorities have clear evidence that both prisoners committed the crime
but neither confessed. Eventually both prisoners will confess and get ten
years imprisonment each (see Figure 3.4 below).
On the surface the frequent non-compliance with the collective output and
price decisions may suggest that OPEC countries are caught in a prisoner's
dilemma, but some of the principal features of the dilemma do not apply to
OPEC.
(1) The prisoner's dilemma is characterized by a complete absence of any
communication between the participants. The lack of communication is the
central feature of the dilemma.
(2) There exists no mechanism for enforcing any prior agreement on
cooperation. Neither party can make a credible threat in the event of
non-compliance by the other party.
(3) Neither party has means to know immediately the behaviour of the
other party.
(4) This is a one-off game, it happens only once in a life-time, there is
no previous experience to learn from.
(5) Players preferences go in opposite directions: the choice that each
prefers to make is not the choice he prefers the other to make. Each
prisoner prefers to be the only confessor. The strengths of these
preferences are such that both are better off making their unpreferred
choices (not to confess) than if both make their preferred choices
[Schelling 1978 p.2161.
The prisoner's dilemma is the archetypal choice problem in which,
contrary to the doctrines of liberal economics, the group interest is not
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furthered by the independent pursuit of individual interest. Prima-facig
the dilemma seems eminently applicable to OPEC. It is clear that as a
group, OPEC will maximize revenues if all members adhere to the jointly
agreed price structure and output quotas, yet the interest of each member
may diverge from the interest of the group. Furthermore, the interests of
some members may coincide forming sub-groups such as Output Maximizers,
Price Maximizers and Cartel Core. These divisions were discussed in
Chapters 1 and 2. The point to make here, as I showed in the previous
section, is that divergent interests between OPEC members may well lead to
a new threat point, which accordingly results on a new equilibrium point
(solution). This certainly means a change either in price or output
agreements. Thus, in contradiction to the Hnyilicza and Pindyck model, I
stress the necessity of defining the threat point, as a first step, before
any search for a solution. In discussing the possible application of the
dilemma to OPEC I distinguish between the following:
(1) Preference about one's own behaviour or the sub-group behaviour.
(2) Preference about the behaviour of the other members or sub-groups of
OPEC.
Having reached an agreement on the structure of prices and output quotas,
each OPEC member prefers to stick to the agreement. That is, each member
prefers others to pursue the group rather their own parochial interests.
On the other hand, the member in question prefers to pursue his own self
interest and thus may prefer to violate the price and production quota
agreement.	 He could do that unilaterally or bilaterally through his
sub-group. The price-output agreement would break down if each member
pursued his own interest while expecting others to put the collective
interest above their own individual interests.
The history of OPEC brings about vivid examples of violation and
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accommodation situations. For example, when the demand for OPEC oil fell
from about 23 mb/d in 1981 to 19 mb/d in 1982 [El-Mokadem 1984 p.35] some
OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE reduced their
production to prevent the fall in price. Another example was in October
1984, when the North Sea oil price was reduced and Nigeria followed. Saudi
Arabia announced that it would cut its production in an attempt to limit
further price reductions. Thus, while Nigeria violated the price-ouput
agreement, Saudi Arabia tried to protect the collective agreement on the
account of its individual preference. Shortly after that, on 29 October,
OPEC ministers agreed to reduce their production by 1.5 mb/d, to 16 mb/d,
as shown in Table 3.1 below.
a
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Table 3.1
Change in OPEC's quota (mb/d): 1982-1984
Country	 March 1982 quota 	 Reduction	 Oct. 1984 quota
Algeria	 0.725	 0.062	 0.663
Ecuador	 0.200	 0.017	 0.183
Gabon	 0.150	 0.013	 0.137
Indonesia	 1.300	 0.111	 1.189
Iran	 2.400	 0.100	 2.300
Iraq	 1.200	 -	 1.200
Kuwait	 1.050	 0.150	 0.900
Libya	 1.100	 0.110	 0.990
Nigeria	 1.300	 -	 1.300
Qatar	 0.300	 0.020	 0.280
Saudi Arabia	 5.000	 0.647	 4.353
tJ.A.E.	 1.100	 0.150	 d.950
Venezuela	 1.675	 0.120	 1.555
Total	 17.500	 1.500	 16.000
(-) The quota has not been changed.
Source: Al-Moudjahid (daily news-paper), 1 Nov. 1984, p.6.
W may consider Saudi Arabia/Nigeria's case as a two person game.
define the parties of the game as follows;
(A) Saudi Arabia; the producer who is willing to prevent the current oil
prices from falling even if it is forced to reduce its current production
level.
(B) Nigeria; the producer who is willing to keep the level of current oil
revenues even if this requires reduced oil prices and increased oil
production.
According to OPEC agreements, the producers' behaviour is constrained by
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the maximum allowable production for each individual producer ttquota, and
the minimum crude price. The strategies available to both producers
according to the agreements were;
(1) Reduce oil production.
(2) Increase oil prices.
If Saudi Arabia and Nigeria behaved within these limits, there would be
no problem (normal behaviour of cartel members). The problem is that the
parties, or at least one of them, behave differently. That is because the
interests of one party oppose the interests of the other and violates the
OPEC agreements. The possible violation strategies are as follows;
(3) Increase oil production.
(4) Reduce oil prices.
One might argue that the last two strategies demonstrate the act of
cheating in cartel theory. This is true, but under cartelisation cheating
becomes widely spread and that would lead to cartel destruction. Here the
process is different, while one party violates the agreements by employing
strategy 3 or 4 or both, the other party accommodates such an action by
employing his strategy 1.
In the matrix below, if Saudi Arabia and Nigeria employed one of their
first two strategies, there would be no problem. The parties, as just
mentioned, behave in accordance with OPEC agreements. The trouble began
when Nigeria decided to 'fulfil its own interests by reducing its oil prices
below the OPEC agreed prices. Nigeria as discussed in Chapter 1, is a
heavily populated country with low oil reserves and large development
programmes. Nigeria realising its problems, chose its strategy 4 (reduce
oil prices) leaving Saudi Arabia to decide on its strategy.
Now if Saudi Arabia acted according to simple cartelisation theory, it
would follow Nigeria's choice by employing its strategy 4. The outcome of
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A2,B3 A2,B4A2,B2
A3,B3 A3,B4A3,B2
A4 , B3 A4,B4A4 , B 2
the game would be a non-cooperative solution (A4,B4). The implications of
such strategy is quite clear; wide-spread cheating within OPEC and
consequently its collapse. OPEC collapse would hurt Saudi Arabia more than
any other producer in the world, because of its large crude oil reserves.
Thus Saudi Arabia wisely rejected strategy 4.
Nigeria's strategies (B)
Cooperative	 1	 Ultimate
solution	 ,solution
1 IA1,Bl
Saudia Arabia's 2	 A2,Bl
strategies (A)	 I
3 I A3,Bl
4 I A4,Bl
Non-cooperative
solution
Strategy 3 is an alternative to violation strategy 4, and since strategy
4 was rejected by Saudi Arabia then strategy 3 had to be rejected.
Strategy 2 cannot be employed because it is hopeless to increase the price
of oil at a time of slack oil demand and declining oil prices. Thus the
only strategy which was consistent with Saudi Arabian interests as the
largest oil reserves holder, was strategy 1 (reduce oil production). By
employing this strategy Saudi Arabia hoped to reduce oil supplies to
prevent further price reductions. Thus the solution in this case was
(A1,B4).
However, Nigeria also violated the OPEC quota by employing its strategy
3.	 Even though it violated both the OPEC quota and OPEC prices, Saudi
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Arabia in contrast still employed its strategy 1. The ultimate solution
was (A1,B3B4).
It should be clear that the outcome of the game was not a cooperative
solution which is (A1,B1) in the matrix. On the other hand, the outcpme of
the game was not a non-cooperative solution (A3A4,B3B4) because as
discussed above Saudi Arabia did not consider cheating as a strategy.
If we assmne that these two producers represent the adverse interests
within OPEC, we may conclude that OPEC did not act as unified cartel.
Cartelisation Theory is unable to assess OPEC behaviour. Furthermore the
analysis confirms the coexistence of cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviour of OPEC members.
The crucial factor to the organisational stability is the number of
stabilising producers (K) and their actual output levels. These are the
members who choose to stabilise the organisation for some reason such as
being large reserves holders, for whom long term price stability is
necessary to maximize the sum of their profits. If the ability of these
stabilising producers to reduce production (5) is large enough so as to
absorb or accommodate any increase in production (O r ) by other members,
OPEC will be stable. ie. stability requires:
< 5
The unstable position would be of the form [ O > 5 ].
Even though, OPEC members have no communication problem, and output as
well as prices are agreed upon in the conference, there is still a
possibility of violations by some members. At a certain point, beyond the
accommodation limits, these may bring unrest for the organisation or at
least generate a non-cooperative solution. Threat and accommodation are
the features of OPEC which cannot be found as such in the prisoner's
dilemma.
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3. In a non-cooperative, non-constant-sum game it will often pay a
player to publicize his plans, in marked contrast with the rather obvious
advantage of secrecy in the zero-sum case. Disclosure may be useful either
as a means of transmitting information or as a threat which permits a
degree of tacit collusion.
(a) Information. Under competition a company will often make certain
that any price increases are well publicised in the hope, or even the
confident expectation, that this move will soon be followed by other firms
in the industry, to their mutual advantage. For OPEC members, the price
and output are agreed upon, precise information helps coordination between
members and on the other hand could help in detecting any violations to the
agreement.
(b) Threat.	 Game theory offers a variety of examples for individual
threat.	 These are not applicable to organisations, but they help to
clarify the communication concept. For example, to a player who announces
that he will drop a bomb which will blow everyone up if he does not have
his way, disclosure of this information is necessary for him to win his
point. Curiously, a reputation for stupidity and stubbornness can be
useful to the player who poses a threat because it will help convince the
others that he really means it [Schelling 1963 pp.21-52].
When one threatens to cut his price if his competitor does, the threat is
no more than a communication of one's own incentives, designed to impress
on the other the automatic consequences of his act. And, incidentally, if
it succeeds in deterring, it benefits both parties. For example, OPECtS
threat in 1983 that there would be a price war if Britain continued
reducing the price of its crude below the OPEC official price, is of this
kind. Nigeria's violation of its quota from 1.3 mb/d to 1.5 mb/d in
1982-83 can be viewed as an enforcement of its request to OPEC members to
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raise its quota but not as a credible threat to price agreements.
But more than communication is involved when one threatens an act that he
would have no incentive to perform, but that is designed to deter through
its promise of mutual harm. To threaten massive retaliation against small
encroachments is of this nature, as is the threat to bump a car that does
not yield the right of way or to call a costly strike if the wage is not
raised a few pence. In the oil industry the Libyan threat, in 1970, to oil
companies working in Libya is well known. The threat was to freeze oil
production if the companies did not increase the government take to a
certain amount. This initiative has had a series effects on the oil
industry as a whole. The distinctive feature of this threat is that the
threatener has the incentive to carry it out if his demands were not met.
He does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfil the threat, if he
thinks the threat may be successful. I will be showing for the Libyan case
in Chapter 7 that the threat and not its fulfilment gains the end;
fulfilment is not required if the threat succeeds. The more certain the
contingent fulfilment is, the less likely is actual fulfilment.
The Libyan threat achievement, in fact, rewarded both parties (the Libyan
Government and the oil companies). It simply shifted the solution point or
Nash solution to the right (see Figure below).
The incremental increase in posted price was divided between the
government and oil companies. Libya's gain as a result of the threat is
measured by L 1 L2 in the Figure, while the companies' gain is measured by
C 1 C2 .	 There was no loss to the oil companies but the advantage of cheap
Libyan oil in comparison to other oils was almost removed, and probably
more important is that Libyan success in threatening oil companies opened
the door to other producers for similar claims. I will be showing, later
in this thesis, a complete analysis of Libya t s tactic in dealing with the
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oil companies to enforce particular solutions. The above assessment raises
an important point which is worth investigating by oil specialists; the
increase in oil prices started by Libya have increased the companies
profits substantially. This in effect made the oil companies closer in
their interests to the producing countries than to the consuming countries.
But the threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and
the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display
his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex po8t, have an
incentive to carry it out. An example of this case (fulfilment) is
provided from the treatment of the Shell oil company in August 1973, where
its production was embargoed by the Libyan government. The event had no
negative effect on the Libyan government while Shell actually lost Libya's
low-sulphur crude. In addition, such an embargo made it clear to all other
companies that Libya certainly meant what it said, and thus made the threat
to oil companies credible.
Once a threat is carried out it may lead to multiple effects by involving
other parties not part of the game initially. In the oil business, one of
the great obstacles to the OPEC members' threats against each other, is the
serious effects it has on the market structure and the major oil companies
in particular. Even in Libya's case, if the oil companies (all of them
majors and independents) would not have agreed to comply with Libya's
terms, there would have been a shortage of over 2 mb/d of low-sulphur oil
in the world market, which is enough to cause a jump in crude prices.
In an oligopolistic market, there are few producers for the commodity and
a large number of buyers competing for it. Wherever this is the case, the
producer can easily switch from one buyer to another at any time.
Producers are not only able to threaten the buyers, but they should be able
to have the same effect on the final consumer.
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The oil market is somehow different. It is true that there are few
producers of oil, but on the other hand there are few buyers for the
commodity. The major oil companies are well known in dealing and refining
of crude oils. The country-company relations are very well-functioning,
usually on the basis of long-term supply contracts; none of the parties is
willing to cut off the long-term relations for temporary reasons. If it
happened, it would be a major setback to both parties and might pull other
parties into conflict situations. Production violation by an OPEC member
probably causes an immediate distribution problem to its buyers, and it may
take a long time to channel the crude to its refineries or sell it to
others. On the other hand, the increase of crude supply by this member can
only be deducted from other member's quotas, causing short-supply problems
to their buyers, and so on.
A related tactic is manoeuvering into a BtatU8 quo from which one can be
dislodged only by an overt act, an act that precipitates mutual damage
because the manoeuvering party has relinquished the power to retreat. In
the Libyan example, if the government decided to fulfil its threat for the
oil companies rejected to raise posted prices, then both parties would end
up at the fulfilment point (L 0 ,C0
 )(see Figure 3.6 below) where both
parties would lose. The country's loss being L0L 1
 , and companies' loss
C0C1
In case a threat its made and fails to deter, there is a second stage
prior to fulfilment, in which both parties have an interest in undoing the
commitment. The purpose of the threat is gone, its deterrence value is
zero, and only the commitment exists to motivate fulfilment. This feature
has, of course, an analogy with stalemate in ordinary bargaining.
Stalemate results from both parties being committed to incompatible
positions, or one party mistakenly committing himself to a position that
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the other truly would not accept. If there appears a possibility of
undoing the commitment, both parties have an interest in doing so. How to
undo it is a matter in which their interests diverge, since different ways
of undoing it lead to different outcomes. Furthermore, undoing does not
mean neglecting a commitment regardless of reputation (in the case of
individuals). Undoing, if the commitment of reputation is real, means
disconnecting the threat from one's reputation, perhaps one's own
reputation with the threatened person himself. It is therefore a subtle
and tenuous situation in which, though both have an interest in undoing the
commitment, they may be quite unable to collaborate in undoing it.
Special care may be needed in defining the threat, both the act that is
threatened and the counter act that is threatened. The difficulty arises
from the fact, just noted, that once the former has been done the incentive
to perform the latter has disappeared. The credibility of the threat
before the act depends on how visible to the threatened party is the
inability of the threatening party to rationalize his way out of his
commitment once it has failed its purpose. Any loopholes the threatening
party leaves himself, if they are visible to the threatened party, weaken
the visible commitment and hence reduce the credibility of the threat.
It is essential, therefore, for maximum credibility, to leave as little
room as possible for judgment or discretion in carrying out the threat. If
one party is committed o punish a certain type of behavior when it reaches
certain limits, but the limits are not carefully and objectively defined,
the party threatened will realise that when the time comes to decide
whether the threat must be enforced or not, his interest and that of the
threatening party will coincide in an attempt to avoid the mutually
unpleasant consequences.
So far I have discussed cooperative and non-cooperative solutions within
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OPEC, assuming the threat to OPEC can be carried out by any OPEC member
against other members. I also showed how a single producing country firmly
successfully threatened a group of disunified oil companies. Yet, OPEC
stability might be equally threatened by non-OPEC producers, who
significantly increased their share of crude production in the last decade
at the expense of OPEC'S production. This situation resulted from low
demand for oil due to the recession and conservation policies, and the
choice of OPEC to be a residual supplier in the oil market. In the next
section, I will discuss the possible ways in which OPEC stability could be
threatened by non-OPEC producers.
3.3 World oil market stability:
It has been argued above that OPEC members are just players in a
continuous game. The outcome of the game and hence the stability of their
organisation, is very much dependent on the behaviour of its thirteen
members. However, the interests of an individual OPEC member, and possibly
the cohesion of OPEC as a whole, may well be threatened or enhanced by some
or all non-OPEC producers' behaviour. For example, the recent developments
in the oil market showed that the oil supply has actually overshot the
demand. This meant that some or all world producers had to shoulder the
burden of the market by reducing their own production, or face a general
reduction in oil prices, or even both, as has been the case since 1983,
where the reduction 4n oil prices was accompanied by OPEC's output
reduction.
Thus the link between the community of oil producers (OPEC and non-OPEC)
is very strong and cannot be ignored, because market forces do not
distinguish between an OPEC member and a non-OPEC member. The 1970s oil
prices increases, as will be shown in Chapter 4, is still fresh in their
minds. Such increases benefited all world oil producers and not only OPEC
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members who actually brought them about. It is true that there can be no
OPEC study in isolation from the world oil market, nor a world market
assessment without OPEC. The tighteness of oil producers everywhere,
necessitates treating them as a group of individual players in a ing1e
continuous game. The outcome of the game depends on individual producers'
behaviour.
In the past, most of the oil producers have pursued non-cooperative
behaviour, considering only their individual interests regardless of the
over-all interest of the producers' community. The evidence of this
behaviour will be seen below, and offers an explanation of the recent world
oil crisis. Yet, the game continues; perhaps at some stage the producers
will learn from past experience and agree to a new, more cooperative era.
Cooperation and Non-cooperation behaviour:
It is well known that the famous major seven oil companies controlled the
oil market for a long time before and after the creation of OPEC. The
power of these companies was destroyed by the growth of their fellow
Independent companies in the late 1950s and 1960s, as will be argued later
when I discuss the case of Libya in Chapters 5 and 7. I will show how the
growth of Independent oil companies and their importance in Libyan oil
production has actually eliminated the ability of the Majors to decide for
oil producers. The diverse interests between Major and Independent
companies among other reasons gave the Libyan Government, in the early
1970s, a clear chance to overcome the companies' bargaining power.
However, it is not surprising if we say that history repeats itself. If
we imagine that OPEC is the Major oil companies of the 1950s-1960s and,
non-OPEC producers are the Independent oil companies of that time, it
becomes easy to understand the present crisis. Since the decline in the
world demand for oil in 1980, the self-interests of different world oil
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producers have shown themselves, either on the market stability side or
otherwise. The producers who were on the stability side (cooperative
producers) reduced their production, while the others increased their
production despite a decline in world demand for oil. We will see later in
this section how this analysis can be explained in terms of game theory.
Here we observe , in Table 3.2 below, the major cooperative and
non-cooperative producers during (1980-82) period. Up to the end of the
period the cooperative producers happened to be OPEC producers. The Table
also shows that some of the major oil producers such as the U.S.A., China,
Venezuela and Canada, have actually cooperated with the first group, but
their contributions were relatively small.
Although the non-cooperation is clear from the Table below, the outcome
of the game in this particular period (1980-82), was on the cooperative
side.	 World oil producers managed to reduce their production by over 7
mb/d which was enough to cover the reduction in world demand. But
non-cooperative producers, if they continued in their non-cooperative
behaviour, would not hurt the cooperative members only but would hurt
themselves as well. The missing cooperation between world oil producers is
undoubtedly harmful to all of them, especially the new high-cost, low
reserves producers.
The oil market problems started with the notion of OPEC being a residual
supplier, adjusting w.th supply-demand imbalances. This concept and the
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, which increased oil prices substantially, have
encouraged non-OPEC producers not only to search for more oil but to
produce as much as they could from the new oil fields, relying on OPEC to
keep the prices from falling. Unfortunately there is no easy way for the
supply to exceed demand without reductions in prices. OPEC has proved to
be unable to play the role of a residual supplier any longer, or at least
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Table 3.2
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative World Oil Producers (mb/d)
During 1980-1982
Producer	 Increase in production Decrease in production
(1)Cooperative producers:
Saudi Arabia	 ...3•455
Iraq	 -1.698
Kuwait	 -0.836
Nigeria	 -0.770
Libya	 -0.699
U.A.E.	 -0.491
(2)Other coop.producers:
Algeria	 -0.331
Venezuela	 -0.279
Indonesia	 -0.240
Canada	 -0.180
Qatar	 -0.145
China	 -0.076
U.S.A.	 -0.059
(3)Non-coop. producres:
Mexico	 +0.868
Iran	 0.510
U.K	 +0.469
USSR	 +0.201
Total	 +2.048	 -9.259
Balance	 -7.211
Source: Calculated from Petroleum Economi8t, [Sept.1983], p.368.
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not sufficiently. Oil producers have found themselves unwillingly reducing
the oil prices and they may continue to do so, assuming the demand stays
low, unless they adjust their production to the demand level.
Since its creation up till now, OPEC has been increasing or decreasing
its crude oil production to balance the world supply-demand situation, thus
playing the role of the world's residual oil supplier. Some writers went
as far as to say "if there have been no OPEC, there would have been greater
fLuctUatiOflB in oil prwee, with adveree coneequencee on the world economy"
[Samii 1984 p.9]. This role of OPEC is shown in Table 3.3 below through
the relationships between world demand, OPEC supply and non-OPEC supply.
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Table 3.3
World Demand for Oil and OPEC and Non-OPEC Supplies
1973-83 (mb/d)
	
Year	 World demand*	 OPEC supply	 Non-OPEC supply
	
1973	 41	 31	 17
	
1974	 46.5	 30	 16.5
	
1975	 43	 28	 15
	
1976	 44	 30	 14
	
1977	 50	 33	 17
	
1978	 48.5	 29.5	 19
	
1979	 51	 30.5	 20.5
	
1980	 46	 27.5	 21.5
	
1981	 46	 23.5	 22.5
	
1982	 41	 18	 23
	
1983	 39	 14**
- 1 .LflC.LUUJ.fl9 bL.ULJ.
(**) Estimates.
Source: OPEC Bull..etin, March 1984, p.18.
During the 1970s, whilst producing oil close to its maximum sustainable
capacity, OPEC was constantly under pressure to raise both output and
production capacity in view of expected increases in oil demand, both in
the industrial and in the developing countries. The increase in world
demand from 41 mb/d in 1973 to 50 mb/d in 1977 was actually met by OPEC's
increased production, while non-OPEC supply was at the same level as in
1973 (17 mb/d). This positive role of OPEC as a residual supplier is
illustrated in Figure (3.7-a) below. If OPEC had • not balanced the
supply-demand equation in 1977, the oil price would have been higher as
indicated in Figure (3.7-b). The price would have increased from P0 to P1.
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Most forecasts indicated that there would be a need by the mid-1980s for
an OPEC production level far above its actual sustainable capacity. Some
studies have projected Saudi production alone to increase to extremely high
levels, to 16.6 mb/d [Franssen 1978 p.5O] according to "World Oi", or even
23 mb/d according to "U.S.CIA" [April 1977 p.18]. These studies assume
that because Saudi Arabia has traditionally played, as an OPEC member, the
role of a residual supplier, and since the other members will not be able
or willing to increase oil production significantly, Saudi Arabia will
continue to do so. They also based these assumptions on expressed Saudi
concern regarding the well-being of the Western economic and political
system [Murshid 1980].
Table 3.4 shows that the difference between the lowest and the highest
levels of Saudi daily oil exports varies significantly from month to month.
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Table 3.4
Saudi Arabian Oil Exports in 1978
Month	 Aramco	 AOC	 Getty	 Total
Jan.	 6.847	 0.074	 0.040	 6.962
Feb.	 7.470	 0.089	 0.051	 7.610
Mar.	 6.653	 0.118	 0.041	 6.812
Apr.	 7.470	 0.143	 0.019	 7.632
May.	 6.625	 0.061	 0.037	 6.723
June	 6.777	 0.110	 0.048	 6.935
July	 6.594	 0.106	 0.047	 6.747
Aug.	 6.795	 0.146	 0.015	 6.956
Sept.	 7.359	 0.165	 0.049	 7.573
Oct.	 8.605	 0.219	 0.059	 8.883
Nov.	 9.378	 0.222	 0.046	 9.646
Dec.	 9.736	 0.236	 0.059	 10.031
1978	 7.524	 0.141	 0.042	 7.707
1977	 8.512	 0.079	 0.061	 8.657
% change	 -11.7	 79.9	 -30.4	
-11.0
Source: Middle East Economic Survey, January 22, 1979.
For example, in May 1978, average daily exports were just over 6.723
nth/d, while in Deceirther of the same year, average daily exports reached
10.031 mb/d to reduce the effect of an oil shortage. The difference
between the highest and the lowest export levels was 3.3 mb/d, a level
which approximates the production level of the second largest OPEC
producer. The oil glut which plagued OPEC countries during late 1977 and
early 1978 and which was estimated to have reached a peak of 2.5 tnb/d [OPEC
Bulletin May 15, 19781 was quickly and significantly reduced to 1.0 mb/d
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and was later eliminated mainly as a result of the Saudi production
cutback, though a few months later an oil shortage developed as a result of
significant reductions in Iranian oil exports due to the political events
in the country at that time.
The Saudi position is influenced by political rather than economic
reasons. Some have suggested that Saudi Arabia took its position against
major oil price increases because it possesses large oil reserves and it
fears that oil price increases will lead to the rapid development of
alternative energy sources. Thus in the long-run, Saudi Arabia will not be
able to maximize the revenues it receives for its oil.
In my view the Saudi position is influenced by the following factors.
Saudi Arabia wishes not to disrupt or destabilise the Western economic and
political system, because the consequences would also affect Saudi Arabia.
If the price of oil increases to significantly higher levels, some of the
other OPEC members might be encouraged to reduce their oil production as
their revenue requirements would be satisfied by lower production levels,
thus creating a shortage of oil supplies which would, in turn, put pressure
on Saudi Arabia to increase its already higher than preferred production.
Another factor is that the Saudis have a great interest in maintaining the
unity of OPEC. This desire makes it necessary for Saudi Arabia to yield,
every now and then, to the mounting pressure from other OPEC members to
increase the price of oil. The Saudi position is also influenced by the
hope that a policy of moderation will encourage the West, especially the
United States, to work towards a permanent solution of the Arab-Israeli
dispute.
Saudi Arabia acquired its tremendous power and has been able to play a
major role in OPEC and exert influence over the world market because of the
huge oil reserves it possesses, because of its large production and excess
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production capacity, and because of its large surplus revenues. Its large
oil reserves have enabled the country to produce large volumes of oil and
rank as the world's second largest oil producer after the Soviet Union.
The size of its oil reserves also made it possible for Saudi Arabia to have
a large excess production capacity which it can use during seasonal or
temporary shortages in oil supplies. Finally, because of its large surplus
oil revenues, Saudi Arabia can afford to reduce its oil production
drastically without suffering any economic hardship.
Since 1980, however, the situation has been reversed. In the last few
years there has been a substantial decline in world demand for oil. The
fall in the demand for oil has been brought about by a number of well-known
f actors such as;
(1) Recession in the United States and other industrial countries.
(2) Energy saving.
(3) Interfuel substitution.
(4) Stock drawdown (this can be derived from Table 3.3 above).
(5) The increase in non-OPEC supply.
These points and, in particular, the latter point which is in the hands
of oil producers, have had a significant effect on oil prices. The
non-OPEC supply increased from 20.5 nth/d (40.2% of world demand) in 1979 to
26 mb/d in 1983, (66.7% of total demand), while OPEC supply decreased from
30.5 mb/d (59.8%), in'1979 to about 14 mb/d (35.9%) only in 1983. This is
shown in Figure 3.8 below.
The decrease in world demand was, in fact, shouldered by OPEC members and
not by the rest of world's producers. OPEC supply reduced by 23.8% during
the period (1979-1983) showing no doubt the intention of its members to
cooperate in order to satisfy the producers' interests. On the other hand,
a number of the non-OPEC producers have not only departed from cooperation
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with OPEC but insisted on non-cooperation behaviour by increasing their own
production despite the decline in the world demand. This opposes their
individual self-interests, as well as the interests of the world producing
community. R. Mabro [19851 in a recent article about BNOC, rightly says
"The UK is not being asked to help OPEC but to look after its own
self-interest &zich may, at time8, coincide with that of other oil
exporting countries".
Figure 3.9 below illustrates an approximate mechanism of oil supply and
demand. It shows both supply and demand curves have shifted to the left
indicating the decline in supply and demand. For non-cooperation reasons,
just mentioned above, the demand shifted more than the supply did, causing
a glut in oil market and consequently, in 1983-4, prices were forced to
decline as shown in Figure 3.9 by the move from high price P 0
 to low price
P1.
The Figure illustrates a non-cooperative case resulting from
non-cooperative behaviour. The world oil producers (OPEC and Non-OPEC)
have no doubt been faced with reductions in their payoffs (or revenues).
It is clear from Figure 3.9 that OP 0Nq > OP1Mq1.
In terms of game theory we may assume that world oil producers according
to their individual choices are divided into two groups, even though the
aim or the payoff for any producer is to maximize the total oil revenues.
They only differ on hd'w to achieve such a goal. These two groups are:
(A) World oil producers who are actually willing to increase their
revenues, but not at reduced oil prices. I call this group "Cooperative
producers". They are mostly OPEC producers.
(B) World oil producers who are also willing to increase their revenues
by any means. They clearly do not care much, in the short-run at least,
whether the price of oil is rising or falling. 	 I call this group
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"Non.-cooperative producer8".
Since oil prices are determined by the market forces of supply and demand
rather than by an individual producer, all an individual producer can do is
to fix his own production level according to his prefered strategy. The
strategies open to both parties are as follows:
(1) Reduce oil production.
(2) Increase oil production.
If both parties (A , B) choose their first strategy (1) by reducing their
production, this would mean that the total world supply of oil, which is
equal to both parties production, would decline. Such a decline in the
supply, at a constant demand level, may well lead to a rise in oil prices.
This eventually leads to an increase in oil revenues and the value of oil
reserves. I call this strategy tcooperatjve Btrategy", (A1,B1) or (10,10)
in the matrix below.
The rise of OPEC and its role as a residual supplier (discussed above),
have to some extent given a reason to some other non-OPEC producers to rely
on the organisation to make the necessary adjustments for the total world
supply and demand. For this reason, and for national reasons such as the
security of domestic needs from energy, they may decide on strategy (2) by
increasing their production. By doing this they hope that the cooperative
producers, especially OPEC and Saudi Arabia in particular, would
accommodate such an ction by reducing their own production (strategy 1).
Thus, strategy (A1,B1) or (10,10) is freely eliminated.
The second party u cooperative prOducer8", especially Saudi Arabia, from
their point of view as the largest oil reserves holders would not actually
employ their strategy (2), for that would result in a reduction in oil
revenues as well as the value of their reserves due to the reduction in oil
prices. They also might fear to lose the prestige of being the leaders of
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the oil market if they do. This peculiarity concerns OPEC producers more
than other cooperative producers. The increase in production might result
in a reduction in prices and destruction of the Cartel. Thus, strategy
(A2,B2) or (5,5) in the matrix above also cannot be employed. The only
strategy open to both parties, and that is actually the state of the oil
market at the present time, is strategy (A1,B2) or (5,7) above. This
strategy clearly favours the non-cooperative producers for they obtain 7
units of utility, while the cooperative producers obtain 5 units only.
The above assessment very much represents the position of the oil market
at the time of writing (1985) and will hold in the near future unless the
demand for oil falls substantially, so as to force the cooperative
producers to choose their strategy two (increase in production) in order to
meet their domestic financial requirements. In this case the world
producers would end up with a non-cooperative solution (A2,B2) or (5,5).
The economic and political chaos is likely to be high in all oil producing
countries, especially high-cost oil producers. The other possibility is
that the price of oil gets so low as to make the non-cooperative producers
realise that they are losing in terms of the value of their resource more
than they actually gain in terms of the volume of production in comparison
to other producers. This could happen before or after the collapse of
OPEC, depending upon how long the non-cooperative producers are prepared to
wait and how much thd cooperative producers could resist such a decline in
prices. Thus, the non-cooperative producers may choose their strategy one
(reduce oil production), and in this case the world oil producers would end
up with a cooperative solution (A1,B1) or (10,10) above.
However, to be optimistic, producers may at any stage realise that the
past has already gone and what is lost because of non-cooperation can only
be compensated by a new look to world production relationships.
	 The
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cooperation between world oil producers is the clear and the only way out
of the producers' dilemma, with or without OPEC.
In this chapter I have reviewed the early attempts at modelling OPEC
behaviour. I showed that the Hnyilicza and Pindyck model has offered a
useful insight into the use of the cooperative side of game theory in the
assessment of OPEC behaviour. My attempt to analyse OPEC behaviour showed
that the members effectively behave as real persons, according to their own
self-interests. But on the other hand I suggested that a number of these
producers actually do care about the collective interests of the group.
This is evident from the use of tacit accommodation. However, the selfish
members of OPEC are not the only force against the interests of the
organisation, but a number of the non-OPEC producers are also exerting some
pressure. Oil market stability, and therefore OPEC stability is no doubt
subject not only to a single or a small number of producers' actions, but
also to a wide range of individual oil producers' preferences. But for
sure the more the cooperation there is between these individual producers,
the better for the majority of individuals and for the producing community
as a whole.
In the next chapter I will show how some of the world producers, OPEC
producers, managed to cooperate in order to satisfy their interests and the
interests of their fellow oil producers.
- 102 -
CHAPTER 4: OPEC RUC'PURE AND FORMULATION
In the previous Chapter I analysed the present dilemma of OPEC members.
It has been argued that the only way OPEC could solve or at least reduce
the scale of its dilemma is through cooperative behaviour where each member
tries to fulfil the Organisation t s interests hoping to increase his own
payoff. This process implies that the more the individual members
cooperate, the more likely is OPEC to be stable • The best position the
members can obtain is with complete cooperation.
In this Chapter I analyse the way in which OPEC became the dominant power
in the world oil market. I will show how the scattered third world oil
exporting countries over the years managed to form and sustain the most
successful cartel of the present time.
In my view the rise of OPEC is the result of its struggle to get a fair
share of profits from the oil business. The oil exporting countries, long
ago before the formation of OPEC in 1960, were driven to follow a number of
strategies to achieve such success. These can be summarized as follows:
(1) The improvement of royalties and taxes on income, leaving the
extraction and marketing of crude oil in the hands of the international
companies.
(2) The formation of national oil companies for extracting and marketing
oil.
In the early years of oil production in the Middle East, the producing
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait would not know
whether the 4 Shillings a ton given to them by oil companies was the
appropriate economic rent. However, currency fluctuations and continuous
inflation reduced the governments revenues. This, in fact, marked the
beginning of dialogue between the governments and the companies.
	 The
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former requested the latter to increase the payments to the governments
concerned. Next, the host countries had to impose taxes on profits from
oil, but this required knowledge of company accounts. Having solved these
problems, the other steps such as profit sharing, participation and
nationalisation followed from the fact that every sovereign nation in the
world has the right to establish control and management of its resources.
This chapter assesses the efforts of oil exporting countries, and the
circumstances in which they had to work, in order to obtain a share of oil
profits at first, and later the domination of crude oil production. Such
events led to a firm control of upstream operations, exploration,
production, marketing and pricing, which in turn provided the natural base
for downstream operations, such as refining, gas treatment and
petrochemical industries.
4.1 Fixed royalty and taxes on profits:
Prior to the Second World War, royalty payments to Iraqi and Iranian
governments were settled on an annual royalty of 4 Shillings (gold) per ton
on oil sold locally or exported regardless of the oil prices. In the late
1930s, the royalty was equivalent to about 20-22 cents per barrel, where
the price was just over one dollar. Strictly speaking this is a fixed
royalty which has no relation to oil prices.
The problem of exporting countries is that the increase in oil prices
would reduce the royalty ratio (royalty per ton/price per ton) and a
e
general inflation reduces the real value of royalty per ton. This means a
reduction in the economic rent to oil producing countries and an increase
in the profits to oil companies. The producing countries efforts to solve
this problem will be discussed later.
Meanwhile, the terms of the payment in the concession agreements granted
by the three States, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar in 1913, 1914 and 1916
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respectively, did not differ substantially from those of Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, except in one respect; royalty payments were fixed in terms of
rupees, not gold shillings. In Bahrain, the 1925 agreements provided for a
royalty payment of 3.5 rupees per ton of crude oil (Article 8). The course
of events was similar in Kuwait. In the 1934 agreement, royalty payment
was fixed at 3 rupees per ton of crude oil plus a quarter of a rupee in
lieu of taxes; this was equivalent to 16 cents a barrel. Similarly, in
Qatar the agreement of 1935 with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stipulated a
royalty payment of 3 rupees per ton of crude oil.
These agreements, which were granted in local currencies instead of gold
Shillings, proved to be insignificant for these States. For example, in
Bahrain the devaluation of the rupee reduced Bahrain's royalty from 17
cents per barrel in 1930 to 12 cents in 1931. The royalty recovered to
reach 18 cents per barrel after the devaluation of the dollar in 1934, but
once more dropped to 10 cents per barrel after the second devaluation of
the rupee in 1949. Similar fluctuations were experienced by Kuwait and
Qatar as shown in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1
Fixed nominal royalty(equivalent in $)in Bahrain,Kuwait and Qatar
(1934 , 1949)
Country-Year	 1934	 1949
Bahrain (3m5 rupees)	 0.18	 0.10
Kuwait (3.25 rupees) 	 0.16	 0.09
Qatar	 (3 rupees)	 0.14	 0.08
Source: Issawi and Yeganeh [1962], p.131.
During and immediately after the Second War, new factors arose that led
the sovereign crude exporting countries in the Middle East to express
dissatisfaction with existing agreements and to press for higher payments.
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First, there was the sharp inflation experienced by the Middle East
during the War. In Iraq and Iran the cost of living index rose from 100 in
1939 to 558 in Iraq in 1948 and 639 in Iran, after the devaluation of the
Rial by 50% in 1941. This rise in prices, beside the increase in prices of
imported goods, greatly reduced the real value of payments to the
governments. The situation had been worsened by the increase in imported
goods prices.
Second, there was the rise in the price of petroleum, which had more than
doubled between 1939 and 1948. Since payments to the governments continued
to be made on a fixed royalty basis, this reduced the share of the
governments in the value of the oil produced. Thus, in a memorandum
presented by the Iranian government to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
August, 1948, the following statement was made: "Royalty basis: the Figure
of four shillings a ton represented one-eighth of the price of Persian
crude oil, whereas now, on the basis of gold, it is according to the
company's accounts less than one-sixteenth. Thus the total of the Persian
government' s royalties in relation to the total price of oil extracted
represented 33 % in 1933 and only 9 % in 1947" [Elwell-Sutton 1955 p.168].
Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the exporting countries were
unsatisfied with the existing agreements.
Now, as I mentioned above, the aim of oil exporting countries was to
obtain the economic rent available through the exploitation of crude oil.
a
The maximization of such rent required a knowledge of:
(a) The demand conditions for crude oil.
.(b) The profits of the oil companies.
Since the exporting countries did not actually produce, sell or price
oil, their knowledge about the whole petroleum business was limited. In
contrast the producing oil companies, which actually ran the industry, had
- 106 -
not only knowledge of their own affairs but knowledge of the oil market.
For oil exporting countries to confront the oil companies, they had to
solve the problem of the lack of information in comparison with the wide
knowledge of the oil companies. This position might be expressed as an
asymmetric information problem.
According to the "rational eapectation BChOOi", adaptive expectations do
not use all of the information available on the functioning of an economy
and are therefore not rational [Cukierman 1984 p.1]. Recognition of this
has forced modern macroeconomic model builders to specify more carefully
who knows what, and when, and to formulate mechanisms for forming
expectations that are consistent with this information structure.
For the purpose of this Chapter it is important to stress who knows what
and when. The pre-OPEC oil market used to be the private property of the
international oil companies; they knew what quantities of crude they
produced, where to market them, and what price and profit levels they
obtained, and above all when to do that. In a sense, they were like states
within states. The oil exporting countries had been no more than generous
hosts. The actual and expected production, prices and profits had to be
formulated in their absence, or more sympathetically, without their
knowledge. At this stage there had been no game the host countries could
have possibly played with oil companies. Because of the lack of
information available to them about their own oil, they could not measure
the extent of their rights. In terms of game theory, the negotiation set
was not clear to them, neither was the threat point. In fact asymmetric
information made the whole oil business look like as if it was in an
equilibrium situation. Later in this chapter I will show how the exporting
countries managed to change this situation by moving into profit-sharing
agreements, and later on to participation in the ownership of the oil
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companies themselves, and in many cases complete nationalisation.
However, what the exporting countries lacked at the beginning was
information about the whole business, especially information related to the
calculations of prices and profits. The events that followed in Venezuela
and the Middle East had served as signals to the exporting countries of the
unfair country-company relationships. The countries soon realized that
they had to move away from the so called "fixed royaity", discussed above,
to a new Iranian-Venezuelan formula of profit sharing. The following
events had led to more radical changes concerning the exporting countries'
share of profits accruing from crude production.
First, there was the introduction in Venezuela of the Law of Hydrocarbons
of 1943 and of the Additional Tax of 1948, which resulted in the increase
of, the government's share to at least 50 % of the net income of the oil
companies. This introduced a new and, to producing countries, far more
attractive pattern to the oil industry.
Second, there was the tentative agreement in April 1946 between the
Soviet Union and the Iranian government for a Soviet-Iranian oil company in
the Northern provinces of Iran. This was part of the Iranian-Soviet
negotiations that resulted in the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran
[Kirk 1954]. Under this project, Iran would supply the oil resources and
receive 49 % of the shares, and the Soviet Union would supply the capital
and technical skills, receiving 51 % of the shares. After 25 years the
shares would be changed to 50-50 for another 25 years; profits would be
divided proportionately to shares. Although the agreement was vague
regarding marketing and pricing, it had a certain attraction, especially
when compared to other existing concessions. Nevertheless, in 1947 the
Iranian Majlis (Parliament) rejected the Soviet offer on political grounds.
However, oil companies offered Iran the Supplemental Agreement on 17 July
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1949, which raised the royalty rate from 4s. to 6s.(gold) and provided for
immediate payment of Iran's share in profits. This agreement was signed by
the Iranian government although it had been pressing for a 50-50 profit
sharing agreement but, after long debate, the Majlis refused to ratify it.
A further offer, made by the company in February 1951, and embodying an
arrangement for ecjual sharing of profits, came too late to prevent the
passing of a law in March that nationalized the oil industry, and the
crisis that followed.
The third factor that encouraged the governments to ask for better terms
was the concession agreements for the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone concluded
in 1948 and 1949. The agreements contained new favourable terms for
producers, as shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2
Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone Oil Agreements: 1948-49
Date	 Bonus($m) Royalty(c per barrel) Carried out interest(%)
	
6 June 1948	 7.5	 34	 15
	
20 Feb. 1949	 9.5	 55	 25
The arrangement between Kuwait and the american Independent Oil Company
of 6 June 1948 (Article 3), provided for a bonus of $7.5 million in cash, a
royalty of $2.50 a ton or about 34 cents per barrel, and a 15 % carrjed
interest" or share of the net profits. The agreement of 20 February 1949,
between Saudi Arabia an the Pacific Western Oil Corporation (Articles 5-7)
provided, even better terms; a bonus of $9.5 million, a royalty of 55 cents
per barrel, and a 25 % "carried interest".
The pattern for this period was set by the agreement between Saudi Arabia
and the Aramco of 30 December 1950, which followed the promulgation of
income tax decrees on 4 November 1950, and 27 December 1950, providing,
among other things, for the taxation of business profits. The agreement
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accepted the principle of equal sharing of profits by stipulating, in
Article 1: "In no case shall the total of 8uch taxes and all other taxes,
royaltte8, rentals and exactions of the government for any year exceed
fifty per cent (50%) of the gross income of Aramco, after such gross income
has been reduced by Aramco's cost of operation, including losses and
depreciation, and by income taxes, if any, payable to any foreign country
but not reduced by any taxes, royalties, rentals or other exactions of the
government for such year".
An important modification was introduced the following year, On 2 October
1951, when it was stipulated that the Saudi Arabian government's 50 % share
was to be calculated before the deduction of foreign (i.e. United States)
income taxes. Similar profit-sharing agreements, arising from the sale of
crude oil to foreign companies, were adopted as shown in Table 4.3 below.
In Kuwait on 3 December 1951, in Iraq on 3 February 1952, in Qatar on 1
September 1952, in Bahrein in September 1952, and in Iran, after the
settlement of the nationalisation dispute, on 19 September 1954.
Table 4.3
Middle East Profit-sharing Agreements: 1950-54
Country	 Date of agreement
S. Arabia	 30 Dec. 1950
Kuwait	 3 Dec. 1951
Iraq'	 3 Feb. 1952
Qatar	 1 Sep. 1952
Bahrein	 15 Sep. 1952
Iran	 19 Sep. 1954
Source: Issawi and Yeganeh [1962], p.134.
As a result of these developments, the per barrel take of the oil
exporting governments increased from as low as 8 cents in Kuwait and Qatar
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in 1950 to reach 50% of total profits in all countries by 1956, as shown in
Table 4.4. The progress of the exporting countries at this stage can be
seen clearly from the last column of the Table, where the government take
increased from about 4.5% of the price, in Qatar, in 1950 to as high as
46.88%, in Kuwait, in the period 1957-59.
The main issues raised by sharing of profits from the extraction and sale
of crude oil are:
(a) The price of crude oil.
(b) Deductions from revenues to arrive at the profit figure.
In order to determine the share of governments from oil income under the
equal profit-sharing agreements, it is necessary to deduct from the value
of crude oil exported or delivered to local refineries the cost of crude
oil production. Some of the agreements, like those with Saudi Arabia and
Iran, provide for deduction of actual cost of production, while some
others, like those with Iraq and Qatar, specify an agreed sum as the cost
of crude output, subject to adjustment in case the actual cost differs from
the agreed cost by a certain specified percentage. The governments were
given the right to check the accounts of the oil companies and verify
costs. As to the coverage of costs, they usually included, in addition to
the fixed and variable costs attributable to production of oil, certain
exploration and drilling outlays. The difference between the value of
crude oil and its cost of production, which is defined as income of oil
operations, is shared equally by oil companies and governments. Actually,
irrespective of the amount of such income, the governments receive
royalties, rentals, and other fixed taxes, but in determining their 50 %
share from income, such payments are taken into account and the balance is
paid in lieu of income tax [Penrose 1968 p.64].
Since its creation, in September 1960, OPEC took the view that royalties
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Table 4.4
Oil Prices and Payments to Producing Governments($/b)
(1946-59)
Country&period Payments to govers. Companies' income Crude price 1/3*
	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 ratio
1 .Bahrein
1946	 0.15	 0.93	 1.18	 12.71
1951	 0.28	 1.30	 1.68	 16.67
1957-59	 0.80	 0.80	 1.75	 45.71
2 • Iran
1956-58	 0.78	 0.78	 1.80	 43.33
3. Iraq(Tapline)
1949	 0.22	 1.43	 2.10	 10.48
1953	 0.75	 1.01	 2.00	 37.50
1955-56	 0.90	 0.90	 2.00	 45.00
4.Kuwait
1950-51	 0.08	 1.28	 1.47	 5.44
1957-59	 0.75	 0.75	 1.60	 46.88
5 .Qatar
1950	 0.08	 1.34	 1.77	 4.52
1957-59	 0.87	 0.87	 2.02	 43.07
6.Saudi Arabia
1946	 0.22	 0.77	 1.18	 18.64
1951	 0.56	 0.92	 1.68	 33.33
1956	 0.78	 0.78	 1.87	 41.71
(*) (Government take/Price) ratio.
Source: Issawi and Yeganeh (1962], p.117.
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should be considered payments to the owners of resources in return for
removing the oil and that royalties should be included as part of the cost
of production. Thus governments should receive royalties plus 50% of gross
income. This matter and others concerning OPEC's share in crude profits
will be discussed next.
4.2 OPEC and Profit sharing:
At the time OPEC was created, royalty payments to host governments were
in the form of royalty per barrel, usually 12.5 % of the posted price,
except in Venezuela where the rate of 16 2/3 % was used. When the
companies agreed on the 50-50 profit-sharing formula in the early 1950s
they calculated the royalties as part of the government's 50 per cent. For
example, at a posted price for crude of $1.80 per barrel with a 12.5 %
royalty (the equivalent of $0.225 per barrel) and allowed production cost
of $0.20 per barrel, the government "take" share would be (50-50 profit)
calculated as follows: Royalty is credited against income tax: the sum due
for one barrel is $1.80 minus $0.20= $1.60. Thus the government share is
$0.80. This formula made the government's actual share much less than
adding royalty to the production cost and then dividing profits equally
between government and company. In this case royalty is treated like other
costs of production: the sum due for one barrel is $1.80-$0.20-$0.225
(royalty)=$1.375	 government share is $0.6875
	
(based on 50-50
profit-sharing). Total government revenue will be $0.6875 (income tax)
plus $0.225 (royalty)=$0.9125 [Al-Sowayegh 1984 p.48]. The royalty, in
effect, became a payment to the companies rather than the countries. In
the words of Rouhani, OPEC's chief negotiator with oil companies "Fiither
the companies are paying income tax at the full rate prescribed by law, but
no royalties ., or they are effectively paying royalty but their income tax
payment amounted to about 41% of income, not 50%" [Mughrabey 1968 p.141).
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Against the foregoing background, Resolution 33, adopted at OPEC's Fourth
Conference in Geneva in 1962, demanded that each member country affected
should approach the company or companies concerned with a view to working
out a formula under which royalty should be fixed at a uniform rate that
members considered equitable, and should not be treated as a credit against
income tax liability. However, approaching the companies to discuss the
issue of royalties was not an easy task. The negotiations on this issue
lasted form 1962 to 1965, and have been characterized by OPEC as the
longest, toughest and most revealing negotiations in the history of the
international oil industry. Throughout the negotiations the oil companies
persistently rejected the principle of collective bargaining, which OPEC
countries adopted to deal with the companies. This principle, as will be
seen in Chapter 7, has been reversed. The oil companies in their message
to OPEC in January 1971 proposed a collective bargaining principle with
OPEC. Although two or more of the companies were joint owners of
concessions in each of the Middle Eastern exporting countries, and were
accustomed to using their collective power in negotiating with individual
countries, they were reluctant to recognize and accord a similar joint
interest to the countries with which they dealt.
Eventually the companies reluctantly agreed to bargain with OPEC. The
protracted negotiations ended in the companies agreeing to improve the
royalties of the oil-producing countries. In other words, royalties were
to be deducted before profits were calculated and divided, thus increasing
the actual government "take" per barrel of crude. However, the royalty
settlement permitted the companies to discount the posted prices by 8.5% in
1964, 7.5% in 1965, and 6.4% in 1966, in calculating their income tax
obligations [Rouhani 1971 p.228]. The posted price for deduction purposes
had to be set at a lower level than the original posted price by the amount
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equal to the rate of discount allowance. The settlement provided for
consultation in 1966 between the governments and the companies on possible
future reductions in the discount rate. In April 1966, at OPEC's Eleventh
Conference in Vienna, the member states adopted Resolution X171, advising
member countries to take steps towards the complete elimination of the
discount allowance granted to the oil companies.
In accordance with this recommendation, negotiations soon reopened
between the producing countries and the companies. However, as usual
negotiations proved difficult, and there was no solution in sight when the
Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1967. Following the outbreak of war, the
Arab countries decided to boycott oil shipments to certain countries; the
boycott, together with the closure of the Suez Canal, caused crude oil
prices to recover. The interruption of oil supplies and the firming of the
oil market improved OPEC'S bargaining position. At the OPEC Conference in
Rome in September 1967, the members decided that the five countries most
concerned with expanding royalties (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and
Qatar) should meet for consultation on the issue in early October. On 9
January 1968, after a two-day conference in Beirut, the five OPEC members
announced that they had accepted an offer by the companies on 6 January to
Iran and Saudi Arabia, binding all companies operating in OPEC member
countries. Under the agreement reached, the discounts were to be phased
out over a four-year peripd, declining from 5.5% in 1968, to 4.5% in 1969,
3.5% in 1970, 2% in 1971,and ceasing entirely in 1972.
So far I have been discussing the problem of profit sharing between crude
producing countries and oil companies. This issue was coupled with another
issue, the rise in oil prices after the Libyan revolution of 1969. The new
dimension had to be introduced in steps:
(1) The removal of the national posted prices.
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(2) Equalisation of posted price and market price.
(3) Taking account of quality of crudes and location of individual
countries in arriving at posted price.
(4) The move by OPEC governments to play an important part
in determining the posted price.
The first sign of the upheaval was the change by Libya of its posted
prices in September 1970, which in turn led to the development of the
Tehran and Tripoli agreements. This argument has been developed as a
bargaining problem between Libya and international oil companies as will be
seen in Chapter 7. Much of Libya's political significance today is rooted
in its emergence in the 1960s as a major crude oil producer. Libya was
seen by Western oil strategists as an alternative to the "unstabie"
political environment that characterized the rest of the Arab world in the
1950s and 1960s. Pushed by the dynamics of competition between the Major
and Independent oil companies and free from any political interference from
the Libyan monarchy, prices for Libyan crude remained solid as the market
for Libyan oil expanded. Nevertheless, encouraged by Libya's advantageous
position, King Idriss demanded a 10 cent increase in the posted price for
Libyan oil. When the companies hesitated, the King gave them an ultimatum,
either to raise their posted prices to levels assessed by the government or
to be ready to face unilateral action. The deadline to comply with the
ultimatum was 1 September 1969. On that day, a revolution brought young
army officers to power in Libya.
As the first anniversary of the revolution approached, the Libyan
officials, recognizing the strength of their position, concentrated their
negotiating pressure on Occidental and Esso. Libya's tactic in dividing
the oil companies and its role in transforming power from international oil
companies to OPEC will be discussed further in Chapter 7. However, on 30
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AuguSt 1970 Occidental gave way, reportedly under the threat of take-over.
Posted prices were raised on 1 September 1970 by 30 cents per barrel, with
a further rise to $2.55 per barrel on January 1971. Taxes were raised to
58% as opposed to the previous 50-50 sharing formula. Some of the tax
rates varied, but the basic rate for government profit in Libya was now
firmly established at 55%.
This was only a prelude to the world-wide wave of bargaining which began
when other OPEC members started to follow the Libyan lead. The major oil
companies were aware that the Libyan settlement would prompt a new wave of
demands by the other oil-producing countries. Between 9 and 12 December
1970 the Twenty-First OPEC Conference met in Caracas, Venezuela, and
adopted Resolution 120, which recommended the following principles:
(1) The establishment of a 55% minimum rate for taxation of company net
income, where net income is defined as gross income minus production cost
and royalty payments.
(2) A uniform posted price in all member countries equal to that of the
most favoured countries.
(3) A uniform increase in posted prices in order to reflect favorable
trends in world market prices.
(4) The adoption of a new system for the calculation of quality and
location differentials affecting market prices.
(5) The elimination of ll discounts offered on crude export prices on 1
January 1971.
To realize these ends, the conference decided on a negotiating strategy
designed around three regional groupings: the Arab Gulf countries, the
Mediterranean exporters, and Venezuela and Indonesia. The first round of
negotiations with the companies was set for 12 January 1971, in Tehran.
The Gulf negotiating team was to consist of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
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However, on 3 January, even before the Tehran negotiations started, local
Libyan representatives of the oil companies were called upon by Deputy
Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jalloud. Libya presented a new set of demands:
(1) A 5% rise in the tax rate in line with the Gulf countries, with
retroactive claims to be settled either by a cash payment (with a 10%
discount), or by five-year installments plus interest, or a tax rate above
55%.
(2) A post-1967 freight differential and a post-May 1970 freight
differential, to be 39 cents per barrel and 30 cents per barrel
respectively.
(3) Monthly rather than quarterly tax payments.
(4) Increased investment in oil and non-oil areas, amounting to at least
25 cents per barrel of exported oil.
If they did not comply with these demands, the companies would be forced
to shut down oil production and risk nationalisation. This unilateral move
by Libya was probably designed to put pressure on its partners in OPEC
before the Tehran negotiations commenced.
The companies, according to Chevalier [1975 p.50], were given government
authorization to act collectively, which was, in theory, contrary to
anti-trust legislation. This meant that the cartel was made off icial and
4
given the blessing of the American, British, French and Dutch governments.
The companies message to OPEC on 16 January 1971, proposing no retroactive
payments or new increases in the tax percentage level beyond current levels
and no new obligatory investment.
The Tehran agreement was signed on 14 February 1971. Member countries
decided upon the tax terms containing the following points:
(1) Total tax rates on income to be stabilised at 55%.
(2) Elimination of all previous discounts worth 3 or 4 cents per barrel.
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With the financial issues out of the way, OPEC members turned their
attention to the issue of government participation in the oil companies.
Participation, as we will see in the next section, was soon replaced by
complete nationalisation in many OPEC countries, which put an end to the
companies' control of production and opened a new era of oil exporting
countries' control of production.
In the discussion on the progress of OPEC, I distinguish between the
following:
---C 1-) -Determ±na-on of-.pices
	 du.tput quojas.
(2) The relationship between the organization and the oil companies.
So far OPEC have succeeded in dealing with the first point as we have
seen from the progress they made concerning tax and related matters. The
argument concerning oil prices will be discussed in some detail in Chapter
7. Here I concentrate the discussion on the second point, which is equally
important for OPEC, because the companies not only produce the crude for
the countries but they sell, market and refine these crudes. In this area
OPEC had no previous experience. For OPEC to understand the market, it had
to participate in the ownership of the experienced oil companies, and
therefore practice the kind of work they do. Participation also
facilitates OPEC's enforcement of its decisions regarding the oil market
and the oil companies. The enforcement is complete when the companies are
nationalized, allowing OPEC decisions concerning oil prices or output to be
final.
4.3 Participation and nationalisation:
Participation was a relatively new concept for the OPEC governments to
advance.	 Historically, nationalisation has been seen as the only way to
break the hold of a foreign monopoly over a developing country.
	 Its
benefits are twofold, eliminating foreign domination and requiring a
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reorientation of the local economy. Although nationalisation had occured
within the oil industry both before and after the formation of OPEC, the
producing countries had, generally speaking, avoided nationalisation,
partly because of the failure of Mosad4iq's nationalisation of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AbC) in Iran in 1953. Early in 1948 the AIOC
had proposed discussions with the Iranian Government to seek ways of
remedying the evident prejudice to Iran of the British Government's policy
of limiting dividend payments, since the Company was obliged to pay the
Iranian Government a sum equal to 20% of its dividend payments over a
specified sum in addition to the royalty of 4 gold shillings per ton.
Although an agreement on new terms was reached in the negotiations it was
not ratified by the Iranian Parliament, and the relations between the
Company and the Government went from bad to worse, culminating in the
nationalisation of the Company in 1951. The dispute dragged on for two
more years, involving the International Court, the United Nations, and the
intervention of the U.S., with the issue of compensation becoming central.
Finally, in 1953 came the fall of the Government of Mosaddiq, and
negotiations were opened under a new Iranian Government. These ended in
the creation of an International Consortium to operate the oil
installations of southern Iran but did not, in principle reverse the
nationalisation [Penrose 1968 p.66]. Even though the first attempt at oil
nationalisation failed, fof some OPEC nationalists the whole concept of oil
concessions, granted to the oil companies in earlier times under
disadvantageous conditions, was increasingly unacceptable. They argued
that the only way to get rid of these unfair concession agreements was by
nationalisation.
However, most OPEC members, ever mindful of the disastrous Mosaddiq
episode, favoured the more cautious method of participation. 	 This
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conservative tendency provoked the emergence of the "anti-OPEC" group of
oil experts and economists, whose political program for the OPEC oil
producers was based on the desirability of nationalising the foreign
companies.	 Even in Iran itself, oil after Mosaddiq was not
de-nationalised. But a comparison with the Mosaddiq crisis shows how
thoroughly the bargaining situation had been reversed. In the early 1950s,
British Petroleum had increased its production in Iraq, Kuwait, and
elsewhere to make up for the shutdown in Iran, and the Iranian government,
without financial reserves, was soon on the verge of bankruptcy. In the
early 1970s, OPEC repeatedly made it clear that, in case of deadlock, a
company would not be allowed to increase production elsewhere and might
even find itself embargoed throughout OPEC. This time, whereas the
companies and the oil-consuming countries disposed of stored reserves of
petroleum ranging from one to three months consumption, the major OPEC
governments, thanks to their earlier success, had financial reserves for a
year or more. This was particularly true in the case of the Libyan
confrontation with the oil companies, which will be dealt with when I come
to the discussion of the Libyan case in Chapters 6 and 7. 	 Indeed, the
production cutbacks in connection with the Arab embargo of 1973 showed that
the less oil OPEC produced, the more it would receive in payment [Rustow
1976 p.29].
Iraq was the first cdüntry to ask for participation, in 1961. The
refusal of the Iraqi Petroleum Company was one of the major factors leading
to Law 80 of December 1961, reclaiming all but 0.5 % of the concession
area. Saudi Arabia, a long-term moderate in oil policy, hoped for
participation, especially after the June 1 q67 Arab-Israeli war, and the
frustration and pressure for nationalisation of Western interests that the
defeat of the Arabs produced. However, there was no determined and
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immediately decisive follow-up. It was generally felt that the conditions
in the 1960s were not opportune for the confrontation with the companies
that would have been inevitable. The cry for nationalisation enjoyed much
more appeal among countries concerned about and involved in oil matters and
national control over resources. Elsewhere, the favourite mechanism for
control was equity participation, that is, partial ownership of the
ventures, rising rapidly to constitute majority control.
The debate between the advocates of nationalisation and those of
participation was heated most of the time from the 1960s to the early
1970s. But as hindsight now shows us, there was not much substance in the
controversy, as the orientations and positions of the governments in the
two camps translated into actual policies revealed in due course. Thus,
none of the governments that had opted in theory for nationalisation did in
practice nationalise all the companies operating on its soil in one blow.
Also, none of the governments that had opted for participation failed in
due course to acquire majority equity participation. During the 1970s the
differentiated picture falls within two distant limits; between 60% and
100% ownership and control of oil companies was held by OPEC countries.
In June 1968, OPEC issued a major document entitled "Eclaratory
St at enent of Petroleum Policy in Member countriest [OPEC Resolutions 24-25
June 1968].
	
The document stipulated, among other things, that tWhere
provision for Covernmei'!tal participation in the ownership of the
concea8iOn-holding company under any of the present petroleum contract8 ha8
not been ad, the government may acquire a reasonable participation ., on
the grounds of the principle of changing circumstances. If such provision
has actually been made but avoided by the operators concerned, the rate
provided for shall serve as a minimum basis for the participation to be
acquired". This was the most significant step taken by OPEC as a body in
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the 1960s towards control by its members of their oil resources, and the
activities and operations related to oil.
The companies were not slow to react, as their practice had been on
similar occasions when the governments had indicated the will and
determination to act unilaterally. But, whatever the effect of the
resistance, it was probably the governments' own slowness to go into
confrontation at the time that was the major reason participation only made
headway some three years later. It seems likely that the individual
preference of some governments for nationalisation was one reason why they
did not press for equity participation. Two price agreements reached after
considerable pressure, in Tehran and Tripoli in February and April 1971
respectively, had to intervene, before the governments turned to
participation as a priority. It seems most likely that they wanted to
dispose of the price question first. Having done so and worked out a
formula meant to last for five years, they felt they could tackle
participation.
In its conference in July 1971, OPEC resolved Member Countries
shall take invnediate steps toerzrds the effective implementation of the
principle of riirticipation in the existing oil concessions. To this end ., a
M1ni8ter1.al Committee shall be formed ... to draw up the bases for the
implementation of effective participation ... and to submit it8
recommendations to an extraordinary meeting ... on 22nd September 1971"
[OPEC Resolution XXIV.135, 22 September, 1971]. The sense of urgency was
expressed in the setting of the date for an extraordinary meeting. This
meeting was duly held and resolved:
(1) That all Member Countries concerned shall establish negotiations with
the oil companies, either individually or in groups, with a view to
achieving effective participation on the bases proposed by the said
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Ministerial Committee.
(2) That the results of the negotiations shall be submitted to the
Conference for coordination. In case such negotiations fail to achieve
their purpose, the Conference shall determine a procedure with a view to
enforcing and achieving the objectives of effective participation through
concerted action [OPEC Resolution XXV. 139]. The emphasised part of the
Resolution is significant; it introduces enforcement, it talks of effective
participation and it warns that concerted action would be taken if the
companies balked, rather than weaker individual action. The Gulf group of
OPEC members originally had in mind an initial 20 % participation, to rise
to 51%. Libya, on the other hand, wanted an immediate 51% participation in
the ownership of oil companies. In its desire for majority control, it was
guided by two factors; its own position involving great concern for as
quick a take-over of a determining position as possible, and Algeria's
nationalisation of 51% of the French companies operating in its territory
in February 1971.
The negotiations were so tough and unproductive that the Monarch of Saudi
Arabia had himself to issue a royal warning, that unilateral action would
be taken if the oil companies continued in their stand. This intervention
was occasioned by Aramco's attempting last-minute diversionary action that
in fact aimed at avoiding the question of participation in existing
ventures, and offered a large ratio in ventures yet to be undertaken.
Finally the companies gave in, and accepted participation with an initial
slice of 20%. But this was only in March 1972. By that time, OPEC members
were getting so impatient that they had almost come to the point of
legislating participation at the level of 51% and acquiring control in one
stroke.
While the negotiations for the terms of compensation were taking place,
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two significant measures were taken by Libya and Iraq. The first
nationalised British Petroleum assets, because of Britain's failure to act
to stop the occupation by Iran of three Arab islands in the lower part of
the Arabian Gulf, which had been under British protection shortly before.
The second nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) (except for the
share of the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles) on 1 June 1972, thus
"ieapfrogging" the participation arrangements. However, the Mosul
Petroleum Company (MPC) and Basarah Petroleum Company (BPC) were not
touched at the time.
A package deal was finally agreed in October 1972, for the Gulf
producers, involving gradual participation, and "buy-back" of government
crude entitlement under participation. The increments of participation
were to be as follows: 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, and 51% equity acquisition
on the first day of 1973, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1982 respectively. Iraq
did not adhere to the arrangements insofar as MPC and BPC were concerned,
preferring to go on with its nationalisation policy, while Libya saw that
the pace as too slow, as it aimed to obtain a minimum of 50% participation
immediately (as it had done under a recent agreement with ENI, the Italian
State Oil Company).
The Gulf agreement could have been seen as a force for stability, as it
seemed to satisfy the aspiration of the governments, though not ideally.
However, it turned out t be an incentive for more gains, sooner than
provided for. In March 1973, Iraq and the IPC group (that is, IPC itself
along with MPC and BPC) reached an overall settlement involving
compensation for the nationalised northern fields and expansion in
production and export capacity for Basarah fields. In Libya, between
January and September 1973, most of the independents and some of the majors
submitted to the governments' demand for 51% equity participation. 	 In
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Venezuela the ownership and management of the oil industry reverted to the
government in accordance with the promulgation of the 1974 Law of
Nationalising of Venezuela Oil Operations, that was put into effect the
following year. However, negotiations were conducted with the
ex-shareholders, mainly Exxon and Shell, which led to some arrangements by
which those companies continued to extract an important part of Venezuelan
oil, currently two thirds, under conditions which are similar to those
applicable in Kuwait [Al-Chalabi 1980 p.47].
By 1974, not only had the terms of the agreement with the Gulf members of
OPEC been bettered by Iraq and the Mediterranean oil countries, but the
Gulf countries also wanted larger participation. The Arab-Israeli war of
October 1973, with all the dramatic and historical events and changes it
brought with it in the fields of oil economics and power relationships, had
intervened, and with it a severe tightening in the oil market. The
circumstances had changed almost beyond recognition, and the power
structure pre-dominating before the war collapsed. Consequently, all the
members of OPEC wanted majority control, and the companies gave in.
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Ithu Dhabi raised the level of their
participation to 60%, then Kuwait reached 100% or full take-over in
December 1975. Qatar followed suit with the Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC)
and Shell in 1976-7. Saudi Arabia finished negotiations with Aramco for
100% take-over in 1977 ( iith retroactivity of terms to the first day of
1976). Iraq completed nationalisation by 1975. The picture is mixed in
Libya, with some companies retaining a 49% interest, but most others were
fully taken over. In Algeria all companies have been nationalised except
for the CFP which holds a 49% interest. For all nationalisations the
governments proposed net book value for compensation which, after long
debate was accepted by the companies.
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One of the most important consequences of the
participation-nationalisation transformation is that the entry of the state
into the planning and management of investment operations for the oil
sector by establishing national oil companies inevitably triggers other
structural changes in the national economy. These lead towards closer
integration of the oil sector into the national economy, through
intersectoral investment linkages, acquisition of technology, new
employment and investment opportunities, etc.. It also strengthens the
link between the oil sector, as a source of energy, or as an industrial
input for the chemical, petrochemical and fertilizer industries or
services, and the other sectors of the national economy. Decisions on
petroleum matters, including oil search and exploration, production
capacity, export facilities, as well as decisions on pricing and marketing,
etc. have, on their transfer to the state, become influenced by
considerations of state sovereignty and its political requirements,
especially those pertaining to economic growth and social development.
This is important in defining the structural features of the oil industry
at the production phase today, because the oil sector is central to the
national economy of the producing countries. In the final analysis it
determines the level of economic activity, the foreign exchange reserves of
the economy, the general level of investment and employment, etc..
The national oil companis (NOCs) must, of necessity, operate within the
framework of these strategies and their investment decisions will not be
subject to purely commercial considerations and profitability criteria, but
will be largely determined within the general framework of achieving
economic and political development. In other words, the national oil
companies, unlike the foreign companies, will not necessarily always act on
the same principles as a commercial entrepreneur, especially where
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financial costs are concerned, since these now tend to be regarded as part
of the general social cost of maximizing social welfare in the producing
country. I will provide an example of N005 activities through the study of
the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LiNoCo) in Chapter 7.
Another important consequence of strutural change is that investment
decisions at the upstream phase of the oil industry are no longer linked
with decisions and investments pertaining to the subsequent oil operations
in the consuming countries (the downstream). This represents a change from
the practice of the companies, which previously invested in crude on the
basis of their forecasts for subsequent refining and distribution
activities.
However, members of OPEC have never concealed their readiness to learn
from the former controlling power in the oil industry (the majors), and,
not surprisingly, the countries are finding that the path taken long ago by
the companies in adopting an integrated approach to the industry is also a
logical path to follow. Some NOCs are venturing into refining and
products' marketing alongside their crude oil export operations. Several
NOCs have their own tanker fleets, and since they are now directly involved
in the production of crude oil, there is a growing awareness on their part
of the need to put an end to the utter waste involved in the flaring of
associated gas. This has led to rapid growth of investment in efforts to
achieve the complete utilization of associated gas in reinjection, in
export, in processing and petrochemicals and, significantly, through
intensified domestic consumption as a substitute for other fuels which
might be more remunerative as exports. Surely it is only to be expected
that the mere existence of national oil companies will, in itself, lead to
ventures in downstream operations and related activities, following the
example already set by the multinationals. This involvement is intensified
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by the fact that OPEC NOCs naturally feel that it is their duty to assist
their countriest development efforts.
Thus, oil exporting countries have succeeded after a long struggle in
overcoming the problems which prevented them from having a free-hand in
managing their resources. Even though it took them a complete decade
(1960s) to move from profit-sharing issue to other important issues, their
progress during the 1970s was impressive.
In the next chapter and through the rest of this thesis I will consider
Libyan oil development as a case study, not only, to present an OPEC
member's experience in upstream and downstream operations, but also, and
probably more important, to assess Libyan achievements in regard to the
control of its oil resources and its role in the upheaval movement which,
once started, gained fruit and strength for all OPEC members.
e
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Part II
CHAPTER 5: THE PRE-OU LIBYAN ECONOMY AND THE DISCOVERY OF OIL
Libya, as any other developing country, has been facing severe economic
problems. Geographical, historical and economic factors have made Libya a
country of hardship and very low income. A United Nations census taken in
1954 showed that three-quarters of the population were classified as
settled and the remainder as nomadic or semi-nomadic. One-quarter of the
settled population was concentrated in the main cities of Tripoli (130,000)
and Benghazi (70,000). The proportion of nomads was highest in Cyrenaica,
with 45% of the total population, and lowest in the Fezzan at 10%.
Since independence in 1951 the Government of Libya has not been in the
hands of experienced managers of its national economy. On occasions teams
of experts, such as that of the International Bank, have been called in,
but in general the direction of the economy has been in Libyan hands, and
at first in the hands of the traditional leaders. The acquisition of
experience in national economic management has not been a continuous or a
progressive affair. There have been many discontinuities and lessons have
had to be learned a number of times.
Of the whole area of the country, not more than 10% could be put to
productive use owing to lack of water, and only 1% was suitable for settled
cultivation, Even though the Government after independence received
substantial foreign aid, compared to the national income, it could do
little with it to build up the necessary base for the Libyan economy.
This chapter, as the first step, will assess the pre-oil Libyan endowment
of factors of production as follows:
(1) Natural resources: total land area and whatever it contains that has
an economic value, such as rivers, forests, minerals and hydrocarbons.
(2) Location: even though this is not a factor of production according to
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text book definitions of productive factors, it can be treated as a factor
of production.
(3) Labour force and its structure: population, skilled and unskilled
labour, and the role of children and women in the economy.
(4) Capital: that portion of goods, physical assets or equipment created
in Libya but not consumed at that time
Since planning for development is a task of expertise, which Libya at
that time at least could not provide locally, the United Nations was asked
to provide the necessary experience for this job. This topic, together
with other forms of foreign assistance and development projects will be
discussed under separate headings.
In the succeeding section I will observe the change in available natural
resources caused by the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. I also
discuss the development of the oil sector, including upstream operations
such as oil exploration, production, transportation and other facilities,
marketing and pricing.
The power of Libya in its negotiations with oil companies, has its roots
in this very first fact of troubled historical and economic conditions. In
the words of Colonel Qadhafi, who emerged as Leader of the 1st September
Revolution in 1969, in his address to the oil companies: "the Libyan
people, who have lived five thousand years without petrolewn, are able to
live again without it". This fact, in effect, was coupled by the discovery
of oil in Libya in commercial quantities in a very short time.
	 Oil
revenues increased with every barrel of crude exported.
	 Exports
accelerated from almost zero in 1961 to over 3 million barrels per day in
1970. It was clear that the Libyan economy could not absorb such huge
revenues. At the time of negotiations with the oil companies in the early
1970s, Libya had enough foreign reserves to finance its economy for two
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years at the then current expenditure level. Thus, poor economic
conditions experienced by Libya, together with fast development of the oil
sector and vast oil revenues have had a great effect on the Libyan
relationship with the oil companies. The ability of Libya to alter these
relationships to its benefit has emerged from the above situation. In this
chapter I will discuss these issues; that is, the pre-oil Libyan economy,
and the emergence of the petroleum sector.
5 • 1 Pre-oil Libyan economy:
To study the pre-oil Libyan economy, I concentrate first on the endowment
of the main factors of production; land, location, labour and capital. The
favoured location of Libya has not only marked its history with successive
foreign interventions, but to some extent has shaped its economy. The main
features of this economy have been the lack of both human and capital
investment. The measurement of these factors reflects the economic reality
of the economy and provides a natural base to the assessment of oil
discoveries and its effect on the economy. There is no doubt that the
discovery of oil in the 1960s (as discussed in Chapter 6) has shaped the
Libya of today, but some of the old economic problems, such as lack of
skilled labour, are still the main constraints on the development of the
Libyan economy.
5.1.1 Land;
Land consists of the sum of all natural resources possessed by Libya i.e
those earning assets not created by Libyans or immigrants to Libya
throughout history. Libya is a country with a vast area of 1,760,000
square kilometres. It had a population of around one million, at the time
of independence in 1951. It comprised two areas of agricultural and
pastoral development the Gefara or coastal plain of Tripolitania and the
plateau region of Cyrenaica.
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Geographically, the overriding environmental factor affecting Libyan
renewable resources is the absence of rainfall over more than 90% of the
country, and the relative and seasonal deficiency of rainfall over the
remaining coastal regions in the vicinity of Tripoli and Benghazi. The
seasonal pattern of rainfall limits rainfed farming to regions within the
200mm isohyet, which amounts to less than 2% of Libya, of which less than
half is cultivable for reasons of terrain and soil conditions. A 200mm
average rainfall is not, however, ideal for dryland farming in regions in
which high temperatures and dry winds can occur at any time of the year.
Underground water varies in depth from one part of the country to another
(in some parts of Fezzan underground water is only 5 meters deep). This
water, which is the most valuable non-renewable resource after oil, is
tapped from artesian wells and also from the general water table. The
problem facing Libya at independence was that the huge reservoir of water
was located in the heart of the desert, and needed very large investment of
capital, which Libya lacked, to extract and transport water to the coastal
areas hundred of miles away. It was only in the 1980s that the Government
established a new scheme, " the great artificial river", to move this water
to the coastal agricultural regions. Several springs exist, mostly in the
mountain areas, but their potential is still unknown.
In addition, Libya has non-oil mineral resources which, other than a
large iron-ore deposit in the Wadi Al-Shati (in Fezzan), are either
a
insignificant or yet unproven as in the case of Gypsum, Salt and Limestone.
The Wadi Al-Shati iron-ore, also, had not been exploited because of the
lack. of capital. By the end of the 1970s a new scheme was put forward to
utilise these deposits at Musrata on the coast, where the iron-ore would be
processed. This is expected to come on-stream by the mid 1980s. Other
mineral resources exist in southern Libya, and the most controversial is
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uranium, which is claimed to exist in the border area with Chad. Uranium
has already, or soon will be, exported from the central Sahara from Niger,
Algeria, Mali and Morocco.
5.1.2 Location:
Libya was an easy target to all invaders through history till 1951. Its
location in the mid-Mediterranean North Africa, made it a natural link
between Europe and Central Africa, and between the Middle East and North
West Africa, The Phoenicians were followed by Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks,
Italians and finally the British and French military administrations. Most
of the time Libya was looked upon by the occupants as a strategic military
site or as a base for armies and a bridge to other lands. The domestic
economy was almost neglected except for the foreign settlers' needs.
The strategic location of Libya in North Africa and near to the troubled
Middle East, had not only attracted the old powers in the world throughout
the history as will be discussed briefly below, but its position has also
been of great importance to the modern global powers. The independence
movement in the Middle East after the Second War, especially the fall of
the monarchy of Farouk in Egypt, and the emergence of the anti-Western
revolutionary Government in 1952 under the leadership of Nasser, has caused
the Western powers, and xnerica in particular, to search for allies nearby
in the Middle East. The purpose of the Western forces (especially the US)
for being in Libya was not only to act in case of trouble, as in the 1967
Arab Israeli war, where the British Military Base in Al-Adam near to the
Egyptian border was used to help Israel against the Arabs, but also to draw
a line for Soviet influence.
Moreover, the location of Libya has been of major significance since the
discovery of oil on Libyan territory. The transport of Libyan crude to oil
refineries in Europe takes less time than other crudes. This advantage of
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Libyan oil, is shared with Algerian and Nigerian oils; together they are
known as "BhOrt-haUl oils" , and have yielded large sums of hard currency
to these producers, as will be shown in Chapter 7.
During the Ottman Empire (1551-1911), Libya depended on two sources of
income. Both of these resulted from the geographical position of the
country; trans-shipping goods between Europe and Africa, and extracting
taxes on foreign ships.
The Libyans used to trans-ship European domestic and imported products to
Africa. On their way back to Europe they carried with them ivory,
gold-dust, ostrich feathers, vegetables and slaves. This trade decreased
sharply after the occupation of Ivory Coast by France in 1893, which made
direct trade between Africa and Europe very much easier and quicker than
through the vast Libyan desert. The Ottomans had a strong navy centered in
Tripoli, which they used to impose taxes on the ships using the nearby sea.
Italy, following in the steps of Great Britain and France, wanted to have
colonies for itself. The location of Libya near to Europe offered Italy an
easy target to fulfil these dream. Indeed, some refered to Libya as
"Italy's fourth shore", after Italy established control over Libya in 1934.
The Italian Government paid particular attention to economic development,
which formed the major part of their economic programme. This was just
beginning to yield fruit when the Second World War broke out, resulting in
the destruction of most of the farms. The remainder were neglected,
especially in Cyrenaica, where the Italians left their farms and workshops
and fled back to Italy.
On. emerging from the colonial era and the Second World War, Libya faced
an intractable development problem which appeared to be almost impossible
to solve. Neither history nor nature could provide economic comfort. By
independence Libya found itself very poorly endowed with skilled and
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educated manpower, a most important product of accumulation over time, and
a crucial resource for economic development. The lack of capital
investment, the constraints on agricultural progress, the peculiarities of
geography, and the distances which separate the Fezzan and the settlements
around Benghazi and Tripoli from each other, which run into hundreds of
miles, all seemed to pose insuperable obstacles. Planning for such an
economy was a heavy task, and help was provided at the request of the
Libyan Government, as will be discussed below.
5.1.3 Labour:
Although the population was over one million inhabitants, in the 1950s,
Libya was not underpopulated relative to its natural resources and its
state of development. It will be seen in Chapter 6 that Libya, after the
discovery of oil, has become a major importer of labour.
Unlike its neighbouring countries, which were not short of population
compared to the size of the country, such as in Egypt and Tunisia, a 1911
Turkish census of Libya found the indigenous population to be 1,523,176.
The population was reduced to almost half the 1911 figure, to 760,000, by
1939 (as an Italian census showed) [Zlitini 1972 p.20]. This was due
mainly to the loss of life in the war against Italy, and in part to the
emigration of Libyans to Tunisia and Egypt. This reduction in population
caused, decline in domestic production.
Before the Second War, a considerable number of Jews were engaged in
a
trading and small enterprises, but the occupation of Palestine attracted
this group, and offered them capital investment opportunities. By 1951
only 7,000 Jews remained in Libya, and these left for Israel after the 1967
Arab-Israeli war. There were skilled workers among the Italian population
who settled in Libya, while other prominent Italians owned large scale
enterprises in agriculture, industry, commerce and finance. Some of the
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large fruit groves, dairies, tobacco farms, wheat farms, etc., were quite
impressive technically. This group also went back to Italy after the 1969
revolution. This population, however, did not provide any qualified labour
force to Libya, unlike Tunisia or Egypt as mentioned above. The manpower
problem was in the form of inadequate skill and low productivity. Probably
the ratio of active to total population was high because about one-quarter
of the children between 10 and 14 years of age were members of the labour
force. In periods of drought and off-seasons, a substantial volume of
visible unemployment could be seen everywhere, especially in Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica, where unemployment might exceed half the labour force of
some districts when drought was acute. As education became more
widespread, unemployment was partially offset by reduced reliance on child
labour.
Libya is a male dominated society; the husband is the complete master of
his family and household activities. The status of women has an important
impact on development. As Arthur Lewis [1955 p.116] said, "Re8triCtions on
the work women may do are also everywhere a barrier to economic growth..."
If women are allowed to work outside the home, the supply of labour is
augmented. Simultaneously, the money women earn creates demand and helps
create a larger market for consumer goods. A large market increases the
opportunities for specialisation. However, the work restrictions placed on
women represent a formidable barrier to economic development.
In 1952, Benjamin Higgins described the Libyan labour force as "almost
wholly male" [Higgins 1953 p.8]. Although females worked in agriculture
during the peak seasons, virtually no women were found in urban industry or
service occupations. Nearly 20 years later the International Labour
Organization (ILO) found that the status of women was virtually unchanged.
In a 1971 survey, which covered 21,915 employees (approximately 5% of the
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labour force), the ILO team found only 1,108 or 5% of the employees were
women [ILO 1971]. of these, 579 or 2.6% were Libyan women, and 529 or 2.4%
non-Libyan. However, of the 17,384 Libyans in the survey, only 3.2% were
women, but non-Libyan women comprised 13% of the non-Libyan employees
covered in the survey.
In the professional, administrative, technical, and clerical categories,
non-Libyan women outranked the Libyan women by 7 to 1. Approximately 99%
of the non-Libyan women were employed in professional, technical and
clerical occupations, while 87% of the Libyan women were employed in
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, such as packers and cleaners.
Occupations which are normally staffed by women in the industrial world are
primarily reserved for men in Libya. For example, there were 755 general
clerks covered in the ILO survey, but only 8 were Libyan women, Of 212
typists only 66 were women, of whom only 19 were Libyan. There were 71
telephone operators, but only one was a Libyan woman.
In the pre-oil period, the education of females was being seriously
neglected.	 In the 1958 academic year there were 97,563 elementary
students, of this total only 16,438 (16.8%) were female.
	 In the same
academic year there were 5,058 students in junior high school, but only 172
(3.4%) female students.	 There were 1,536 male students in secondary
schools, but only 40 females (2.6%).
Successive invasions and dominations left Libya with minimal human
a
resources. In 1936, it was estimated that 95% of the Libyan population was
illiterate. In 1939, only 9,646 Libyans attended public schools in Libya.
A large number attended Koranic schools, but the teaching was limited to
Koranic scripture and elementary Arabic. Only 282 students were enrolled
in secondary schools [Lindberg 1952 p.7]. The situation had improved
somewhat by independence. Even considering the improvements of early years
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of independence, only 20% of the students of elementary and secondary
school-age children were attending school. There were no colleges or
universities in the country. With the aid of the United Nations, Libya was
able to increase the proportion of students in the educational system from
1950 to 1959. Just prior to the discovery of oil in 1958 there were 97,563
elementary students, 5,058 junior high school students, and 1,081 secondary
students attending public schools in Libya (Ministry of Education 1972
p. 7 ]. The teaching staff was dominated by Egyptians, and in many schools
the Egyptian curriculum was followed without modification. The world Bank
Mission criticised the curriculum as being "i00 acadern'Lc". The MIssIon
Report suggested that more emphasis should be placed on vocational training
(UNESCO 1952 p.9].
Although the number of students increased during the 1950s, there was a
considerable waste in the educational system. In the 1958-1959 academic
year there were 34,530 students enroled in the first year of elementary
school. Of these students, only 11,752, or about 9% of the total
population, completed the sixth year of elementary school, and only 4,558
(3.5% of the population) completed the eighth grade. The high drop-out
rate was one factor that contributed to the high illiteracy rate.
According to the official census figures of 1954, 81.1% of the total
population was illiterate.	 Between 1954 and 1964 there had been a
significant increase in the number of students attending schools, but the
a
census figure of 1964 reported that over 73% of the Libyan citizens were
still illiterate.	 Functional illiteracy was probably even higher than
this. Another 2 1.6% could "read only" or "read and write". In 1964 only
5.2% of the population had completed primary school or more education as
shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Citizens and Total Population, Six Years and Over
By Sex and Educational Status: 1964
Total	 Citizens
Educational Status	 Total	 Female	 Male	 Total Female Male
Illiterate	 868,704	 514,708	 354,286	 863,468 511,815 351,653
Read only	 13,060	 2,845	 10,215	 12,838	 2,746	 10,092
Read and write	 262,813	 51,667	 211,146	 343,558	 41,685	 201,873
Primary cert.	 43,789	 6,569	 37,220	 39,539	 4,458	 35,081
Prep. cert.	 19,611	 3,358	 16,253	 16,145	 1,500	 14,645
General sec. cert.	 9,099	 2,599	 6,500	 4,750	 295	 4,455
Graduate & above	 5,277	 1,061	 4,216	 1,523	 96	 1,427
Not stated	 939	 448	 491	 373	 157	 216
Total	 1,223,582	 583,255	 640,327	 1,182,194	 562,752	 619,442
Source: Ministry of Planning, Statistical Ab8tract, [1969], p.41.
Nearly 90% of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, for the most
part employing only the crudest of agricultural techniques. Industry and
crafts together absorbed little more than 6% of the labour force, public
and private administration about 3%. Manpower was hardly differentiated as
to skill at all, except for workers engaged in handicrafts [Ministry of
Planning 1974]. This pattern has almost completely reversed in the 1970s,
as shown in Diagram 5.1. Phis change was mainly due to the beginning of
the oil era and the conseqent gradual domination of economic activities by
the public sector.
5.1.4 Capital:
At the time of independence in 1951, Libya, like other underdeveloped
countries, was short of capital in the broad sense; ie. reproducible
capital (plant, machinery, equipment, etc.), non-reproducible capital such
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as land and intermediate goods, and services which were used up within one
year. Both the existing real capital and the flow of monetary savings
available for investment purposes were inadequate. Capital in both these
senses was particularly scarce. Outside the Italian economic activities
the existing plant, equipment, and housing were meager indeed; capital
goods accumulated by the Italians suffered extensive damage during the
Second War, and much of what remained was a drain on the economy. It was
expensive to maintain, and much of it was appropriate only to a more
advanced economy. Except for the very few wealthy families, the
accumulated capital of the Libyan population consisted mainly of livestock,
tools, a little light equipment, and housing that ranged from simple to
primitive. Even this capital suffered depletion during the war.
The supply of capital in the monetary sense was restricted by the extreme
poverty of the people. No accurate statistics exist, but it is apparent
that the share of national income saved was very small indeed [Higgins 1959
p.29]. Only a fraction of the population was able to save at all, except
in years of very good harvest. In these good years, prosperous Libyans
might buy land, but this process merely served to bid up the price of land,
and was a transfer of assets rather than saving. Alternatively, the
population could add to its livestock and to its store of silver ornaments.
Neither of these forms of accumulation represented saving in the sense of
an offset to increases in private investment and government expenditures.
Accumulation of livestock might not even represent a decision to restrict
consumption.	 It might be a mere matter of an increased survival rate of
livestock in good years.	 Nor does saving in either of these forms
constitute a source of loan capital; it does not increase the lending power
of banks, nor provide a market for new issues of securities.	 The
accumulation of livestock or ornaments is Ba ying only in the very formal
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sense that it represents a gap between income (including accruals to
capital) and current consumption.
For four decades (1920s-1950s), the Libyan budget was in deficit. These
deficits were reduced and at times, as in the mid-1950s, turned to surplus
by foreign governments; by Italy during the thirty years when Libya was an
Italian colony; from 1943 to 1952 by the Administering Powers (the United
Kingdom in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, France in the Fezzan); and since
then by foreign aid and leases of military bases. It is only since the
export of oil in commercial quantities began in 1963, as will be discussed
in Chapter 6, that the Libyan budget deficit has turned to surplus without
foreign assistance. Foreign aid effects on the government's budget during
the 1950s, can be seen in Table 5.2 below, through the growth of governmet
expenditure and revenues. While government expenditure increased from
£L3.6 million in 1950-51 to £L20.4 million in 1957-58, the decrease in
foreign aid in 1958-60 led to the decline of revenues.
The Lindberg [1952 p.30] study, revealed that the percentage of total
family expenditures on food was 80% for city dwellers. The high percentage
spent on food suggested a state of poverty resulting in under-nutrition.
The calorific content of the average diet was only 1,300 calories per
person per day.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was £L15 million Libyan Pounds in 1955, or
a
£L14 per capita income, which was very low. By 1958 GDP increased to £L52
million and per capita income to £L40. Apart from the inflation of 5%
annually, the increase was due to foreign aid and the revenues from oil
companies, which paid for the concessions according to the Petroleum Law,
issued in 1955.
Although large segments of the population existed outside the modern
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Table 5.2
The Effects of Foreign Aid on Libya's Budget(LM):1950-1960
Year Domestic Rev. External Rev. Total Rev. Expenditure Balance
1950/51	 3.658	 -	 3.658	 5.522	 -1.864
1951/52	 4.171	 -	 4.171	 5.911	 -1.740
1952/53	 4.881	 1.273	 6.154	 6.618	 -0.464
1953/54	 5.239	 4.013	 9.252	 8.233	 +1.019
1954/55	 5.549	 5.641	 11.190	 8.797	 +2.393
1955/56	 7.016	 6.270	 13.331	 12.978	 +0.353
1956/57	 8.147	 9.979	 18.126	 15.433	 +2.693
1957/58	 9.595	 10.845	 20.440	 17.031	 +3.409
1958/59	 10.269	 6.683	 16.952	 20.024	 -3.072
1959/60	 11.542	 6.821	 18.363	 20.613	 -2.250
(+)Means surplus and (-)means deficit.
Source: Ministry of Planning, [1974], p.4, and J. Allan, [1981], p.77.
.
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economy in a self-sustained nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life,
statistical estimates were made of Libyan national income at the time of
independence. Income per head was estimated slightly higher than in India
but markedly lower than other Middle Eastern countries. In 1952, officials
of the British Administration estimated the per capita income in
Tripolitania at $40 per annum. The income was subject to fluctuations;
income tended to fall in drought years and rise in good crop years.
The structure of GDP in 1958 was as shown in Diagram 5.2 below; 26.1%
derived from agriculture, 18.4% from manufacturing and mining, 3.4% from
construction, and 1.5% from electricity.
Total goods share was 49.4% while services share was 50.6%. The latter's
share was even higher in 1962, as shown in Diagram 5.2 below. This means
that investment was concentrated on the service sector rather than the
productive sector.
Agricultural development was handicapped by the extreme shortage of
skills in agriculture and the scarcity of capital. Erosion had caused
significant loss of soil fertility. Infrastructure was almost entirely
lacking in the rural areas and badly damaged during the war in the urban
areas.	 There was also a lack of essential technical and economic data
needed for the formulation of adequate agricultural development projects
[The International Bank for Reconstruction 1960 p.35].
The main cereals were barley and wheat, the main vegetables, potatoes and
.
tomatoes; and the main industrial crop, groundnuts. There was also a wide
range of fruit and tree crops and, by contrast, very few field crops.
Olives, dates, and almonds were the most important fruits, citrus were
largely introduced after the Second World War and seem to have a promising
future as will be discussed below. Temperate fruits such as pears, apples,
grapes, apricots, peaches, and plums as well as semi-tropical fruit such as
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pomegranates and bananas, were produced in Libya. Fruit yields were low
compared to world averages; a half to a third of world averages for olives
and dates, a quarter to a sixth for citrus.
Fishing as a resource was underdeveloped despite the existence of sponge
beds and fishing grounds containing Tuna, Sardines, Red mullet, and other
varieties. These beds were actively exploited by foreign fleets, e.g.
Greeks, Italian, and Maltese, rather than by Libyan fleets.
Libya's position on the Mediterranean and the proximity to Europe, the
main source for tourists, are important factors for a possible tourist
industry. However, Libya has two main tourist attractions; beaches which
stretch on 1900 km coast on the Mediterranean, and archaeological sites in
Liptis, Sabrata and Cyrene. The progress of this industry was slow for
reasons such as:
a- The lack of services needed to support a large tourist industry, which
requires huge capital investment, ie hotels, infrastructure and transport.
b- Libya was in competition with other Mediteranean countries with a good
reputation in this field, such as Malta, Tunisia and many others.
c- Libya is further away from European countries than some other tourist
centres such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia or Malta.
Before the Italian military invasion of Libya in 1911, Italy could
interfere with the Libyan economy. At the end of 19th century a branch of
the Bank of Rome was set up in Tripoli. This Bank had two branches in
e
Benghazi and Derna by 1907. 	 The purpose of the Bank was to buy
agricultural land and to help the Italian immigrants who were coming in
increasing numbers to cultivate and settle on the lands which they or the
Bank, had bought. The Bank had some other economic activities and built
some factories which tied the Libyan economy to Italian initiatives.
Food processing ventures were few and usually involved government
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participation. The Citrus Fruit Corporation was able to raise exports in
1954 to a level 70% higher in volume and more than 100% higher in value
than any figure previously attained. This expansion was based partly on
improved cleaning and grading with the use of a new machine (and FAQ
technical assistance), and on an agreement with the Italian government to
import the fruit. The other successful ventures in which the Government
participated were the tanning industry and the sale of fresh vegetables.
The rural sector comprised nearly 90% of the active population; wages
were paid in kind, in money or a mixture of the two. Payment in kind was
extensive, especially for indentured labour and for seasonal activities
[Higgins 1953 p.86]. The jebbad (drawers of water) were one example of
indentured labour that existed in Fezzan. Before the French occupation
(1948) of the Fezzan, the jebbad who watered date-palms received one-fourth
of the crop. Similarly, with respect to barley, the jebbad was entitled to
one-fourth of the crop. Even in recent years, after the oil was discovered
(the 1960s), the system was still largely in practice. I remember the
jebbad used to have 50% of the crop with respect to olives. Their pay in
the pre-oil era was so low that they were constantly in debt to the
landlords. The landlords advanced dates, barley and olives; as a result
the jebbad lost their freedom of action and mobility [Lindberg 1952]. Also
in Cyrenaica ploughing, harvesting of cereals, weaving of wool, and stock
tending involved payments in kind fixed by tradition. Money wages payments
were mainly confined to the cities or the Italian agricultural schemes.
In the 1950s wage rates in Libya were as low as most of the developing
countries. The wage level in agriculture was very depressed (L0.100
0.150 per day in 1952-54), and the rural/urban wage differential which was
small, favoured the emergence of the modern sector.
After the Petroleum Law was issued in 1955, oil companies starting
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exploring the desert. 	 These companies offered employment at wages
substantially higher than the rates prevailing either in agriculture or
industry, and the wage-gap between the traditional and modern sectors
widened considerably. Between 1956 and 1959, wage rates in agriculture
rose from £L0.140 to £L0.180 per day, but oil companies were employing
unskilled labour at rates varying between £L0.250 and £L0.400. 	 This
initiative from the oil companies caused some important economic changes,
by shifting the labour force from the agricultural lands to oil companies
in the desert. Table 5.3 below shows a time series of agricultural wages
(median) derived from the records of large farms in Libya.
Table 5.3
Agricultural wages in Libya 19531959
Year	 Wage £L per day	 Index
1953	 0.135	 100
1954	 0.140	 103
1955	 0.140	 103
1956	 0.145	 107
1957	 0.150	 111
1958	 0.170	 126
1959	 0.180	 133
Source: Libyan University London University Joint Research Project on
Libya, [1970], p.164.
Throughout the centuries of colonisation, the Libyans were not only
politically dominated but also economically dominated. They suffered loss
of lives and wealth; even during the first few years of independence, it
was impossible for Libya to survive without foreign assistance.
In Tripoli only, production of corn during sixteen years (1862 1878)
showed a surplus in the balance of trade. Exports exceeded imports by
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1.5 15.000 Franc. See Table 5.4 below.
Table 5.4
Tripolitania corn trade surplus (1862_1878)
Corn	 Exports in Francs 	 Imports in Francs
Wheat	 14,786,000	 7,925,000
Barley	 5,076,000	 10,422,000
Total	 19,862,000	 18,347,000
Surplus	 1,515,000
Source: Zlitni [1972], p.7.
The exported goods were livestock, wool, sheep skin, goat hair, dates,
olive oil, esparta grass, ground nuts and honey. Even though imports
increased at a rate faster than the exports, a trade surplus continued to
exist till the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 asTab1e 5.5 shows. This
implies the availability of productivity, the scarcity of capital
notwithstanding.
Table 5.5
Libyan trade surplus '5...191O
Year	 Exports	 Imports	 Trade surplus
1905	 123,520	 26,120	 97,40
1906	 158,040	 22,800	 135,24
1907	 121,040	 42,160	 78,88
1908	 128,840	 27,040	 101,80
S
1909	 117,360	 64,240	 53,12
1910	 176,000	 128,000	 48,00
Source: Zlitni (1972], p.17.
In its foreign trade, because of the poor economic conditions, Libya
could not produce enough goods to meet the growing imports. This deficit
in the trade balance was growing rapidly in the 1950s and in the early
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1960s. Most of this was due to the increase in machinery and oil equipment
imports used particularly by oil companies after the petroleum law of 1955.
The table below (5.6) shows the growth of exports and imports during the
1950s. Exports were mainly agricultural goods such as groundnuts, almonds,
esparta grass, olives and potatoes. Libya also exported livestock, and
scrap metal which remained in Libya following the destruction of the Second
War.
The balance of payments ran a heavy deficit from 1952 to 1959. The value
of the Libyan imports of goods and services were nearly 50% of the value of
its GNP. The World Bank report noted that this is "an extraordinarily high
proportion matched by few other countries in the world" [Libyan
University-London University Joint Research Project on Libya 1970 p.9].
Less than 20% of the foreign exchange proceeds necessary to pay these
imports was obtained from the sale of Libyan merchandise exports. The
remainder came from invisible exports, such as the military expenditures of
foreign governments, and foreign aid. The unearned income was sufficient
to cover the imports, and Libya was able to make additions of $25.2 million
to her foreign exchange reserves.
5.1 • 5 Development planning:
The Libyan development plan in the 1950s had two advantages, which helped
Libya to achieve a certain degrees of progress. The undertaking of the
United Nations extensive resource survey, and the selection of the planning
a
team according to the results of the resource survey.
A- The UN survey:
On. the basis of the Mission Survey carried out in the early 1950s, the
broad outline of a development plan could already be discerned in Libyan
economic life. The survey made clear which sectors of the economy provided
some hope of expansion and called for more intensive study. The planning
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Table 5.6
Libya's Foreign Trade in (L.000):1950-1960
Year
	
	
Imports	 Exports	 Re-exports	 Trade Bal.
Oil companies Other
1950	 -	 6,983	 3,780	
-	 -3,203
1951	 -	 12,040	 4,720	
-	 -7,320
1952	 -	 11,640	 4,450	
-	 -7,190
1953	 -	 11,360	 3,480	 -	
-8,880
1954	 -	 11,198	 3,668	 170	 -7,360
1955	 14,388	 4,265	 329	 -9,794
1956	 16,601	 3,805	 349	 -12,447
1957	 5,008	 23,068	 4,753	 663	 -22,660
1958	 10,079	 24,422	 4,313	 763	 -29,425
1959	 12,850	 27,735	 3,659	 641	 -36,285
1960	 21,395	 38,990	 3,111	 920	 -56,357
Source: Bank of Libya, 1, [1967], Table 21.
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team was composed of experts in each area of potential development. There
were fifteen experts in all; included were a hydrologist, a war damage
expert, a minerologist, a social welfare expert, a power engineer, a
tanning expert, an expert on the cleaning, grading, and packing of wool, a
fishing expert, and other FAO experts on dates, olives, animal husbandry,
and citrus. Also participating were a public finance expert, a UNESCO team
on general education, a WHO team on public health, a team on manpower
training, with a chief economist to coordinate their work into a
comprehensive plan [Higgins 1953 p.702].
The summary of the twenty four-year plan proposed by the mission, which
had suggested three phases for development, is shown in Table 5.7. In
phase one, a first six-year plan (1952-1957), emphasis was put on training
and education, agricultural research, experiment, demonstration, and
improvement. Agricultural production was to be increased by all possible
means, including training of farmers, improvement of tools and techniques,
and, when and where feasible, by expansion of cultivated acreage of
individual farms and of the country as a whole. The role of repair of war
damages, other public works, and public utilities was stressed. Net
absorption of manpower into public development programmes was considered.
Increased import surpluses, the large budget deficit, reliance on foreign
financial and technical assistance were assessed. Capital accumulation of
5 to 10% of national income was taken as a target.
S
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Table 5.7
Summary of the UN Proposed 24-year Development Plan for Libya
Phase
	
	
Main features	 Capital accum.and savings
Emphasis was put on agriculture 5 to 10% of national income
and training, repair of war
(1):1952-57 damages, import surplus,budget
deficit and reliance on foreign
assistance.
Increased emphasis on agricul. 	 10 to 15% of nat. income
processing and light industries, savings 10% of nat. income
(2):1957-69 reduced import surplus, reduced
budget deficits and reduced
reliance on foreign grants.
Accelerated development of agri. at least 15% of nat.income
and light industries, balanced	 at least 15% of nat.income
(3):1969-75 trade, balanced budgets and
independence of foreign aid.
agri. = agriculture
nat. = national
In phase two were the second and third six-year plans. These placed
increased emphasis on agricultural processing and similar light industries,
for domestic markets, using domestic raw materials; the net release of
manpower from the public development programme to the private industrial
sector; reduced import surpluses, reduced budget deficits, and reduced
reliance on foreign grants; capital accumulation of 10 to 15% of national
income was targeted, the domestic savings of at least 10% of national
income; reduced taxes and increased sales of consumer's goods were planned
for.
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In phase three were the fourth and subsequent six-year plans. These
stressed the accelerated development of agricultural processing and similar
light industries; balanced trade; balanced budgets independent of foreign
financial and technical assistance; capital accumulation and domestic
savings of at least 15% of national income was planned for.
The UN mission recommendations were taken into account by the regime, as
the main source for planning, but the time period for each plan was
different. In fact the mission did not expect oil exploration to be
speeded up, as it was in actuality. The oil development increased the
Government revenues and this in turn led to the revision of the development
plans.
B- Development projects:
Among the government enterprises that were established (with technical
assistance from the UN and the United States) were a date packing plant, a
central milk pasteurisation plant, and the Tripolitanian Esparta
Corporation. Esparta is a wild grass which grows on the mountains of South
Tripolitania; it used to manufacture fine paper. This product is mainly
collected for export, and some of it used to make handicraft products such
as baskets. The latter organization has endeavored to assist small-scale
private enterprise, which was most lacking in Libya, by granting £L1O,000
credit to establish a handicrafts committee for promoting the production
and sale of handicraft products.
a
For some years it was apparent that the Tripoli steam turbine electricity
plant would have to be rehabilitated and expanded. SECI, an Italian
company, owned the plant. The government did not want to leave it in the
hands of the company, but lacked the capital needed for modernisation. The
American grants made it possible to earmark £L1 million for this purpose.
The Libyan Finance Corporation (LFC) was slow in getting under way and it
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never reached the scale recommended in the plan. At the end of 1954 it had
total capital of £L100,000 and had made fifty three loans of three to five
years, amounting to £L98,000. It should be clear, as mentioned earlier,
that the lack of capital and private enterpreneurship had been one of the
main obstacles to Libyan economic development. Very little genuinely
Libyan private entrepreneurship appeared; the penchant for monopoly
privileges continued to be a barrier. During the early part of 1957 the
government was approached for grants of monopoly privileges in matches
production, date processing, production of industrial alcohol, fisheries,
and various agricultural ventures. By encouraging monopolisation the
Government actually helped some private enterpreneurs to find their way and
participate in economic development. Conversely it blocked the way for new
national enterprises to take such a chance.
Foreign enterprise remained chiefly Italian. In the spring of 1955 the
Libyan government finally reached an agreement with Italy regarding Italian
residents and property, which included non-discrimination against Italian
enterprises by the financial institutions. This agreement provided the
basis for expansion of Italian enterprises, probably on account of the lack
of capital and experience by domestic entrepreAc*rs.
At the same time, enactment of the Petroleum Law in June 1956 had led to
active drilling by a number of foreign oil companies, the most important
activity of non-Italian foreign enterprise in the country by far. The oil
.
business became the main source of income following the commencement of oil
exports in the early 1960s.
Such development as took place in the first five years (1952-1957) could
never be financed domestically. There had to be another source of finance,
foreign aid and foreign agreements. The strategic location of Libya in
North Africa and near to the troubled Middle East, as I mentioned earlier,
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had not only attracted the old powers in the world throughout the history
as discussed earlier, but this position has also been of great importance
to the modern powers of the globe. Towards the end of 1953, Libya
concluded a long term (twenty-year) agreement with the United Kingdom to
establish military bases in Libya, under which Britain promised £3,750,000
per year for 1952-57. Out of this, one million pounds per year was
specifically earmarked for development projects. In July 1954 a similar
agreement were signed between Libya and the United States of America in
which the latter promised to pay $4 million per year for five years and a
lower sum in the following years, plus $3 million in the fiscal year 1955
for specific projects (see Table 5.8 below). The US also provided 24,000
tons of wheat for relief and $1.5 million in technical assistance. The UN
Technical Assistance Program amounted to $850,000. In 1954 France offered
£100,000 for development and £163,000 for budgetary subventions. Italy and
Turkey each granted £10,000 to the Development Agency. Moreover, since the
agreement with the United Kingdom was made retroactive, total foreign aid
in 1954-55 was running in excess of $26 million per year, or more than half
the estimated national income.
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Table 5.8
Foreign aid to Libya (in million £&$): 1954-1956
1954-55	 1956
Source of aid	 £	 $	 £	 $
1.United Kingdom 	 9.500	 5
2.United States	 8.500	 12
3.tJnited Nations	 0.850
4.France	 0.263
5.Italy	 0.010
6.Turkey	 0.010
Total	 9.783	 9.350	 5	 12
In 1956, both the British and the Pmerican grants were running at even
higher rates. Jmerican assistance reached $12 million per year, of which
$5 million was specifically earmarked for development (see Table 5.8
above). The budgetary subvention from the UK was raised by £250,000 in the
fiscal year 1956 and by £750,000 in the following years. 	 The sums
earmarked for development alone exceeded 20% of national income. 	 These
grants were large only relative to the very low national income.
Although the financial problem looked as if it had been solved, large
scale projects were still not possible in Libya, because of the lack of
technical and managerial skills; entrepreneurship was a much more serious
bottleneck than lack of capital. Part of the foreign grants was used by
the government to establish important banks such as the National Bank of
Libya, which took over the function of issuing currency from the Currency
Commission in March 1957; also, the Agricultural Credit Bank, this was slow
in getting under way, partly for lack of a co-operative movement through
which the Bank could operate.
The changing structure of imports was a pointer to the changing structure
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of the economy even before the actual discovery of oil. The share of
capital and intermediate goods, which was for the use of oil companies, on
the Libyan import list between 1954 and 1963 rose in terms of percentage
and of total value. In 1954, these imports registered a total value of
about £L5, or 43% of the total value of civil imports; in 1958, £L14 or 57%
of the total value of civil imports. It was the discovery of oil which was
responsible for the spectacular transformation of the Libyan economy after
1959.
Thus the pre-oil Libyan economy was no different from other developing
economies in the world. Even though, the population was small compared to
other less developed countries, there had been very little natural
resources in use. Unlike Tunisia which has a relatively high proportion of
agricultral land, or Egypt which is blessed with the Nile River, Libyan
cultivated land was no more than 1% of the total area with no natural
rivers whatsoever. The lack of capital investment and know how made
exploitation of potential resources a dream in the back of the Libyan
minds. Again, the location of Libya, as well as the prospect of
discovering oil, attracted foreigners to Libya. This time not the old
invaders but the well funded and technically advanced oil companies. This
matter will be discussed next.
5 • 2 The emergence of the petroleum sector;
In this section I analyse the development of the Libyan oil sector since
a
the promulgation of the Petroleum Law in 1955. The development of oil in
Libya was, to a great extent, an exception as far as Libyan industry is
concerned. It developed so quickly that the distinctions between different
stages of production from exploration to marketing can hardly be observed.
The possibilities of oil in Libya, and the permisiveness of the Petroleum
Law were the main attractions for oil companies to explore for oil in
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Libya. This law was designed by American oil companies to serve their own
interests. It allowed the concessionaires to deduct large charges on all
physical assets acquired before production, and did not tie Libyan oil
royalties to the posted price, as was the case in the Middle East. These
favourable conditions made it attractive for international oil companies
(majors and independents) to compete for Libyan oil. This competition has
had serious effects on the oil companies, the Libyan economy and the world
oil market. Some of these effects will be discussed in the next chapter.
Soon after oil was discovered, the companies built pipelines through the
Libyan desert, oil ports and terminals on the coast, construction and
gathering facilities, etc.. The result of this intense activity in the oil
industry was a huge increase in Libyan crude production, which was
unprecedented over such a short time. Accordingly oil revenues became so
large that the underdeveloped Libyan economy could not absorb them. These
developments were the main sources of power which made the Libyan
Government t s bargaining with the oil companies in early 1970s not only
possible but likely to be successful. The terms of the Petroleum Law and
the acceleration of oil discoveries and exports will be discussed next.
5• 2 • 1 The Petroleum Law:
There are three factors which together worked as incentives to oil
exploration in Libya. First, the presumed geological history of Libya.
Second, the increased demand for oil following rapid industrial expansion
a
after the Second World War; and third, the similarity between the
geographical context of Libya and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria which
were, oil producers in the 1950s.
When the Mineral Law was promulgated in 1953, nine international
petroleum companies started preliminary geological reconnaissance in Libya
by paying a fee of £L500 for a year, renewable annually, for every
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reconnaissance permit. Most of these companies were majors such as Esso
Standard, Mobil and Shell [Mosley 1973 p.261], and the remaining were
independents such as Amerada, Continental and Bunker Hunt.
Libya was uncertain as to how to go about granting concessions. The
King's ministers were told by their foreign advisers, none of whom were oil
experts, that they should at once set about writing a general petroleum
law, defining the terms under which the concessions would be granted. The
Libyans were by this time extremely anxious to see their potential
petroleum wealth turned into hard cash, and they were therefore most
grateful when the American oil companies offered to speed things up for
them by loaning legal experts from their organizations and helping them to
draft a petroleum law that would enable operations to go ahead. As a
result, the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 looked like an equitable piece of
legislation that would benefit both parties to any concession agreement,
and at a quick glance its provisions did not seem different from those of
the old Middle East concessions. Profits from the concessions would be
subject to a tax of 50%, and a royalty of 12.5% on every barrel of oil
would be traded as a partial payment of the tax on profits. But the
Libyans were to discover that they also accepted some fine print, the
significance of which they did not appreciate until it began to affect
them.	 Written into the Law by the American experts were two provisions
which were especially favourable to their operations:
a
The first was a depreciation allowance, which allowed the concession-
aires to deduct a charge of 20% on all physical assets acquired before
production. (They also had a choice of a 20% amortization of all their
expenditures before production began, ora depletion allowance of 25% of
their gross income).
The second provision tied Libyan oil royalties not to the posted price,
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as in the rest of the Middle East, but to the price which the oil secured
on the market.
The moment the new law was promulgated the rush began. The reason for
this rush by international oil companies can be summarised as follows:
A- The proximity of Libya in relation to Europe provided a chance none of
the oil companies wished to miss.
B- The major oil companies, which were eager to find a west of Suez oil
resource, especially after the closure of the Canal in 1956, thus Libya was
an important opportunity.
C- The independent companies, which had competed with the majors in oil
refining, wanted to have their own sources of crude oil instead of
continuing to rely on the majors for it.
D- The producing oil companies also wanted to diversify their resources.
The terms of the Petroleum Law had made operations especially attractive
to independent oil companies, for the lack of a posted price provision
meant that they could sell Libyan oil at cut rates and thus obtain an
advantage in markets still largely controlled by the major companies.
The 1955 Law divided Libya into four zones for the purpose of allocating
concessions corresponding in areas to the three provinces of Tripolitania
(zone 1), Cyrenaica (north-zone 2, and south of the 280 parallel-zone 3)
and the Fezzan (zone 4)(see Map 5.1 ). There was no significance in this
zoning other than to achieve a correspondence with the three provinces, and
the fact that the remoter zones 3 and 4 carried lower rents and lower
minimum working obligations. Article 7 noted that applications for
concessions were to conform as far as possible to the grid lines of the
official Map, and each concessionaire was to be limited to a maximum of
three concessions in each of the first and second zones and four in the
third and fourth zones [Nafa 1976 p.271]. The total area allocated to any
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one concessionaire should be limited to 30,000 square kilometres in each of
zones 1 and 2, and to 80,000 km2 in each of zones 3 and 4 [The Libyan
Petroleum Law, 1955, Article 9].
Concessions were granted for a period of 50 years, and were renewable for
a further period of 10 years, making 60 years the maximum period for which
they might be held. 77 concessions were granted to 14 companies between
1955 and 1958, increased to 84 concessions by the end of 1959 (see Table
5.9 and Map 5.1). Many of the companies concerned were affiliates of Major
and Independent oil firms. Up to this stage 55% of Libyan territory was
covered by the concessions. The number of concessions had increased to 95
by the end of 1961, and to 136 in 1966. At the end of 1967, there were 42
concession-holders in Libya of which 22 were American companies, and 20
were Western European companies [Knapp 1977 p.2l0].
There were two Articles in the Petroleum Law designed to stimulate
concession-holders to vigorous exploration activity. Article 9 required a
bond or banker's guarantee of £L50,000 throughout the life of a concession,
to secure the "due performance of the concession-holder's obligations under
all concesatons held by him in Libya". This may have had some effect in
deterring applications of a purely speculative nature. Article 10 required
concession-holders to surrender 25% of the area of a concession within five
years from the date of the original grant, 50% within eight years and 66
2/3% in the first and second zones within ten years, and 75% in the third
and fourth zones. This provision, which had become normal practice in the
granting of concessions by other countries (though varying in percentages
and periods), proved to be an effective encouragement to industrious
exploration. The oil companies, being concerned not to surrender an area
subsequently found fruitful, strove to cover the whole of their concession
by survey at least, and the more promising parts by wild-cat drilling
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Table 5.9
List of Oil Concessions in Libya up to 1959
Concession	 Company	 Date Granted
2
3-8
9-15
16-22
23,24
25-29
30,31
32,33
34-37
38-41
42-47
48
49
50
51
52
53,54
55
56
57
58
59
•	 *Esso Standard (Libya)
Nelson Bunker Hunt
•	 *Esso Standard (Libya)
Mobil Oil of Canada LTD*
Libyan-American Oil Co.
Compagnie des Petroles Total(Libya)
Ainerada Petroleum Co.(Libya)
Continental Oil Co. (Libya)
Oasis Oil Co.
BP Exploration Co. (Libya)*
Libya Shell
Texaco Overseas/California Asiatic*
•	 *Esso Standard (Libya)
Campagnie Des Petroles Total(Libya)
Mobil Oil of Canada LTD*
Texaco Overseas/Cal. Asiatic*
Libya Shell N.V.*
a
Continental Oil Co.
Oasis Oil Co.
Oasis Oil Co.
Mobil Oil of Canada LTD*
•	 *Esso Standard (Libya)
Ainerada Petroleum Co.of Libya
11. 20. 55
11.20. 55
12.12.55
12.31. 55
12. 12.55
12.31.55
12.12.55
12.12.55
12. 12.55
1.28.56
1.11.56
12. 31. 55
5. 02. 56
5. 02. 56
5. 02. 56
5. 02. 56
12. 15.56
12. 22. 56
12. 22. 56
1.26.57
1.26.57
12. 11.56
12. 22. 56
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Table 5.9 continue
Concession	 Company	 Date Granted
60
61
62
63,64
65
66-68
69,70
71
72
73
74-76
77
78
79
80,81
82
83
84
Oasis Oil Co.
Campagnie Des Petroles Total(Libya)
Mobil Oil of Canada LTD*
BP Exploration Co. (Libya)*
Nelson Bunker Hunt
Gulf Oil Co. of Libya*
Libya Shell N.V.*
Pxnerada Petroleum Co. of Libya
Mobil Oil of Canada LTD*
Texaco Overseas/Cal. Asiatic*
Pan American Oil Co.
D.E.A./Wiag
Elwerath
Gulf Oil Co. of Libya*
BP Exploration Co. (Libya)*
C.O.R.L.
Texaco Overseas/Cal. Asiatic*
Pan Amilerican Libya Oil Co.
a
1.26.57
3 • 04 • 57
2. 20. 57
7.14.57
12. 18.57
4. 08. 57
12. 10.57
12. 10.57
12.18.57
11.10.57
3.17.58
8.14.58
6. 02. 59
8.22.59
9. 05. 59
11.19.59
12.06. 59
12. 10.59
(*) Major oil companies.
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
[1960], p.60.
- 158B -
before being called upon to choose areas for surrender. Article 10 also
contained provisions for minimum working obligations, designed to ensure
that a company did not obtain a concession and leave it idle. This might
occur even in the case of a major enterprise, if it suited the company's
world-wide development and supply planning to leave an acquisition for
examination and development at a future date. However, there was also a
danger that unscrupulous operators, having surmounted the competence test
for award of concessions, might obtain them for speculative purposes,
hoping to assign or sell out at a gain subsequently without themselves
having performed, or having the capability to perform, exploration and
development work. To forestall such action Article 17 of the Law required
the Commission's consent to assignment of concessions other than to
affiliates of the concession-holder. The minimum working obligations are
shown in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10
Minimum Working Obligations
Zone/Period	 Zones 1,2 £L(skm/year) 	 Zones3,4 £L(skm/year)
During the first 5 years
	 1.5	 1.5
During the next 3 years	 3.5	 1.5
Subsequently	 6	 3.5
Source: Waddams [1980], p.62.
This law was an important event for two reasons. First, it enabled a
a
large number of oil companies to engage in the systematic exploration of
large tracts of land, an activity which soon rewarded both the country and
the. companies with significant oil finds. Second, the law departed from
the usual system of concession-granting in the Middle East which usually
leads to the establishment of a single concessionaire in the exporting
country, e.g Aramco in Saudi Arabia, Anglo-Iranian in Iran. Libya departed
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from the control of the Majors because it wanted fast exploration and
development at a time of plentiful oil supply. The law provided an
opportunity to the Independents to enter an area hitherto denied to them.
The Independents, such as Occidental, Amerada, Continental and Marathon are
petroleum companies which competed with the Majors in the oil prduct
markets but did not control many sources of crude petroleum. The
competition between the Majors and Independents was rightly thought to be
the appropriate method.
According to testimony in a private civil suit by Mustafa Halim, King
Idris's Prime Minister, concessions were awarded in such a way as to avoid
making the country overly dependent on the "Seven Sisters", which might
subordinate the promotion of Libyan output to their much larger interests
in the Arab Gulf and the avoidance of a surplus in world markets: "I did
not want Libya to begin as Iraq or as S2udi Arabia or as Atwait, I did not
want my country to be in the hands of one oil company" (Blair 1976 p.211].
Instead, special consideration was given to independent companies which,
lacking concessions elsewhere, would stand or fall by their success in
Libya: "We wanted to discover oil quickly. This was why we preferred
independents in the first stage, because they had very little intere8ts in
the Eastern hamisphere outside Libya" (Blair 1976]. As a result, Libya led
all other OPEC countries in the proportion of its output produced by
independents. In 1970, independents produced 55% of Libya's crude output,
compared to an average df 15% for all OPEC countries. These Independents
were reliant on oil supplies in Libya, and were fairly vulnerable to
pressures exerted by the host government, while the majors enjoyed
diversification of sources.
	 This point was the first of a series of
significant events which changed the environment of the oil market, at the
time of Libyan negotiations with oil companies. As will be argued in
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Chapter 7, these events worked in favour of Libya and OPEC.
It is clear from the way the 1955 Petroleum Law was drafted, the response
of oil companies to its inducement revealed that its provisions were too
generous, as discussed above. In November 1957, the Libyan government
began to insist on better terms in negotiating the granting of new
concessions. Allowances were reduced in 1958, agreements completely
eliminated in subsequent contracts, and new concessionaires were requested
to pay a bonus from 1959. The concessionaires were requested to spend a
fixed minimum amount on exploration over a specified period of time. This
principle had not been required in the old Middle East concessions, but has
since gained wide currency in Libya.
The amendment of the 1955 law on July 3, 1961, defined certain concepts,
such as company profits, reference prices for tax purposes, allowable
expenses, with much greater precision than hitherto. Libya allowed sales
and marketing discount practices, in which companies with access to Libyan
oil enjoyed clear advantages over other competitors which were not as near
as Libya to the European markets.
5.2.2 Oil production and facilities:
The story of oil discoveries in Libya is a long and interesting one. I
shall not retell it here, but rather briefly state the major events which
have had significant effects on the development of the Libyan oil industry.
It is also worth stating here that the search for oil in Libya was not in
the interest of Libyans only, but also in the interests of foreign oil
companies and foreign powers. European countries such as Italy, France,
the UX, the United States and the USSR, all had thought there might be oil
in Libya, especially when oil was discovered in the Algerian Sahara, which
is an extension of the great Libyan desert. Libya, I think, might not have
been granted independence so swiftly if oil had already been discovered in
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its soil.
Because oil had already been found in Algeria (one field was almost on
the Libyan frontier) western Fezzan the first main centre of interest.
Esso Libya spent a year on geological and geophysical exploration in
Concession One, between the Ubari Sand Sea and the Algerian frontier. In
June 1957 Esso decided to drill. In January 1958 came proof that there was
oil in Fezzan, when Atshan Number Two well started flowing at the rate of
500 barrels per day (b/d), but its low output was not worth exploiting.
Early in 1958 Esso started drilling in its 10,000 square-mile Concession 6,
which stretched southwards from the Gulf of Sirte to Gabel Zelton. Despite
extensive exploration and drilling costing £24 million in 1958, not one
commercial find had been made by the end of the year .
 [Wright 1969 p.247].
The search continued in 1959, which was the year when success was
achieved. A promising well was found at Bir Zelten. Zelten Number One
flowed at 17,500 b/d, a rate that compared favourably with Saudi Arabian
and Kuwaiti oil wells. At less than 6,000 feet Zelten Number 2 was brought
in at 15,000 b/d. New promising wells were discovered in 1958 and 1959 as
summarized in Table 5.11.
In May 1965 the Libyan Government invited offers for some new
concessions. They were composed partly of acreage not previously assigned
and partly of territory handed back under the clause in the Petroleum Law
requiring concession-holders to relinquish 25% of their holding five years
after its being granted: In February 1966 allocations were announced, and
two concessions, 102 and 103, went to Occidental of Libya INC (OXY). The
findings of this company proved to be significant, and the fact that it had
no other discoveries other than in Libya proved to be crucial, not only for
its future and other companies t
 futures, but for the future of the whole
industry; this was important in the shift of oil power from the
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Table 5.11
Summary of Petroleum Discoveries: 1958-1959
Company	 Field name	 Completion date Prod.(b/d Gravity Depth
Esso Standard El Atshan	 20 Jan.1958	 508	 44.5	 2,200
Oasis	 El Bahi	 27 Jul.1958	 500	 39.0	 5,840
C.P.T.L.	 Oued Tahara	 26 Dec.1958	 100	 45.0	 4,580
Oasis	 Dahra	 30 Apr.1959	 1,061	 41.0	 3,200
Esso Standard Zelten	 13 Jun.1959	 17,500	 37.0	 5,500
Esso Sirte	 Mabruk	 30 Jul.1959	 500	 40.0	 5,700
Gulf	 Emgaget	 7 Sep.1959	 888	 37.9	 4,100
iuoseas	 Beida	 26 Sep.1959	 3,650	 36.6	 4,000
Shell	 Bir Tlacsin	 30 Oct.1959	 700	 44.0	 8,900
Mobil	 Autal	 1 Nov.1959	 990	 34.0	 9,900
Oasis	 Dahra B.	 14 Nov.1959	 36	 43.5	 2,800
Oasis	 Waha	 27 Dec.1959	 226	 21.6	 1,500
Source: Farley [1971], p.123.
- 162A -
monopolisation companies to OPEC The role of Occidental (OXY) in these oil
market changes will be elaborated in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, within fifteen
days of the award, Occidental had started seismic operations in Concession
102. By the end of April 1967 seven Augila wells of OXY were between them
producing 61,000 b/d. This was just the start of OXY's succesful
operation in Libya. In concession 103, the A 1
 wildcat drilled about 40
miles west of Augila came in at a magnificent 40,080 b/d in May 1967. The
A2
 well came in at 53,349 b/d, and A 3
 at only 2,000 b/d less than A2.
Drilling and exploration activities continued throughout 1960s and 1970s as
Table 5.12 shows. The reduction in the number of rigs in the early 1970s
(shown in the Table 5.12) followed by a reduction in the number of
completed wells, reflected the change in Libyan oil policy, which was
marked by conservation in the 1970s. The trend also reflected the
relationship between the Libyan Government and the oil companies after the
September revolution in 1969 [Allan 1982 pslO].
Transportation facilities and terminals:
Except for the new off-shore discoveries near Zuara in Libyan- Tunisian
waters, which have been, until recently in dispute between the two
countries, most of the oil fields are deep in the desert. Mabruk or Nafora
fields are only about 35 miles from the terminals. The farthest of all is
Sarir field of BP, at about 320 miles from the terminals. Map 5.2 shows
the locations of these fields; it also shows oil and gas pipelines and
exporting terminals on the coast, as well as medical, commercial, and
social facilities.
Within twenty-nine months of first striking oil at Zelten, the first
crude oil to be exported from Libya was shipped off from Marsa al Brega.
In June 1960, following hydrological surveys, Marsa al Brega was selected
as the most appropriate location for an oil port and terminal. Marsa al
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Table 5.12
Oil Activities in Libya: 1963-1980
No.of companies	 No.of Wells
	 No.of Rigs
	
Year	 Producing Non prod. Oil Gas
	 Dry	 Total
	
1963	 7	 16	 440	 8	 546	 994	 46
	
1964	 10	 15	 657	 14	 743	 1414	 45
	
1965	 12	 10	 820	 18	 878	 1716	 55
	
1966	 14	 27	 1006	 15	 933	 1954	 21
	
1967	 16	 27	 1086	 19	 983	 2088	 22
	
1968	 17	 22	 1164	 20	 1074	 2238	 37
	
1969	 21	 23	 1316	 24	 1133	 2473	 55
	
1970	 21	 22	 1487	 27	 1204	 2718	 13
	
1971	 20	 14	 1529	 27	 1243	 2799	 18
	
1972	 20	 11	 1553	 27	 1274	 2854	 9
	
1973	 21	 15	 1600	 27	 1309	 2936	 8
	
1974	 21	 --	 1646	 28	 1334	 3008	 14
	
1975	 19	 2	 1679	 29	 1384	 3092	 9
	
1976	 19	 --	 1729	 29	 1424	 3180	 18
	
1977	 19	
--	 1827	 31	 1458	 3316	 22
	
1978	 13	 6	 1935	 31	 1585	 3451	 27
	
1979	 --	 --	 2093	 33	 1545	 3671	 32
	
1980	 --	 --	 2218	 33	 1591	 3842	 22
(--) Not available.
Source: Central Bank of Libya, (1980], p.86.
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Brega, besides being 800 km. from Tripoli and 250 km. from Benghazi, was
also 175 km. from Esso's Zelten field in the desert. Following the
selection of Marsa al Brega a contract for a 105-mile, 30-inch pipeline
from Zelten to Brega was awarded, and in July the first shiploads of 40
foot lengths of pipe began arriving off the terminal site (Kubbah 1964].
As there were no harbour facilities, the pipes, which had been plugged at
both ends, were floated into the sea, towed to land by boats, and
man-handled ashore. By August 1961 nearly 16,000 sections of pipe had been
welded, wrapped, and buried to form the complete pipeline; an asphalt road
parallel to the pipline was also completed. Smaller fields at Riah and
Jabal were tied into the pipeline system later. Originaly the pipeline had
a capacity of some 200,000 b/d. Pumping equipment had to be added to
enlarge that capacity by 1965 to 605,000 b/d. Table 5.13 indicates that
both oil and gas production from the Zelten field increased nearly 25 times
between 1961 and 1964, which forced the company to increase the pipeline
capacity.
Table 5.13
Production of Zelten Oil Fields (1961-1964)
Year	 Oil production in barrels
	 Associated Gas in(000)cubic feet
1961	 6,641,886	 4,250,807
1962	 46,012,020	 29,341,533
1963	 91,262,136	 58,730,136
e
1964	 149,259,417	 100,847,567
Source: Farley [19713, p.120.
During the same period, an aircraft landing strip was constructed at
Brega, trailer housing to accommodate some 60 people was brought in, and a
surge tank and maintenance facilities set up. Simultaneously, the harbour
was dredged and a wharf and a breakwater completed, fourteen 2,200ton
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caissons, built of concrete and each in one piece, being sunk into the
dredged channels to complete an L-shaped wharf and breakwater. A second
breakwater, built of sand-filled steel cells, was added to the first, and
mooring berths were constructed off-shore with connecting feeder lines.
Other buildings and facilities were constructed, such as storage tanks,
meter batteries to measure the oil loaded onto the tankers, on-shore roads,
offices, warehouse and maintenance buildings.
Between 1961 and 1964 the number of producing wells in the Zelten field
increased from 3 to 43, with an average flow of some 500,000 b/d. This
expansion in turn resulted in the construction of an additional pipeline
along the road to Marsa al Brega as part of a water injection project to
keep up the field's pressure, a 100% increase in.the capacity of the
gas-oil separation plant, expansion of the flow lines and gathering units,
and the construction of permanent air-conditioned housing and a new
airstrip.
The Oasis Oil Company began production in 1962. Crude oil was drawn from
the Gialo, Defa, Dahra and Bahi oil fields via an 850 km. trunkline of one
million b/d capacity to the Sidrah oil terminal. A point of interest is
that the line passes through the Beida Field of Amoseas Concession 47,
making it possible for the latter company to use any surplus capacity in
the pipeline for exporting its production from Sidrah Terminal.
Mobil-Gelsenberg production was concentrated in the Ainal Field in
Concession 12 and 1inkd via a 282 km. pipeline to Ras-Lanuf terminal,
while the Hofra and Ora fields led to the same export point through a 160
km.	 line. Nafora oil field of Ainoseas used a parallel 52 km. 	 line to
join Mobil's Amal Raslanuf pipeline.
Sarir Field of BP was further from the coast than any other productive
field.	 Marsa Hariga on the Gulf of Bomba at Tobruk was selected as a
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terminal port. Marsa Hariga stands on a deep-water bay forming probably
the best natural harbour in Libya. Loading could continue there during
spells of rough weather that frequently held up operations at the Gulf of
Sirte terminals. The water was deep enough to allow tankers to moor close
inshore and load from surface pipelines. This feature helped in hanàling
the waxy Sarir crude, which had to be heated before it would flow. In 1965
BP started work on Marsa Hariga project by laying a 320-mile, 34-inch
pipeline, part of it through the great Sand Sea of Calancio; this was
finished at the end of 1966. By then some seventy wells were ready to
start feeding oil into the pipeline, which had an initial capacity of
100,000 b/d. On January 1967 the first shipment of Sarir crude left Marsa
Hariga. The cost of pipeline and terminals was approximately £m35.
In the space of about ten months, Occidental built a 135-mile, 40-inch
pipeline with a capacity of one million b/d from the Idris Field to
Zuetina, on the Gulf of Sirte near Agedabia. A 24-inch spur-line brought
in Augila crude, and production started in February 1968 at 150,000 b/d.
Late in 1967 Occidental brought in the D 1
 well, 15 miles south of the Idris
Field, with an enormous flow of 74,867 b/d, and a 40-inch spur-line was
built to link this find with the main Zuetina pipeline.
Fees, rents, royalties and taxation:
The fee payable on grant of concession was, as mentioned earlier, £L500,
and the rents are shown in Table 5.14 below. These provisions contained
e
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Table 5.14
Libyan Concession Rents
Source: Waddams [1980], p.63.
an ambiguity, which was corrected in the 1961 amendment to the law. It was
intended that the high rent of £L2,500 should apply immediately on the
discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities, whenever that took place,
but the wording of the original law applied this only to the period after
the eighth year. The object of this greatly increased rent was to
stimulate a concessionaire into fast development of discovered oil and not
to leave it undeveloped. In fact it turned out to be ineffective, since
there was no objective criterion or definition of "commercial quantitiee".
The higher rent was thus charged only after a company had begun
development.
A royalty of 12.5% of its value "on the field" was to be paid on crude
oil, gas and natural gasoline, both after deduction of those quantities
used by the company in its operations of producing the oil and transporting
it to seaboard terminal. The value of the oil and gas for calculating the
royalty was to be based on the "free competitive market price" F.O.B. at
the seaboard, from which were to be deducted the handling charges and costs
of transportation from field storage. Of course the cost of moving oil
from BP's Sarir field, 320 miles, to Marsa Hariga on the coast, is not
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comparable to Amoseas Ras-lanuf just 52 km. pipeline. However, there was
to be no free competitive market price for crude oil at the seaboard
terminal as virtually all the oil to be produced in Libya was transferred
to the producing companies' affiliates at a price decided by the companies
themselves.	 Neither was there any published market price which was free
and competitive at any seaboard terminal outside Libya, either nearest or
elsewhere in the world. Hence these royalty definitions in respect of
crude oil were, to say the least, imprecise. When the profit-sharing
principle became more widely accepted, royalty came to be regarded,
whatever its level, as a contribution to the Government's share of the
profits of the concessionaire, and hence was confused with taxes on
profits.
Article 14 of the Petroleum Law required the concession-holder to pay
income taxes and other taxes and imposts payable under the laws of Libya,
and in addition a surtax which made the total of these payments equal to
50% of the profits [Waddams 1980 p.651. Fees, rents and royalties paid
were regarded as advance payments of the profit to which the Government was
entitled.	 The fees, rents, royalties and surtax were to be paid to the
Petroleum Commission. The other taxes and imposts, mostly customs duties,
stamp taxes and vehicle licence levies, were to be paid as they were
incurred, to the appropriate government authority. If all of these
payments combined exceeded the company's libilities to the Commission (for
rents, fees, royalties aid surtax) the excess was to be carried forward and
deducted from payments to the Commission due in the following year or
years.
The Law defined profits as "the income of the concession holder obtained
from all his petroleum exploration ., prospecting, mining and producing
activities in Libya after deducting allozzble costs and expenses" [The
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Petroleum Law. Article 14]. Exploration and prospecting expenses and
intangible drilling costs might be deducted in the year in which they were
incurred, or capitalised and amortised at a rate of 20% per year, at the
option of the concession-holder, and of those acquired after production had
begun at 10% per year. There was also a depletion allowance introduced
into the 1955 law. This allowed a deduction from taxable income of 25% of
gross income derived from operations up to a maximum of 50% of net income.
In lieu of depletion allowance the concession-holder might amortize his
intangible pre-production exploration expenditure at 20% per year.
The calculation of the profits which were to be equally divided between
Government and company is crucial. In this respect, the Libyan Law was
imprecise in the definition of income and permissive in that of costs and
expenses allowed to be set against income in order to identify the taxable
profit. The definition of income indeed confines itself because it pays no
heed to the fact that such an income from exports of crude oil, by the
majors at least, is never identifiable. The oil exported by the major
international oil companies is transferred to affiliates, which transport
it overseas and sell it to other affiliates in consuming countries where,
mixed with crudes from other sources, it is refined, distributed and sold
as oil products and chemical and other feedstocks. The oil company, even
by the most sophisticated accounting methods, is unable to identify the
profits attributable to operations in Libya contained in sales of final
products jointly ref med from blended crudes from many sources. But there
is no profit realised at all until the processed oil is sold as petrol, the
kerosene, or fuel oil to the final consumer. The interpretation of the
definition of income in the 1955 Law was imprecise, and it was not until
1965 that a tightly worded definition of the value of crude oil exported,
in unequivocal terms of posted prices, was to be effective.
	 However,
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Government revenues are still calculated in terms of fees, rents, royalties
and taxes, even after the participation/nationalisation movement during the
first half of 1970s, e.g. in 1978 the different components of the
Government oil revenues was as shown in Table 5.15 below.
Table 5.15
Government Oil Revenues in 1978
Item	 (000)Libyan Dinars	 Percentage
Royalties	 547,053	 25.16
Surtax and income tax
	
1,607,170	 73.90
Rents of concessions	 17,089	 0.79
Vehicle licence levies
	
127	 0.01
Stamp taxes
	 487	 0.02
Other	 2,677	 0.12
Total	 2,174,603	 100.00
Payment from 1977	 617,129
Grand total	 2,791,732
Source: Ministry of planning [1979], pp.24 and 25.
Thus the weakness of the 1955 Petroleum Law formed the strong base for
accelerating the search for oil in Libya, by the competition between Major
and Independent companies. The intensive exploration resulted in series
discoveries which followed by building of pipelines, terminals, and other
facilities. Upstream operations were speeded up to satisfy the desires of
both the Libyan Government and the oil companies. This development, which
will be discussed in the next section, proved to be of great importance to
Government-company relationships, in that the Government not only insisted
on a higher share of per barrel profits and prices, but also on the partial
and in some cases complete ownership of the oil companies' Libyan
facilities.
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Natural gas development:
While successive Libyan governments in the 1960s were content to allow
the rapid exploration of oil reserves, they were slow to insist on measures
to prevent the waste of natural gas produced in association with oil.
Unless a local or foreign market is found for it, such natural gas must be
flared (burnt) at the oil field, except for that part used by the companies
in their own operations. In addition to associated gas there were several
gas fields discovered. These were plugged and the fields abandoned, Of
these the most notable were Concessions numbers 6 and 20 of Esso, which
were eventually used by the great gas liquefaction plant constructed at
Marsa al Brega and completed towards the end of 1968. Others fields with
substantial gas production were discovered by Libyan Atlantic off-shore in
Concession 88, Gulf in 66, Oasis in 26 and CPTL in 23, all in western
Libya; Mobil in 72 zone 3 in the far south; and Pan-American (Amoco) in 95.
None of these fields were developed (Wright 1981 p.234]. By 1962 there was
an estimated 30 billion cubic metres of associated natural gas in Zelten
field alone, and more in the other fields. In 1964 Algeria started the
first successful commercial shipments of natural gas in frozen, liquefied
form to Britain and France, and Esso announced plans for similar exports of
Zelten gas. In November 1965 the company signed contracts for the supply
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Italy and Spain and started building a
$300 million gas liquefaction plant at Marsa Brega. In this process the
gas is frozen to minus 1 '61 degrees centigrade and then shipped as a liquid
in purpose built tankers to a receiving terminal, where the frozen liquid
is regasified for commercial use. The project was described as the largest
single investment that the parent company had ever made, and at the start
of construction the largest such plant in the world [Waddams 1980 p.199].
It was begun in 1965 for completion in 1968, when its initial capacity
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would be 345 million cubic feet of gas a day. The main pipeline was a 175
km. 36-inch unit from Zelten (now Nassar) field, which was originally
planned to carry seawater to the fields as part of a subsequently abandoned
oilfield re-injection programme. A second supply was taken from the Rag-uba
field via a 98km. 20/22-inch spur and further sources of natural gas were
available from fields owned by Oasis and Amoseas through a pipeline feeding
into the Zelten system.
All of this construction had to be completed prior to the export of
crude. In fact, the high speed of these operations was intended to speed
up the shipments of crude abroad. The increase in production and exports
resulted in the increase of Libya's oil revenues and the companies'
profits.
crude production and Government revenues:
By the time its pipeline construction and other facilities were
completed, Esso announced the start of exports. Zelten crude was the first
Libyan oil to be produced and exported. Zelten production started on 8
August 1961. Half a million barrels of oil were pumped before the pipeline
filled completely, and not until 17 August did oil begin to reach Marsa al
Brega. On 12 September 1961, fifteen months after the start of work on the
Zelten-Brega transportation system, the first oil was shipped from Libya.
Total exports in 1961 amounted to 6,670,000 barrels. Essots achievement
was duly acknowledged on 25 October when the Marsa al Brega terminal was
officially inaugurated #by King Idris. Esso exports had been flowing for
less than a year when in May 1962, oil started moving along an 85-mile,
30-inch pipeline from the Oasis group's Bahi and Dahra Fields in Concession
32 to Es Sidra terminal, 100 miles west of Marsa al Brega road.
Libyan production increased rapidly in the 1960s, and by 1966 Libya was
already the fourth largest producer in the Middle East/North Africa region,
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accounting for more than 12% of production in the region. Libya became the
third largest producer in 1968, increasing its share to 21.8%, and in 1969,
for a passing moment, it was the second largest producer slightly ahead of
Saudi Arabia (excluding output from the Neutral Zone) and surpassed only by
Iran. The Libyan share of regional production peaked then at 23,6%.See
Table 5.16.
Table 5.16
Libya, Middle East and World Crude Oil Production: 1966-70.
(in million tons)
YEAR	 Libya (%) Middle East (%)
	 World
1966	 73 4.3	 576	 12.6	 1710
1967	 84 4.6	 506	 16.6	 1832
1968	 125 6.3	 573	 21.8	 2001
1969	 150 7.0	 634	 23.6	 2135
1970	 158 6.8	 712	 22.2	 2334
Source: Ministry of Planning [1971], p.4.
At the beginning of 1969 Libya was the world's sixth oil producer and
fourth oil exporter. Its share of world production was 7% as shown in
Table 5.16 above and Diagram 5.3 below. In Africa, Libya produced more
than 50% of African crudes; 59% in 1968, and 64% in 1969 [Ministry of
Planning 1971].
Even though huge amounts of Libyan gas had been wasted, the acceleration
a
of crude production by oil companies proved to be of major significance.
Libya simply could not absorb the attributed oil revenues efficiently.
This is evident from the rate of return on capital in the indigenous
sectors. Instead it accumulated foreign exchange reserves and did not
comply with the Law No. 5 of 1963, which states that at least 70% of oil
revenues must be spent on development programs. I will show in Chapter 7
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how Libya made use of such huge accumulated foreign reserves to strengthen
its position at the time of negotiations with foreign oil companies. In
the next chapter I will analyse the role of oil revenues on the Libyan
economy.
Unintentionally, foreign exchange reserves under the monarchy
strengthened the position of the revolutionary Government after 1969, as
will be discussed in the next two chapters. It should be clear that the
Libyan government, at the time of concession granting, showed no sign of
possible conflict with the oil companies. The profit and competition
motives of oil companies were the main reasons for the rapid development of
the Libyan oil industry. As a result the companies gained substantial
profits during the 1960s, but the 1970s showed that these companies had to
take into account the preferences of the Libyan Government as well as their
own interests. The latter point will be discussed in Chapter 7. First I
discuss and analyse the post-oil Libyan economy.
a
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CHAPTER 6: THE POST-OIL LIBYAN ECONOMY
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the post-oil Libyan economy and to
assess how far this economy has been affected by the newly developed oil
sector. The development of a new sector (any sector) requires the use of
the factors of production, land, labour and capital. If these factors are
employed in other sectors, and in an economy where the importation of
capital and labour is not desired or could not be financed, the boom in the
newly developed sector attracts some of the existing factors of production
which are inputs to other sectors of the economy. But the reduction in the
workforce, for instance, of manufacturing or agriculture or even services
would reduce the output capacity of these sectors. In countries where
manufacturing industry was most affected by the booming energy sector, as
in the case in Holland or Britain, the term used to describe this effect is
or the "ThAtch Di.Bea8e" [Corden 1984]. In a country
where the main economic activity is agriculture, Nigeria for example, the
problem may take the form of "D-agriculturalisation".
In Libya at the time of oil discoveries, as I argued in Chapter 5,
neither capital nor skilled labour were locally available, therefore
neither manufacturing nor agriculture were so developed as to be affected
by development of the oil industry in the sense of movement of resources
out of these sectors. What is described as a problem in Holland, Britain
or Nigeria may not be sen a problem as such in Libya. The Libyan case is
quite different from the usual models mentioned above. Here I attempt to
analyse this case and to consider the impact of the booming sector
arguments. The main points I intend to discuss in this Chapter are as
follows:
(1) The main features of the Libyan economy.
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(2) The inf low of capital and labour.
(3) The spending effect of oil revenues. -
(4) Socio-economic developments.
(5) Other aggregate economies (i.e. wages and prices).
6.1. The main features of the post-oil Libyan economy:
I argued in Chapter 5 that Libya was receiving foreign assistance on a
bilateral basis to provide needed capital for current government
expenditures, as well as for some development projects. Thus much of the
growth generated can be attributed to the impact of foreign technical and
financial assistance. But by 1957 the impact of a new resource, crude oil,
had become foreseeable [The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development 1960 p.177]. Foreign private investments in exploration,
drilling and construction of oil facilities provided the economy with other
financial resources besides the bilateral and multilateral government aid.
The Libyan economy has dramatically changed; oil production and oil
revenues increased at a rate never before experienced by an oil producer.
GDP and per capita income increased substantially as oil revenues
increased. The main features of the post-oil Libyan economy can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Oil production and revenues:
Soon after the first few shipments of crude oil abroad, in the early
1960s, government revenues increased rapidly. Figure 6.1 below shows the
development of oil pr&luction and oil and non-oil government revenues
between 1963 and 1975. The important features are:
(A) Non-oil revenues constitutes a small portion of the country's total
revenues. This clearly shows the significance of oil revenues in their
contribution to the government's budget and therefore the impact that oil
revenues actually have on the Libyan economy.
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FIGURE 6.1
Crude oil production, oil and non-oil revenues 1963-75
25
22.50
20
17.50
15
12.50
—10
0
-J
7.50
U)
uJ
z
LiJ5
>
uJ
2.50
0
1962	 1964	 1966	 1968	 1970	 1972	 1974
YEAR
XRXIS:SCALE RS PRINTED.
YRXIS;SCALE = Y	 (10 c*-2)
- 176A -
UTO/PE3'1	 E)' i
(B) The very steep climb of oil production and exports in the 1960s,
which can be compared favourably with the Arab World, Middle East, and
Africa. Oil production increased from less than half a million b/d in 1963
to about 1.7 mb/d in 1967 and reached a peak of over 3 inb/d in 1970.
(C) The third feature of Figure 6.1 is the decline in crude oil
production after 1970. This reflects a combination of factors. In the
early 1970s the Libyan Government became increasingly concerned with oil
conservation, partly because it began to realise that the life span of
reserves at the current rates of production might be too short relative to
the time horizon of desired economic development, and partly because Libya
became suspicious of technical maipractices on the part of oil companies
eager to produce as much as they could immediately, irrespective of the
long-term damage to future recoverable reserves. In implementing a
conservation policy the Libyan Government exploited very intelligently the
fragmented character of the community of oil producing companies in Libya,
as I argued in the previous two chapters. This point will be analysed
further, using game theory concepts, in Chapter 7.
(D) There was a continuous increase in oil revenues despite the decline
in crude oil production. Oil revenues increased from £LM117 (million
Libyan pounds) in 1963 to more than £LM772 in 1969. [In September 1971 the
Libyan currency was changed from the Pound to the Dinar, and one-thousandth
of the Dinar was the dirham. At the same time the new currency was
revalued in terms of the US dollar from a par rate of $2.80 to LD1 =
$2.90]. After the 1973 oil crisis Libya's oil revenues increased to LDB2.4
(billion Libyan dinars) and about LDB6.5 by 1980, just after the Iranian
crisis.
The impact of oil, on economic growth has been impressive. From 1960 to
1967 the compounded rate of growth of Libyan national income averaged
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21.5%, while for the same period it was 4.07% and 3.75% for Morocco and
Tunisia, respectively. Per capita income in Libya was $1,215 in 1968,
while for the same year it was $293 in Algeria, $185 in Morocco, and $236
in Tunisia (Abderrahman 1973 p.l35].
(2) Gross Domestic Product growth:
The importance of oil in the Libyan economy can be seen clearly from an
examination of gross domestic product of the country. GDP as shown in
Figure 6.2 increased from LD155.5 million in 1962 to LD7753 million in 1979
[Ministry of Planning 1982 p.25]. Non-oil activities accounted for LD117.5
million in 1962 (75.6% of GDP), and LD3195.2 million in 1979 (41.2% of
GDP).	 However, GDP data at factor cost confirms a number of
generalisations about an oil economy.
(A) Little growth occured in agriculture. The contribution of this
sector to GDP fluctuated between LDM14.9 (9.6% of GDP) and LDM149.9 (1.9%
of GDP) during the 1962-1979 period. (See Table 6.1). These variations
are characteristic of an agriculture depending heavily on irregular
rainfall.
(B) Manufacturing tends to grow faster than agriculture, although from a
small base. The manufacturing contribution to GDP appeared to have a large
increase from LD9.0 million in 1962 (5.8% of GDP) to LD185.8 million in
1979 (2.4% of GDP).
(C) The oil boom is always associated with a construction boom, because
of increases in investmext and because infrastructure and housing generally
occupy a significant place in the investment pattern. The contribution of
this sector to GDP fluctuated between LDM1O.3 (6.6% of GDP) and LDM834.7
(10.8% of GDP) during 1962-1979.
(D) Considerable growth took place in the services sector.
	 Public
administration and defence increased their contribution to GDP from LDM15.5
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Table 6.1
Gross Domestic Product of Libya by Sectors(current prices LDM)
Sector	 1962 %
	 1970 %
	 1979 %
1.Agriculture,Forestry&Fishing	 14.9 9.6 33.1 2.6 149.9 1.9
2.Petroleurn mining	 38.0 24.4 812.6 63.1 4558
	 59
3.Other mining& Quarrying 	 0.6 0.4
	 1.7 0.1 41.5 0.5
4.Manufacturing	 9.0 5.8 22.5 1.7 185.8 2.4
5.Construction	 10.3 6.6 87.8 6.8 834.7 10.8
6.Electricity and Gas
	 0.9 0.6
	 6.2 0.5 40.0 0.5
7.Transportation & Conununic.
	 8.6 5.5 43.2 3.4 301.2 3.9
8.Wholesale & retail trade
	 14.2 9.1 47.0 3.7 393.2 5.1
9.Banking & insurance
	 1.7 1.1
	 8.3 0.6 194.6 2.5
10.Public admini.& defence 	 15.5 10.0 98.1 7.6 512.5 6.6
11.Educational services	 5.0 3.2 39.7 3.1 206.6 2.7
12.Hea].th services	 2.1 1.4 15.8 1.2 104.2 1.3
13.Ownership of dwellings	 29.4 18.9 59.6 4.6 188.8 2.4
14.Other services	 5.3 3.4 12.7 1.0 42.2 0.6
15.GDP at factor cost	 155.5 100 1288 100 7753 100
Source: Ministry of Planning, National Accounts,(1962-71),
36, 38, and (1971-78), p.192.
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(10% of GDP) in 1962 to LDM512.,5 (6.6% of GDP) in 1979. 	 Education from
LDM5.0 (3.2% of GD?) to LDM2O1.6 (2.7% of GD?), and health services from
LDM2.1 (1.4% of GDP) to LDM1O4.2 (1.3% of GDP). All these sectors expanded
much faster than non-oil GD? (e.g.,1971=238 with 1962=100) [Knapp 1977].
Expenditure of the gross domestic product, as shown in Table 6.2,
indicates the change in the share of consumption and investment in relation
to GD?. While private consumption increased from 28.8% in 1971 to about
32% in 1975 and then slightly reduced to 28% by 1978, the public
consumption share increased at a faster rate, from 19.57% in 1971 to 27.6%
in 1975 and 26.89% in 1978. But the highest percentage increase in
individual contributions to GDP was confined to imports of goods and
services. The increase in the imports share of GDP reflects the growth in
total investment, which increased from 18% in 1971 to 26.5% in 1974 and
30.55% in 1975. The imports, as will be seen later, are mostly capital
goods which are essential ingredients to domestic investment.
Table 6.2
Expenditure on the Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices (1971-78)
(Percentage ratio of individual itemB to GDP.)
Item	 1971	 1975	 1978
Exports of goods &Services
	
59.94	 54.32	 56.16
Imports of goods &Services	 26.80	 44.07	 35.61
Resource gap [1]
	
33.14	 10.25	 20.55
Private consumption	 28.81	 31.57	 28.03
Public consumption 	 19.57	 27.63	 26.89
Total consumption [2]
	
48.38	 59.20	 54.92
Total investment [3]
	
18.48	 30.55	 24.53
Gross Domestic Product[1+2+3] 100
	 100	 100
Source: Arab Monetary Fund [1983], p.140.
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Per capita income increased every year except those when oil revenues
slowed down reflecting the fact that GDP and per capita income still depend
on the oil contribution despite the great effort to develop other economic
activities.	 Table 6.3 shows the increase in per capita income and the
population growth.
	 Per capita income increased from LD1O7 in 1962 to
LD3155 or about US $10658 in 1980.
Table 6.3
Per capita income in Libya (Libyan Dinar), and population(M)
1962-1980
Year Per capita Population Year Per capita population
1962	 107	 1.45	 1972	 796	 2.20
1963	 156	 1.50	 1973	 929	 2.35
1964	 234	 1.56	 1974	 1510	 2.51
1965	 304	 1.62	 1975	 1369	 2.68
1966	 379	 1.68	 1976	 1679	 2.84
1967	 430	 1.74	 1977	 1910	 2.94
1968	 595	 1.80	 1978	 1818	 3.01
1969	 654	 1.87	 1979	 2479	 3.13
1970	 642	 2.01	 1980	 3155	 3.25
Source: Socio-economic evolution in Libya, Ministry of Planning,
[1980], p.11.
However, despite the growth in GDP and per capita income, the dual
character of the Libyan economy has had its impact on the economic as well
as social and political aspects of the country. From the economic point of
vie,, two incompletely integrated sectors exist side by side. This was
particularly true during the first decade of the oil era, but its
significance was greatly reduced in the 1970s as oil revenues became widely
distributed, as will be discussed later. The existence of a dual economy
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has limited the size of the Libyan domestic market, as the number of people
engaged in the modern sector is quite low relative to the total population.
(3) Migrant workers:
Libya has immense wealth and its economic development has been swift.
The small population and workforce have required the importation of quite
large numbers of migrant workers. Migrants have flooded into Libya,
particularly from its neighbours, Egypt and Tunisia. Table 6.4 shows the
rapid growth in their numbers through the 1970s up to 1976. There were a
mere 17,300 migrants in Libya in 1964, while in 1975 they represented about
33% of the entire workforce. According to the estimates of Birks and
Sinclair [1984 p.267], the official figures are rather low and probably
misleading.	 One reason for the discrepancy between the official and
estimated figures (see Table 6.4) could be the extent of illegal and
undocumented immigration. Libyan officials are either unwilling or unable
to take account of its full extent in official planning documents. The
discrepancy is of major significance for the analysis of investment
efficiency and productivity in such sectors as agriculture and
construction.	 It also raises the very important question of the
productivity of nationals.
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Table 6.4
Growth of Migrant Workers in Libya
Source: Birks and Sinclair [1984], p.267.
The migrant workforce in Libya are of all skill levels and are widely
dispersed throughout the economy. The construction sector is the principal
provider of non-national employment, followed by educational services,
agriculture and manufacturing. There is good reason to believe that in
future years the employment of non-Libyans in the manufacturing sector will
grow, while their employment in construction declines. At least it will
decline if Libyan demand for housing and infrastructural and development
spending ever ends.
Table 6.5 shows that a small but significant number of migrants work in
the '
 agriculture sector, and this illustrates another remarkable facet of
Libyan development, namely the agricultural sectorts dependence on
expatriate labour. Almost certainly these immigrants work in those parts
of the agricultural sector which are modern , in the sense of being
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capital-intensive, using modern technology, and where labour productivity
is relatively high. There may, however, be a certain number of immigrants
on traditional farms, where they will earn very low wages and exhibit low
productivity.
Table 6.5
Distribution of Migrant Workers by Economic Sector in Libya
1975 and 1980*
	
Economic Sector	 1975	 1980
No.	 %	 No.
1.Agriculture	 17.6	 7.9	 23.1	 8.2
2.Petroleum & Gas 	 2.7	 1.2	 2.9	 1.0
3.Mining & Quarrying 	 2.8	 1.3	 3.7	 1.3
4.Manufacturing	 13.8	 6.2	 23.2	 8.3
5.Electricity,Gas & Water	 3.6	 1.6	 5.4	 1.9
6.Construction	 118.0	 53.0	 129.5	 46.2
7.Trade,Restau.& Hotels	 7.7	 3.5	 4.5	 1.6
8.Transport & Communic.	 6.2	 2.8	 11.7	 4.2
9.Finance & Insurance	 1.6	 0.7	 2.5	 0.9
10.Public Administration	 5.2	 2.3	 6.0	 2.1
11.Education	 14.1	 6.0	 30.6	 10.9
12.Health	 9.8	 4.3	 18.2	 6.6
13.Other	 •	 19.6	 8.8	 18.7	 6.8
Total	 222.7	 100	 280.0	 100
(*) Official Estimates.
Source: Birks and Sinclair [1980].
Libyan manpower shortages are aggravated partly by political and partly
by social reasons. On the political side, Libyan relations with Egypt
deteriorated in the mid 1970s to the point where in 1977 Libya and Egypt
- 183 -
broke off diplomatic relations. A result of this dispute was that Libya
dropped Tobruk as an industrial centre and is said to have expelled 100,000
Egyptian workers. Many Egyptian workers left, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, have but returned to Libya a short time later.
The social side is actually related to the problem of manpower in Libya.
Given a choice, migrant workers from within the Middle East prefer to work
in Western Europe; the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states are a second
choice. The conditions under which migrant workers are required to live in
Libya, and to a great extent in the Gulf, are harsh. Social mores and
customs are often applied quite rigorously, and this tends to reduce the
number of migrant workers (International Labour organization 1980 p.81].
Thus, despite the socio-economic problems which tended to reduce the
number of migrant workers coming to Libya, productive sectors in the
economy still, to a great extent, depend upon the migrant workers,
especially in oil because of its nature as a highly technical industry.
The inflow of both capital (through oil companies) and labour from various
countries has accelerated the development of the oil industry as well as
non-oil activities, as will be discussed next.
6.2 The inflow of capital and labour:
According to resource movement concepts, the boom in the energy sector
raises the marginal products of the mobile factors employed within the
sector, and so draws resources out of other sectors. This gives rise to
various adjustments in the rest of the economy, one mechanism of adjustment
being the real exchange rate [Corden and Neary 1982 p.827].
Suppose that D0D0 in Figure 6.3 below, is the demand for labour in the
oil booming sector, where the wage rate (in terms of manufacturing) is
measured on the vertical axis and labour supply measured on the horizontal
axis. The energy sector's labour demand schedule shifts upwards, as shown
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in the Figure, by an amount proportional to the extent of technological
progress. The latter acts exactly the same way as a price increase,
raising profitability and the demand for labour in the energy sector at a
given wage rate.
This effect, which raises the wage rate in the oil sector to (W 1 ), at a
constant real exchange rate, thus causes labour to move out of both the
manufacturing and services sectors. Such reduction in the manufacturing
and services labour force may result in a decline in production by these
sectors. Thus we may say that the resource movement effect gives rise to
direct de-industrialisation.
Such an effect, which may be applicable in such developed countries as
Holland or the UK, is of no significance in the case of Libya or in other
oil-rich developing countries. Generally, the distinction between the two
types of economies in regard to the resource movement effect can be stated
as follows:
(a) The developed economies have a mature infrastructure, involving
manufacturing as well as services, while Libya for instance has just begun
the process of building up such socio-economic infrastructure since 1963.
(b) Oil revenues in an oil-rich developed country constitute a small
proportion of national income, thus the overall effect of income from oil
on the economy is not felt as much as in a developing country which is
heavily dependent on oil revenues.
(c) In Western countries the free-market system and the existence of
mature money markets allow for flexible movement of capital as well as for
exchange rate fluctuations. This is not the case in a number of oil
developing countries with underdeveloped markets, such as Libya.
However, taking the above remarks into account, the following facts
concerning the resource movement effect of oil revenues on the Libyan
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economy, show clearly that it takes a completely different form from the
de-industrialization or de-agriculturalization effect.
(1) The oil industry is a capital intensive industry or capital extensive
industry according to Machiup [1983 p.58]. In Libya the oil industry was,
until the Government take over in the 1970s, run completely by the
multinational oil companies. There had been no Libyan capital involved in
the development of the Libyan oil industry when it first started. In other
words, there had been no capital movement from any sector of the economy to
the oil industry.
(2) The oil sector employs a relatively small proportion of the labour
force. According to the Industrial Census of 1964, firms holding
concessions employed 5510 workers. Concessionaires provided jobs for less
than 1.5% of the whole labour force [Mabro 1970 p.321]. Table 6.6 below
shows the growth in oil concession workers. At the beginning and the end
of the period (1964-1969) the nuniber of such workers was at the same level
(1.5%) in relation to Libyan total employment. This indicates that there
was no employment shift to the oil industry on the account of any of the
other sectors of the economy.
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Table 6.6
Oil Concessions Employment in Libya (000 Workers): 1964-69
Year No.of oil concession workers % of total Total employment
1964	 5.5	 1.5	 365.3
1965	 5.9	 1.6	 372.2
1966	 5.7	 1.5	 380.2
1967	 5.4	 1.4	 389.3
1968	 5.7	 1.4	 400.5
1969	 6.2	 1.5	 414.6
Source: Ministry of planning,Economic and Social Indicator8,
[1982], p.8.
(3) Manufacturing industry was small in size, as was the number of
workers employed. It employed 6.6% of the total labour force in 1964, and
about 4.7% in 1969. Here also there was no obvious employment shift from
this sector to the booming oil industry.
(4) Even agriculture, by far the largest sector in the Libyan economy as
far as labour is concerned, has not been affected by the oil sector in
terms of employment movement. Agriculture accounted for 41% of the total
labour force in 1962 and 40% in 1964. The lowest Figure for agriculture
employment was in 1969 (125,000 workers) or about 30% of total labour
force. Figure 6.4 below suggests that the reduction in the number of
agricultural workers, witich is a sign of development, was as a result of
the increase in the number of workers in construction, transport and other
sectors through the spending effect of oil revenues, and not due to the
resource movement effect to the oil sector.
It should be clear that despite the reduction in the number of workers in
both agriculture and manufacturing during the first decade of the Libyan
oil industry (1960s), neither sectors have actually experienced a decline
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in production levels. This is so because of the existence of some
unemployment in agriculture which rises during the off seasons, and the
steady increase in the number of foreign workers (Table 6.7). This once
more assures us that the booming oil industry has had no appreciable effect
on of agriculture and manufacturing.
Table 6.7
Growth of production and employment
in agriculture and industry in Libya: 1963-1969
Year	 Agri.growth(%) Manuf.growth(%) Foreign workers
prod.	 employ. prod. employ.
	 growth(%)
1963	 1.3	
-0.1	 10.0	 0.0	 3.1
1964	 10.6	
-0.1	 16.2	 0.0	 3.6
1965	 50.9	
-1.9	 9.6	
-0.4	 11.7
1966	 8.3	
-1.8	 14.3	
-2.5	 14.7
1967	 13.2	
-3.4	 13.9	
-4.8	 16.9
1968	 8.1	
-3.5	 22.0	
-5.5	 21.9
1969	 12.0	 -4.2	 4.0	
-6.7	 26.3
Source: Ministry of Planning [19821, pp.9 and 29.
Sociological surveys show that the internal migrants of the mid-1960s did
not leave the farms with the expectation of employment in the petroleum
sector, but rather they were attracted to the urban centres because of the
relatively higher wages paid in construction, industry, and government
[Mukergi and Kataifi 1970].
The land tenure system and extended family structure were probably
factors that caused farmers to migrate to urban centres. The widespread
tribal land tenure system tends to inhibit growth in agricultural incomes
by discouraging capital improvement on the land. The extended family
structure as it is practiced in rural Libya also contributes to the
- 188 -
backward state of agriculture. In 1965 an FAO study concluded that those
factors would continue to operate until the Libyan farmer is given security
of tenure and investment [FAO 1969 p.14]. The movement of the national
labour force was, in fact, from the goods sector (including the oil sector
of which employment actually declined) to the services sector during the
first decade of the boom as shown in Figure 6.5. This is, as I will show
later, because of high wages in the service sector relative to the goods
sector.
However, the resource movement effect of oil revenues on the Libyan
economy has been on the form of inflow of both foreign capital and labour.
This shift is of major significance because it not only prevented a
de-industrialisation or a de-agriculturalisation effect, but it also
provided the other sectors of the economy with skilled and non-skilled
labour force. At this point I turn to discuss the spending effect of oil
revenues.
6.3 Spending effect:
According to this concept, the higher real income resulting from an
oil-boom leads to extra spending on services, which raises their output
(i.e. causes a real appreciation) and thus leads to further adjustments
[Corden and Neary 1982 p.830]. The rate of exchange depends on the supply
of a currency in the foreign exchange market in relation to the demand for
it in that market. The demand for a country's currency is derived from the
demand for that country's exports; the supply of its currency depends on
its demand for imports, both visible and invisible. When the demand for a
currency in the foreign exchange market is large in relation to the supply,
it will bring about an appreciation of the currency.
It is assumed here that the energy sector does not use any labour already
in use in other sectors of the economy. Hence at the initial real exchange
- 189 -
FTGURE 5.5
Labour force movement in Libya (000 workers) 19G2-69
280
260
240
220
200
(1)
uJ
D
D
D
D
160
140
1960	 1961	 1962	 1963	 964	 1965	 1966	 1967	 1968
YEAR
- 189A -
Ut,p1i06 LP 985
rate the boom has no effect on the economy's labour supply. Provided the
demand for services rises with income, demand at the initial real exchange
rate moves along an income-consumption curve such as ON in Figure 6.6,
which intersects T'S (the new production possibility curve) at point c
Once again, there is excess demand for services at the initial real
exchange rate and so a real appreciation must occur. The new equilibrium
must lie somewhere between j and c.
If the resource movement effect is stronger than spending effect, the new
equilibrium would be somewhere between b and j indicating a decline in the
output of services. If this is not the case, because the spending effect
is stronger, the post-boom equilibrium would be somewhere between j and c,
indicating an increase in the output of services.
More than that, Van Long [1983 p.57] has argued that the mineral export
boom may result in.
(1) An expansion of all industries.
(2) An increase in the profitability of the traditional tradeables
sector.
Apart from the differences mentioned earlier between the developed
economies and the Libyan economy, the notion of the spending effect of oil
revenues provides a significant insight in understanding the post-oil
Libyan economy. The idea of expansion in all economic activities is very
likely in the Libyan case. Even though the exchange rate in Libya is
fixed, the increase in prices of imported goods and services relative to
export prices brings favourable terms of trade. This means the country can
obtain more goods and services from abroad. This is equivalent to an
appreciation effect concerning the spending effect of oil revenues in a
free market economy. This point will be further discussed later, when I
examine inflation in Libya.
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The increased oil revenues after 1963 enabled the Libyan public sector to
finance a massive development programme. These large amounts of
development expenditures were an important factor in creating higher demand
for food products, capital, raw materials and labour which the domestic
economy was unable to satisfy. The result was growth with inflationary
pressure. The government tried to lessen the inflationary trend by opening
the country to imports of goods and services, including the importation of
labour. To analyse the spending effect of oil revenues on the Libyan
economy I proceed by considering the following:
(1) Oil and government income.
(2) Institutional arrangements and planning.
(3) Demand for goods and services.
(4) Sectoral development.
(5) Personal income and wages.
(6) Inflation.
6• 3 • 1 Oil and government income:
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that oil revenues have increased
substantially since the export of crude oil began in commercial quantities.
They increased from £LM117 in 1963 to more than £LM772 in 1969. After the
1973 oil crisis Libyan oil revenues increased to LDB 2.4 (billion Libyan
dinars) and to about LDB 6.5 by 1980.
As I argued in Chapter 5, the development of the oil industry in Libya
was from the early stages under the control of the Government. This point
is of great significance, since the growth in the oil industry and oil
revenues would increase the Government domination over the economy. On the
other hand it would mean a decline in the share of the private sector, both
in production and investment.
The management of capital formation was also gradually moving out of the
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private sector into government-run projects and, whereas the private sector
was responsible for over 70% of the capital formation in 1962, by 1967 this
had fallen to under 50%. After a recovery in private sector activity up to
1969 it fell away steadily as a proportion of total activity until 1971,
when it was only 38%, and the proportion fell steadily thereafter.
The tendency to massive public investment, especially after 1969, is
evident. The emphasis early in the 197 Os on infrastructure and agriculture
is borne out by the pattern of investment, shown in Table 6.8. Social
services and infrastructure absorbed large proportions of total investment
in 1975. This is not surprising however, since there was an acute absence
of infrastructure, which became particularly obvious when domestic
expenditure rose in line with oil income. The limited provision of social
services in the early 1970s also occasioned substantial investment in
government services. In such areas as education and health, Libyan
standards are improving dramatically [Allan 1981 pp.232-252].
e
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Table 6.8
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 1975, 1980*
And Anticipated (1981_1985)* in (LDmillion)
Economic Sector	 1975	 %	 1980	 %	 1981-85 %
1.Agriculture	 149.9	 14.2	 205	 14.1 1,400 12.5
2.Manufacturing	 121.5	 11.5	 218	 15.0 2,000 17.9
3.Electricity & Water
	
135.1	 12.8	 223	 15.4 1,600 14.3
4.Transport & Communi.
	
157.8	 15.0	 241	 16.6 1,800 16.1
5.Housing	 235.5	 22.3	 158	 10.9 1,500 13.4
6.Public Services
	
91.4	 8.7	 150	 10.3 1,000	 8.9
7.Education & Health
	
99.3	 9.4	 135	 9.3 1,000	 8.9
8.Other(Oil,Trade etc)
	
64.2	 6.1	 121	 8.4 0,900	 8.0
Total	 1,054.7	 100 1,451	 100 11.200	 100
(*) Constant 1979 prices.
Source: Second Five Year Plan, Secretariat of Planning [1982], p.41.
Agriculture received a substantial share of investment expenditure, both
in 1975 and 1980 as shown in Table 6.8. In 1980 the share accounted for by
industrial investment is anticipated as increasing to the point where it
almost absorbs the highest share of investment. This trend towards an
increasing emphasis on industry is echoed in the current 1981-1985 Plan,
with it absorbing 18% of all investment in the period 1981 to 1985. Taken
a
together however, "electricity and water" and "transport and communication"
comprise 30% of total investment. Infrastructure will therefore continue
to be a major component of Libyan planning and domestic expenditure.
Thus the Government control over planning and developing the economy has
been growing over time. This was mostly due to the increased oil revenues
during the 1960s and furthered by the government since 1969. Government
expenditure no doubt covered all sectors of the Libyan economy and the
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fruits of oil revenues reached every household in one way or another, but
the priorities of successive governments' spending on various sectors of
the economy differ. Their efforts in institutional building, planning and
managing the country's resources will be discussed next.
6.3.2 Institutional arrangements and planning:
It took the Libyan Government some time after the first shipment of crude
oil abroad in 1961 to make institutional and administrative arrangements to
cope with the new situation of the expected abundant wealth. New
Ministries of Petroleum Affairs and Industry were created in May 1961, and
in April 1963 as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 5.
During the same period constitutional changes were made to end the
federal arrangements. The unity of the State led to a concentration of
constitutional power and to the centralization of planning. A National
Planning Council was introduced to examine matters of planning policy, and
a Ministry of Planning and Development was set up to administer and execute
planning and development. Measures were taken to regulate banking
activities under a Banking Law of April 1963, and the Bank of Libya assumed
the full powers of a Central Bank. In addition to the establishment of a
legal minimum reserve for the Central Bank, it set interest and commission
regulations for the Libyan commercial banks.
During the last two decades and since commercial shipments of Libyan oil
in the early 1960s, planning for development in Libya had been concerned
for an overall development of the economy.
Accordingly, actual development expenditure in Libya is taken as a
measurement of absorptive capacity of the economy [El-Jehaimi 1975 p.62].
Particular attention has been given to agriculture, construction and
industry. Diagram 6.1 shows that more was spent on construction and
agriculture than on any other sector during the first five-year plan
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(1963-1968), while since 1970 priority has been given to agriculture,
housing and industry.
Article 11 of Law No.5 of 1963 provided that the funds for government's
development programmes were to be supplied by:
(1) Imounts allocated by the government for development, "provided they
BhOuid not be leeB than 70% of the oii revenuett.
(2) Amounts allocated from loans which are provided by the government.
(3) Amounts and monies allocated by the government in accordance with
international agreements or agreements made with international
organizations (Farley 1971 p.195].
Article 11 of Law No.5 remains in force, but the government has not been
able to comply with the Law. In the period between 1963 and 1969, only 20%
of oil revenues were spent for development programmes, and only 40% during
1970-80 period. The level of absorptive capacity (actual expenditure) of
the Libyan economy in relation to development allocations and oil revenues
is shown in Diagram 6.2 below.
The Libyan Government was unable to comply with the Law for two reasons:
(a) Oil revenues grew more rapidly than was initially anticipated.
(b) The absorptive capacity of the Libyan economy was so limited that
investment of 70% of oil revenues would have driven the marginal
productivity of capital to zero (El-Maihub 1977 p.35].
Libya adopted a first five-year plan (1963-68) soon after its emergence
e
as an oil-exporting country. As oil revenues grew faster than originally
expected, the plan was continually expanded through additional allocations.
Initially, planned expenditures were set at £L169 million but the final
version budgeted for £L625.3 million. The plan sought to remedy the
deficiencies which had affected the economy and to secure the optimum
exploitation of the country's resources, as well as to preserve the
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nation's security, dignity and prosperity. There were seven major
objectives for the plan [Ministry of Planning, Development Plan
(1963-1968)]:
(1) To ensure the early improvement of the standards of living of the
people, particularly those of limited income who did not benefit from the
economic prosperity.
(2) To give special consideration to the agriculture sector, being the
source of supply of most of the essential consumer goods, besides being the
source of income and employment for the majority of the people; to improve
the productive efficiency of farms and labour; and to encourage the private
sector to make investments in these fields.
(3) To permit the public sector to continue in such services as
education, health, communications and housing, together with other sectors
as required to consolidate the basic elements for rapid economic growth.
(4) To develop rural areas by establishing production and public service
projects, thus ensuring regular employment for people in the countryside,
utilising their productive faculties and raising their incomes in such a
way as to achieve justice in the distribution of national income and
restrict their migration into the cities.
(5) To organise the imports policy to avoid importation of all goods
which can be produced in the country on the one hand, and to ensure
protection from the danger of inflation and the provision of sufficient
a
supplies of the capital goods needed for development on the other; at the
same time striving to set up local production and adopt an appropriate
customs policy for its protections and in this way gradually and
continuously substitute local production for the mass of such imports.
(6) To take such monetary, financial and commercial measures as may be
necessary to ensure increased revenue and to enforce control on
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expenditures.
(7) To take steps to meet the lack of information and statistical data
which are necessary for planning, by strengthening existing statistical
organs and by studies and research work.
Accordingly reconstruction, investment in infrastructure and housing were
the main priorities in that 49.6% of the version budget was allocated to
communications, public works, and housing as shown in Table 6.9 below.
Agriculture was next with 10.1%, followed closely by education at 9.6%
The actual expenditure was less than the allocations by £L74.3 million.
The failure to meet investment targets is not uncommon in an oil economy as
planners and governments always tend to under-estimate the real constraints
on implementation: manpower, infrastructure, and institutional limitations.
Communications and housing (including public works) absorbed 46% of actual
expenditure. This may be compared with the 11.9% share absorbed by
agriculture, 8.6% by education, 5.2% by industry, and 3% by public health
[Knapp 1977 p.2l6].
The 1963-68 development plan was followed by a second five-year plan
(1969-74) which was scrapped by the Revolution on 1 September 1969. The
new Government wanted to raise priorities and objectives and establish a
new institutional framework. During 1970-72 the Government spent £L791
million on economic and social development. The emphasis in that period
rested heavily on housing, 19% (about £L149.1 million) of actual
expenditure, agriculture at 17.1% (about £L135 million), and industry at
13.8% (L109 million) [Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin Oct/Dec. 1979].
Unlike the first five-year plan (1963-68), which emphasised communication
and public works, the three-year plan (1973-75), after the revolution,
emphasised agriculture and land reclamation, housing, and industry. LD555
million (more than 25% of actual expenditure) was spent on agriculture,
- 197 -
Table 6.9
First Five Year Plan (1963-68) and Additional Year 1969;
Original allocation, Final Version, & Actual Expenditure (ELM)
Sector	 O.Plan %	 V.Plan %	 A.Exp.	 %
1.Agriculture & forestry
	
29.3 17.3
	 63.0 10.1	 65.4 11.9
2.Industry	 6.9	 4.1	 32.6	 5.2	 28.5	 5.2
3.National economy	 2.9	 1.1	 5.5	 0.9	 4.3	 0.8
4.Communications	 27.5 16.2	 118.6 19.0	 91.6 16.6
5.Public works	 38.7 26.6	 82.2 13.1
6.Education	 22.4 13.1	 59.9	 9.6	 47.6	 8.6
7.Health	 12.5	 7.4	 24.3	 3.9	 16.5	 3.0
8.Labour & social affairs
	
8.7	 5.1	 29.7	 3.0	 20.2	 3.7
9.News & guidance	 2.6	 1.5	 10.4	 1.7	 6.6	 1.2
10.Public administration 	 6.4	 3.8	 0.8	 0.1	 46.3	 8.4
11.Planning & develop.	 11.4	 6.7	 9.7	 1.5	 5.0	 0.9
12.Housing	 -	 -	 109.3 17.5	 192.2 29.4
13.Interior	 -	 -	 52.3	 8.4
14.Electricity	 -	 -	 25.3	 5.0	 56.8 10.3
15.Other	 -	 -	 1.7	 0.3
Total	 169.1	 100	 625.3	 100	 551.0	 100
Notes: (1) Fiscal Years, April-March.
(2) Actual expenditures for Interior are included under
a
Public administration, and for Public works are included
under Housing.
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LD336 million (15.3 of actual expenditure) on housing, and LD269 million
(about 12.3%) on industry.
Again, in the Second five-year plan (1976-80) and the Third five-year
plan (1981-85), the emphasis was on agriculture and land reclamation, but
at a lower rate, with 19% of total allocations in the Second five-year
plan, and 16.7% in the third five-year plan. Industry and Housing are the
second important sectors according to the plans as shown in Table 6.10
below.
Growth was still impressive by world standards, with the non-oil sector
averaging 10.9% a year. To give more achievable figures, the overall
target in the (1981-85) plan, was set at 10.3% per annum (Lloyds Bank, 1983
p.5].
As I argued early in this chapter and in Chapter 5, oil exports increased
rapidly during the 1960s, with it oil revenues increased substantially.
The favourable terms of trade in the 1960s enabled Libya to obtain more
goods and services from abroad. Thus, rapid development of the oil
industry continuously improved the balance of payments. The demand for
domestic and imported goods, services and labour and the impact of oil
revenues on the balance of payments as a whole will be discussed below.
6.3.3 Dmand for goods and services:
The effect of spending oil revenues on the Libyan economy can be
expressed as a shift to the right in the demand curve for goods and
a
services.	 This shift was a result of increased oil revenues which, as I
argued above, increased both GDP and per capita income substantially.
Spending these revenues through administrative and ambitious development
plans increased the purchasing power of the community, shifting the demand
curve to the right
This shift in the demand for goods and services was furthered by the
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Table 6.10
Transformation Plans (1976-80), and (1981-85) in LDM
(1976-80)Plan	 (198 1-85)Plan
Sector	 Allocations Expen.
	 Allocations
1.Agriculture	 1818.8	 1695.3	 3100
2.Industry & Minerals
	 1463.5	 1250.5	 3930*
3.Oil & Gas
	 411.2	 367.4	 200
4.Electricity	 858.4	 1000.9	 2000
5.Education	 588.6	 464.8	 1000
6.Information & Culture
	
124.5	 120.0	 150
7.Manpower	 57.0	 43.2	 150
8.Public Health
	
310.1	 258.8	 560
9.Social affairs,S.security 	 23.0	 15.8	 130
10.Youth & Sports 	 75.6	 51.7	 100
11.Housing	 1007.0	 864.5**	 1700
12.Municipalities 	 748.1	 890.9	 1300
13.Communi.& Marine trans. 	 1051.0	 1086.4	 2100
14.Economy	 86.8	 104.2	 500
15.Planning	 26.0	 17.2	 80
16.Project reserves 	 164.5	 1500
Total	 8813.1	 8231.6	 18500
(*)This figure includes LD2730 million allocated for heavy industries
a
(**)Includjng Justice.
Source: Ministry of Planning, Socio-economic servey for (1976-80)
Plan, p.63, and Central Bank of Libya, (1980], p.74.
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increase in population and a large increase in foreign workers. The latter
group brought with them a new style of life and a new pattern of
consumption requirements. Such developments in demand can be observed
through the decline of local non-oil exports and the increase in imported
goods and services.
It is normally expected that in an economy highly dependent on a single
commodity for its living, the exports trend would be very much in tune with
the gross domestic product. This is exactly the case in Libya since oil
began to be exported in commercial quantities in the early 1960s. Table
6.11 below shows that the non-oil trade balance has been increasingly in
deficit. The 1958 deficit was £LM11, increased to £LM59 in 1963 and more
than tripled by 1970, to £LM205.
Table 6.11
The Effects of Oil Exports on Trade Balance in Libya (ELM)
1958-1970
Item	 1958	 1962	 1963	 1967	 1970
(1) Non-oil exports	 +5	 +3	 +2	 +2	 +3
(2) Imports	 -16	 -49	 -61	 -140	 -205
(3) Non-oil trade
balance	 -11	 -46	 -59	 -138	 -202
(4) Oil exports	 +10*	 +35	 +62	 +231	 +569
(5) Oil and Non-oil
trade balance •
	 -1	 -11	 +3	 +93	 +369
(+-) Signs show foreign exchange earnings and outgoings
respectively, and not increases and decreases.
(*) This value represents payments for concessions.
Source: Central Bank of Libya, Baiance of Payment, various issues.
Exports, mostly of agricultural produce, diminshed somewhat, but did not
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by any means cease with the arrival of the oil era. This sector, as I
argued above, has been very much affected by rainfall fluctuations and to
some extent by the movement of the labour force from agriculture in the
rural areas to the booming services sector in the urban areas.
The oil boom which increased domestic earnings substantially, as I have
already discussed, resulted in higher demand for goods and services, which
domestic production failed to provide. This was coupled with the
increasing expatriate population with, a new variety of consumption
requirements. The alternative and the easy way, with the help of cash from
oil, to cover the gap between rapidly increasing consumption and low levels
of domestic production is to depend heavily on imports from abroad.
Imports increased from £LM16 in 1958 to about £LM49 in 1962 and then jumped
fourfold to £LM205 in 1970. However, the massive increase in imports had
to be met by the increase in crude oil production and exports. It is
shown, in Table 6.11, that nothing in Libya has ever increased as much as
oil revenues did. It had increased from £LM35 in 1962 to nearly twice as
much in the very next year, and from £LM231 in 1967 to £LM567 in 1970.
During the second decade of the oil boom (1970s), the Libyan balance of
trade and balance of payments continued their dependence on oil exports.
But, in addition, the 1970s showed how vulnerable is the Libyan economy
through its dependence on a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings,
especially with increased imports. This effect is quite clear from the
fluctuations of the balance of trade and balance of payments during the
197 Os.
Figure 6.7 shows that the value of exports rose in each year during the
1970s, except in 1972, 1975 and 1978, in spite of falls in volume which, as
will be argued in Chapter 7, was a result or an outcome of the game between
Libya and foreign oil companies. The tightness of oil revenues to oil
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prices can be beneficial to oil producers at some times, but on the other
hand it can have a negative effect at other times. For example, while the
increased oil prices in the 1970s was a blessing to exporting countriest
economies, it was followed by a period of hardship when oil prices tumbled
down in the 1980s. However, although Libyan oil exports declined in 1974,
its value doubled because of the great price rises, but fell back again in
1975 owing to lower prices. Soon in 1976 oil revenues recovered because of
the greater volume of exports.
Exports rose by 19.5% in 1977, but figures for 1978 show a decline in
total exports of 13.3% from LD3,381.8 million in 1977 to LD2,932.9 million,
due to cutbacks in oil production and demand. The main destination of the
Libyan crude exports are shown in Figure 6.8. However, in 1979 total
exports increased to LD4,761.9 million and in 1980 to LD6,489.1 million as
a result of increased world demand for oil, in addition to price increases
imposed by Libya. This was in spite of an 18% cut in oil supplies
effective from April 1979 [Lloyds Bank 1980 p.14]. Exports continued to
fall during 1980 and 1981 owing to the slump in world demand. Despite
increased crude extraction by oil companies in 1981, export earnings are
likely to continue to be depressed for some time as demand for oil continue
to fall. As mentioned earlier, this has a negative effect on the Libyan
economy through its heavy dependence on oil revenues. The reluctance of
the Libyan authorities to reduce their oil prices in line with their
non-OPEC competitors, especially the UK and Norway, is also contributing to
the reduction in revenues [Lloyds Bank 1982 p.22].
The second point showing the increased demand for goods and services can
be observed in the continuous increase in imported goods and services.
Imports increased from £L250 million in 1971 to LD1049 million in 1975 and
over LD2 billion in 1980.
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Libya's crude oil exports by destination
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Capital goods in general and machinery and transport equipment in
particular are the main import categories. The latter accounting for over
35% of total imports in 1976, and 37.5% in 1977. The highest increase of
machinery and transport equipment imports was in 1979 (42.5% of total
imports), as shown in Table 6.12 below.
Table 6.12
Percentage Distribution of Value of Libyan Imports
by Commodity Section: 1971-1980
Item	 1971 1976 1977 1979 1980
1.Food and live animals
	 19.0 13.3 17.0 15.1 16.9
2.Beverages and Tobacco
	 1.0	 0.3	 0.5	 0.5	 0.5
3.Crude materials inedible	 2.3	 2.1 • 2.6	 1.9	 1.8
4. Mineral fuels ,Lubricants
and related materials	 3.3	 2.7	 0.6	 0.7	 0.7
5.Animal and vegetable oils&fats
	 2.2	 1.2	 1.2	 1.1	 1.9
6.Chemicals	 6.0	 3.9	 3.6	 4.1	 5.4
7.Manufactured goods
	 20.8 27.4 21.9 23.3 . 24.1
8.Machinery and transport equip.	 29.2 35.3 37.5 42.5 38.0
9.Miscellaneous manufac.articles 	 16.2 13.8 15.1 10.8 10.7
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Ministry of planning,TreflaB OJ xternat Z'raa, Feb.1982,p.17.
The imports of food and live animals dropped from 19% of total imports in
a
1971 to 13.3% in 1976, then increased to 16.9% in 1980 showing the
shortfall in domestic agricultural production that existed. The importance
of such imports should be reduced as the agricultural development schemes
become operative. There has been a reduction in the value of fuels and
chemical imports, as a result of petrochemical and refinery industries, and
the operation of the new chemical works at bu Kaimash (in the West of the
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country near Zuara).	 Similarly, the increase in livestock production
should reduce imports of animal products.
The Libyan Government is increasing its domination of the import trade,
with the growing number of public trading bodies curbing the role played by
the private sector. Legislation introduced in January 1979 declared that
all permitted imports would in future require an import licence and only
certain organizations would be granted these licences. These include
public sector establishments, organizations and companies, co-operative
societies, and establishments which have been taken over by workers'
committees. The power of the public trading bodies had already been
increased under a directive issued in May 1978. This allowed the state
organizations to monopolize totally the granting of import licences within
their sector of operation, thus making the function of private sector
merchants redundant. Not only is the power of the state trading
organizations becoming greater within their operations area, but their
sphere of activity is also increasing.
These government monopolies include the National Supplies Corporation
(which controls imports of Wheat flour, Wheat, Barley, Rice, Sugar, Tea,
Salt, and various other commodities), the General Tobacco Corporation, the
National Oil Corporation, the General Corporation for the Import and
Marketing Agricultural Tools and Equipment and the National Pharmacentical
Company.
a
In September 1975 the government took over the importation of motor cars
and later also commercial vehicles. In November 1977 a state import
authority for clothing was established, and the Electronics General Company
was set up in 1977 as sole importer of electronic equipment (including
radios, televisions, etc.). Other goods in which state organisations have
an import monopoly include most telecommunications equipment and building
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materials, fertilizers, tyres and batteries, leather goods (including
footwear), computers, furniture, pottery and glass. In 1979 it was
announced that gold and other pecious metals could only be traded by the
Gold and Metals Company.
However, the dependence of Libya on exports of oil and imports of capital
and consumption commodities confronts the country with the problem of
international fluctuations of prices (imported inflation). This has led to
more difficulties in implementing and evaluating development projects
[Elhuni p.23]. However, oil activities have been developed very rapidly,
and this development, in addition to the dramatic surge in oil prices
during the 1970s, has rewarded the country with substantial amounts of hard
currencies. Capital in the form of revenues has to be used in developing
the country's non-mineral as well as mineral resources. Such developments,
as will be argued below, is the only substitute for oil when the latter
runs out. This development takes different forms such as infrastructure,
natural resources, agriculture, industry, health, education etc.
6.3.4 Sectoral development:
Throughout the past two decades development spending, which is highly
depended on oil revenues, has risen rapidly in all sectors. However
agriculture and industry, the backbone of the rural sector, have received
the highest priority, followed by housing, communication and transport.
Although these sectors differ in success, they have faced some real
a
problems which could not be easily solved by pouring capital into the
economy.	 Here we deal with the development of the main sectors of the
economy, showing how far they overcome some of the problems facing them.
1- Agriculture: Since the base of the economy, before oil, was
agriculture, it was natural that the economic impact of oil would be felt
most acutely in that sector.
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Despite limited access to funds, Libyan agriculture had achieved some
progress before the oil era dawned. In the first useful estimate of
national income produced by the Ministry of National Economy in 1958,
agriculture accounted for 27% of the value added, as I discussed in Chapter
5. In that year the sector employed 72% of the working population.
Domestic agricultural produce also fed the bulk of the Libyan population
and provided a surplus for export. The impressive record of the private
sector was remarkable. 	 [McLachian 1982]. The rush because of oil
attracted far more people than the modern sector could absorb. The result
was decreased farmland in many parts of the country, and increased crowding
in urban centers, as seen from the population movement throughout the last
two decades. As an example, Table 6.13 shows the net migration movement to
Tripoli and Benghazi in 1973.
Table 6.13
Migration in and out of the Main Towns in Libya: 1973
Migration	 Tripoli	 Benghazi
In-migrants	 141387	 60610
Out-migrants	 28928	 16244
Net-migration	 112458	 44366
Source: Ministry of Planning, InternaZ. Mtgratton, Tripoli,
1973, p.61.
One immediate result of this situation was a sudden increase in the
demand for foodstuff in these centres. This came both as a result of
increased urban population and of higher per capita consumption, due to
higher disposable income among Libyans and foreigners serving the oil
industry and related activities.
Under normal conditions this would provide a strong stimulus for
agricultural production to increase in response to higher prices for
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foodstuffs.	 But such a healthy development could not take place for two
reasons:
(1) The low state of technology in agriculture.
(2) The higher profits on investment in the trade and service sectors of
the economy.
The inflow of oil revenues to Libya after 1961, albeit on a modest scale,
induced a gradual expansion of government intervention into the conduct of
the agricultural sector. This went on parallel to the dynamic of change
within the sector itself brought on by the re-occupation of former Italian
farms and increasing market participation by Libyan farmers.
Constraints on agricultural activities arising from severe environmental
problems apply throughout the country, being only slightly less
constricting in the North than in the South. Effects of adverse natural
conditions are demonstrated in a UN team assessment of land use in Libya
summarized in Table 6.14 below.
Table 6.14
Land Use in Libya
Land use type	 Area(skm)	 % Of total
Urban	 500	 0.03
Agriculture-arable and orchard
	 18,000	 1.10
Agriculture-pasture and grassland
	 70,000	 4.00
Forest and scrubland
	 5,000	 0.30
Wastelands	 1,666,000	 94.57
Total	 1,760,000	 100.00
Source: National Physical Perspective Plan 1981-2000, UNDP,
Tripoli, March 1979, p.36.
The concern of the ruling authorities in Libya during the present century
has largely been with the arable and orchard farming, comprising a mere
- 206 -
1.1% of the country's land surface. The whole of this land is concentrated
in the Western and Eastern regions. 78% in the West of the country, 21% in
the East and just 1% in the South [Bansil 1979 p.2].
Government control of incoming oil revenues no doubt acted as a spur to
those in authority to assist that area of the economy felt to be vital to
the interests of the state and all ordinary members of the rural community.
Adoption of the development plan for the years 1963-68 formalised the
apparent need to involve the arms of government in agriculture.
In 1961, the government initiated long-term agricultural loans on easy
terms, for the purchase of agricultural land from the Italian settlers who
had acquired it during the Italian colonisation. This policy began with a
credit scheme of lending up to 50% of the estimated sale of the farm, but a
year later it was modified to lend up to 100% of the value of small farms,
the value of which did not exceed £L1000 [Libyan-London Universities Joint
Research Project 1969 p.13].
Although this credit policy helped to transfer the ownership of many
farms to Libyan nationals, the economic and social price paid for this
achievement was high and could have been avoided. The first result of this
credit policy was a sudden increase in the value of agricultural land owned
by Italians. Liberal credit terms encouraged many people to enter the
market as competitive buyers, while the supply side was relatively
organised and inflexible. This had the effect of further raising the cost
e
of agricultural production and diminishing its competitive position in the
economy. inother detrimental aspect of this policy was the tendency to
grant these long-term credits to urban people who had neither the
experience, nor the necessity, to maintain and improve the productive
capacity of their newly acquired farms. Since they had other sources of
income, either in government or the tertiary sector, they generally looked
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upon their purchases of these farms as good investment outlets in the face
of rising inflationary trends initiated by the oil industry.
The government tried to increase agriculture's contribution to the
national economy. Farmers were offered low-interest fifteen-year loans by
the National Agricultural Bank (founded in 1957), as well as subsidised
farm machinery and equipment. Repayments did not start for five years and
were then made in ten annual instalments. The bank also bought olive oil,
almonds, and groundnut surpluses, generally above world prices, to create
an anti-inflationary buffer stock, and encouraged farming co-operatives.
From 1961 onwards the bank was advancing more than £L1 million a year in
loans which was quite impressive as shown in Figure 6.9 below. The bank
also ceased charging interest altogether by 1966.
Such activities encouraged a rapid rise in agricultural output, estimated
at 4.5% a year during 1962-67, not least through intensification of
irrigation in the oases and former Italian farms, together with spread on
to the extensive margin in areas such as Ajaylat. Rapid and accelerating
depletion of Libyan northern water resources was experienced as a
consequence of this investment. The decisions of the past two decades at
national and individual farmer level have clearly implied that water
resources were not considered to be limited, and further that the
investment of capital to raise and distribute water create a productive
combination of those factors which might lead to viable and even profitable
e
agricultural enterprises. Map 6.1 summarises a study by Pallas (1978 p.88]
of Libyan water use in the mid-1970s and the anticipated use by the end of
the century. Pallas noted that 97% of water was drawn from the ground in
the mid-1970s. Libya has no flowing water and rainfall is significant only
in small coastal tracts of the Gefara plain and the Jabal Nafusah in the
North-West and in the Jabal Al khdar in the North-East. Rainfed farming
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is limited to the Gefara, and to the coastal and adjacent uplands, an area
in all totalling about 100,000 square kilometres.
Libya t s groundwater falls into two categories:
(1) There are renewable resources in the coastal plains of Tripoli,
Benghazi and near Misuratah.
(2) In the South there are substantial fossil water resources which have
been dated to be between 6,000 and 30,000 years old.
The safe yield of an aquifer is equivalent to the average annual
recharge. The recharge is in turn directly related to the annual
precipitation of the catchment. It has taken many years to arrive at a
Figure for the Gefara plain system, but by 1980 it was generally agreed
that the safe yield of the system was 100 million cubic metres (Allan
1981] • By 1940 this safe yield had probably begun to be exceeded as a
progressive decline in groundwater levels was evident (Cederstrom and
Bertcuola 1960].
The trend in water extraction continued at the same rate until the early
1960s, when additional pumping began on the private sector holdings created
as a result of the sale and subdivision of large Italian farms.
Observation well records of the Soil and Water Conservation Department of
Ministry of Agriculture clearly demonstrated the trend by 1968 [Allan,
Maclachlan and Penrose p.38], and a one metre per year rate of decline at
points 40 kilometres from the coast was obviously going to become a three
a
metres per year annual decline in a few years time. In the event the three
metres per year rate occurred by 1973 and five metres per year was being
recorded by 1980. These data and other indirect measures of water use
suggest that the rate of with-drawal in the Gefara system was running at
600 million cubic metres per year, or about six times the rate of recharge.
The impact on the groundwater resource has been severe. By 1981 the
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water at points such as Bin Gashir and Suwani Bin Yadim had been pumped to
below sea level so that the gradient in the aquifer ran South away from the
sea. The problem of sea-water intrusion had already affected coastal
farms, and by 1980 it affected the wells six kilometres inland which supply
Tripoli city.
In the past, when standards of living were lower and aspirations less
than they presently are, ingenious plans were elaborated for maximum use of
agriculture for generating employment and income. Agriculture had, by
1980, lost its potential in both these roles. This arose not simply
because of changed attitudes towards agricultural employment by the Libyan
population, but because there were real alterations in the physical
resource base between the 1950s and the 1980s. The boom in agriculture
that affected the 1960s and 1970s systematically exploited limited and fast
declining water reserves in the Northern areas of the country. Expert
opinion indicated that radical reduction in water use in the Gefara was
vital if permanent damage was not to be sustained. In effect, richest
agricultural area in Libya, and one of sophisticated and productive
agriculture, was at risk of losing its irrigation potential. Government
plans for the Gefara coastal strip under discussion in 1980 and 1981
included a land redistribution programme, enforcement of full-time farming,
a managed crop rotation, and greater state control of day-to-day farming
activities. All of this was designed to reduce water use in agriculture by
a
two thirds.
Investment in irrigation has substantially increased production since
1960, but the style of investment has not been consistent with a sustained
use of water resources. The technologies deployed have made larger volumes
of water available than was possible by traditional methods, and to some
extent there has been an appropriate substitution of capital for labour, of
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which Libya is also short. But, according to Allan, to date the investment
has not been directed to substituting for water, in the sense of
introducing irrigation systems which will allow one cubic meter to support
two or even three times the area of crops currently supported [Allan 1982
p.101. Capital remains a pre-requisite for the deployment of the expensive
trickle and glass-house technologies which are the only viable irrigation
options for Libya.
(2) Industry: Because of agricultural difficulties, and in order to
diversify the Libyan economy, priority is now given to the industrial
sector, both for light and heavy industry. Industrialisation, especially
with a bias towards heavy industry, has a natural appeal for a country
undergoing its own version of socialist transformation. The strategy aimed
at inaximising the advantages of the Libyan current capital surplus to
create a sector that will provide employment opportunities, treasury
revenues and foreign exchange earnings after oil exports have diminished
drastically, or ceased altogether.
It was the service industries, and not manufacturing, that created the
main demand for labour. The development of manufacturing industries was
slow and on a limited scale. By 1938, 789 establishments were in existence
employing some 20,000 industrial employees in the country [Wright 1979
p.271]. The main industries, both then and after independence were, small
food-processing plants, garages, and workshops. The more important
establishments were those which produced building materials, metal
products, agricultural foodstuffs and tobacco.
• Although many of the original factories were destroyed during the Second
World War, much the same light industrial structure emerged during the
1950s, but with more local ownership. During the 1950s also, two
industrial training centres were established in Tripoli and Benghazi, and
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according to a 1956 census there were then 3121 industrial establishments
in Libya, 87% of which employed fewer than 10 people. Even in the 1960s
the tobacco industry, employing about 4,000 in growing and processing, was
the second largest industry after oil. A Ministry of Industry was formed
in 1961 to supervise state-owned factories and to plan the development of
private and nationalised industries. In the first five-year plan (1963-68)
almost £L7 million were allocated to this sector. The aims were as
follows:
(1) To raise the present level of production, in quantity, kind and
quality.
(2) To promote consumption of Libyan manufactured goods so to reduce
dependence on foreign goods.
(3) To create an export market and a higher level of employment.
Of the allocation to industry, £L5 million were set aside for credits,
and an Industrial Development Organisation was established. In 1965 this
became the Industrial and Real Estate Bank, authorised to lend 60% of its
£L10 million capital free of interest. Up to September 1970 it had lent
LD11.7 million, and in 1971 it lent only LD1.1 for industrial purposes.
Commercial banks also made large contributions to Libyan industry, before
and after the establishment of the Industrial and Real Estate Bank. This
is shown in Figure 6.10 below.
Most private investment was made either in housing and real estate, or in
e
oil industry contracting-transport, servicing, equipment-hire, and
catering, or in foreign trade. Thus the government had to play the part of
industrial pioneer and at the same time provide the bulk of the funds for
the private sector's modest industrial development ventures.
The role of the industrial bank, which had previously been a major lender
to the private construction industry and food processing sector, has
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declined in recent years, and in 1981 its real estate operations were taken
up by a new Real Estate Investment and Savings Bank established to
encourage construction and personal savings linked to property (Middle East
Economic Digest (MEED) Feb.1981].
Increased government expenditure on industry was accompanied by a
corresponding decline in private sector investment. In 1968 private sector
investment in manufacturing was valued at LD4.2 million compared to public
capital funding of LDO.9 million. Although by 1972 private sector
investment had risen to LD7.8 million, the government in this year supplied
LD11.7 million to industry. In subsequent years direct private sector
investment has fallen away completely [Allan 1982 p.58]. Private
construction has undoubtedly remained more buoyant than activity in any
other industrial subsector.
Since the Libyan Revolution of 1969, the government attitude towards
industry has changed dramatically, with more attention being paid to the
development of public sector projects. In 1970 the National Public
Organisation for Industrialisation (NPOI) was established as the major
organ for implementing the public sector's industrial development plan.
Initial capital of NPOI was put at LD6 million, but this has been increased
many-fold in succeeding years. In its first year of operation NPOI was
involved in five projects; by 1977 the number had risen to 43, and by 1980
NPOI was to have funded 91 projects with a total capital investment of
LD500 million [Al Muhdawi 1981 p.253]. The rising value of planned and
actual government investment in the Libyan industrial sector that occured
after the Revolution is shown in Figure 6.11 below.
The introduction of government investment in industry on a large scale
has had the quite deliberate result of redressing the previous heavy bias
in favour of small industrial establishments. 19% of planned investment
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was allocated to the industrial sector in 1976-80 development plan, with
this leap being made possible by the important change in investment
priorities towards major capital intensive heavy industry projects. Libyan
determination to industrialise is even more firmly stamped on the 1981-85
plan, the second plan of Economic and Social Transformation, in the form of
a 21.5% leading investment allocation [MEED Jan.1981]. The subsectoral
breakdown in Table 6.15 shows that industrial metallurgy and petrochemicals
in particular, are to be the main recipients of this huge capital
expenditure.
a
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Table 6.15
Investment by Industry Groups During 1981-1985 ($m) in Libya
Industry Group	 Total Structure(%) Growth(%)
1.Food industries	 536.4	 6.2	 16.4
2.Textiles and leather
	 223.6	 2.6	 16.3
3.Wood and furniture
	 6.8	
-	 7.6
4.Paper and printing
	 25.3	
-	 9•7
5.Chemicals	 657.7	 7.6	 35.2
6.Petroleum products
	 837.7	 9.6	 21.1
7.Petrochemicals	 2,195.4	 25.3	 38.9
8.Building materials
	 702.3	 8.1	 13.9
9.Metallurgy	 2,742.9	 31.7	 60.0
1 0.Metalworking, engineering
& electrical equipment	 609.7	 7.0	 28.9
11.Other manuf. industries
	 168.9	 1.9	 3.4
Total	 8,706.7	 100	 21.6
Source: Secretariat of Planning, Draft flan, [1982].
The main obstacles to Libya's industry can be summarised as follows:
(1) The small home market for industrial products.
(2) The shortage and cost of skilled labour.
(3) Lack of experienced management.
(4) Competition from foreign goods.
(5) The need to import many raw materials means that industry needs state
aid and protection for healthy survival [wright 1979].
Nevertheless, refining oil locally for export is intended to increase the
return to Libya per unit of hydrocarbon exported, which in turn should
reduce the need for high crude exports to fund the country's budget, and so
extend the life of Libyan oil reserves [Baker 1982]. If Libyan industry is
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unable to run without subsidies from the general budget, it will clearly
not have satisfied its major objectives of becoming an alternative source
of income to crude oil exports.
3-Infrastructure: In Libya, oil revenues has transformed not only the
productive sectors (agriculture and industry), but the entire economy. It
has affected the style and the extent of the development of transport,
communication, and housing.
Governments with large oil revenues to dispose approach the provision of
roads and related infrastructure differently from those operating on
restricted budgets. In addition, the expectations of the people
participating in the fruits of an oil economy are high and these high
expectations extend to the type of road, sea, and air network, as well as
telecommunication and housing.
Transport was amongst the sectors to attract investment in the first
development plan (1963-68), and as a result of the schemes initiated by the
plan, 868 kilometres of road were constructed by 1968 and 3400 km. were in
the process of construction, including the coastal highway (1769 km.).
Other transport facilities were improved, such as the handling capacities
of the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi. New storage areas and quays were
constructed and modern equipment for handling cargo was installed.
Airports were also improved, new runways constructed, and new aircraft
acquired.
Allocations to the development of transport totalled LD71 million (21.1%
of total development allocations), placing transport second in importance
after public works (24.4%). The LD71 million allocated to transport was
not spent and only LD53 million was in fact expended [National Accounts
1971-1978], representing 17.8% of total development spending. A reason for
the shortfall was the difficulty of mobilising investment before the
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appropriate studies had been carried out, and it was not until the
mid-1960s that a comprehensive study was completed by the consultants
Doxiadis.
In the 1971-73 period LD113 million were allocated to transport and LD76
million were spent. Although the budgeted targets were not reached, actual
spending in the 1971-73 period ran at a rate four times that achieved in
the earlier period at current prices. Transport expenditures were more
than sevenfold those of 1963-68 at current prices. The average annual
expenditure was LD128 million, a high figure even taking into account
inflation and a very high figure in terms of the absorptive capacity of the
economy.
In the 1976-80 development plan the transport sector continued to occupy
third place, after industry and agriculture, but with a further reduction
to total 12.6% of proposed spending. Table 6.16 shows that the investment
of the 1976-80 period brought substantial improvements to the nation's
communications. Most dramatic were the improvements in telecommunications.
Sea transport responded to the investments and there was steady improvement
in the road network.
a
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Table 6.16
Development of the Transport Sector in Libya 1975-80
Sub-sector	 Unit	 1975	 1980	 %Change
Paved roads	 km	 7747.0	 10,700.0	 38.1
Cars per kilometer	 No	 37.8	 62.2	 64.5
Civil planes	 No	 10.0	 17.0	 70.0
Air passengers	 No(000)	 559.0	 1,125.0	 100.1
Commercial ships
	 Ton(000)	 18.3	 39.3	 114.0
Oil tankers	 Ton(000)	 412.0	 766.0	 86.0
Ports capacity	 mn ton	 3.0	 7.0	 133.3
Telephone/person	 No	 1.8	 6.0	 290.0
Source: Secretariat of Planning, The gvolution of the Five-Year
Development Plan, [1980].
In its efforts to decentralize the economy effectively the government
aims to improve the telecommunications network. In the 1981-85 development
plan, telecommunications development is allocated $1.17 billion and will
involve the improvement of automatic exchanges and the microwave system, as
well as the introduction of a new international telephone exchange and
telex facilities for Misuratah, Derna and Sabhah [Lloyds Bank 1982].
It is not only in the transport sector that oil revenues play an
important role. They have also been the basis of the other sectors of the
economy. The role of transport in making such growth possible is just as
e
important for the services sector as for the productive sectors. Transport
will play an essential role in sustaining the level of construction, the
proposed growth in agricultural and industrial production, as well as
further developments in the services sector.
The impact of oil revenues on the Libyan economy is also visible from the
growth of personal incomes and wages, as will be discussed below.
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6.3.5 Personal income and wages:
I argued in Chapter 5 that pre-oil per capita income and Gross Domestic
Product as a whole were very low. Per capita income was about £L14 in
1953.	 This was one of the most depressed incomes in the world at that
time. Wages, as will be argued below, were also very low. It is oniy
since the export of oil in commercial quantities in 1963, per capita income
and wages have begun to rise with the increased oil revenues. As I argued
earlier in this chapter, per capita income increased from £L156 in 1963 to
£L642 in 1970, and over to LD1500 in 1974. Because of the continuous
increase in oil revenues since then, there have been no restrictions on
wages and salaries except the rise in prices for goods and services, as
will be discussed below.
In Libya, capital is relatively abundant in the form of financial
revenues that accrue to the government from oil. But capital alone cannot
induce economic progress. Complementary resources are required, the most
important being labour, especially skilled labour and qualified management.
The real employment problem as far as unskilled labour is concerned is
not so much an issue of quantitative supplies but one of allocation and
policies. The expansion of a modern sector (oil industry, manufacturing,
transport and trade) as well as the development of a progressive
agriculture, depends on the existence of a pool of professional and skilled
workers and on the presence of a stable and disciplined group of unskilled
workers. A drift of rural workers to towns and cities, even if it depletes
the agricultural reserve of labour, is not necessarily a bad thing. The
problem must not be looked at through the farmers' eyes (they may regret
the days when labour was abundant and cheap) but in the broader context of
allocation and growth in the whole economy. If the labour market is
competitive and if obstacles to mobility are not too obstructive, workers
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will tend to move from the relatively inefficient to the relatively more
efficient sector or sectors in the economy, as the latter are likely to
offer higher wages. Re-allocation favours the efficient activities and
thus benefits both the individual worker and the economy. There is no
necessary reason why a drift to towns and cities should have adverse
effects on the economic performance of the country.
The 1964 Population Census showed that the recorded labour force includes
some 400,000 workers. Slightly less than 26% of the population
participated in the labour force; this is rather low. The participation of
children is lower than in most developing countries and than in other
Middle Eastern countries. That of women, according to the census, is
almost negligible, as I discussed in Chapter 5. The low participation
rates for children are due to the expansion of schooling, which is
generally seen as a sign of progress. In the case of women, traditions may
play an important role, but traditions are affected also by economic
conditions [Deeb and Deeb 1982]. In rural areas women and children may
work for short periods only during the seasonal peak of agricultural
demand, and this work, though limited in time, is usually very significant
in terms of its contribution to output. Moreover, many agricultural
operations such as tending animals or processing farm products, are part of
the normal duties of the housewife and are not considered as "employment"
by the Census.	 FrQm an economic point of view however, these duties
represent a genuine contribution to the productive effort of the community.
In most developing countries wage rates for unskilled workers are higher
in the modern sector than in agriculture. The Libyan-London [1969] joint
project study showed that in 1968, Libyan agricultural wage-rates were
higher than industrial rates. But construction wages were highest,
probably because of the nature of this sector, which requires more physical
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effort compared with other work. Typical wage rates are shown in Table
6.17.
Table 6.17
Average Wages in the Main Sectors in Libya (1968)
Sector	 Average Wages(L)
Agriculture	 1.000
Oil industry	 0.750
Government	 0.700-0.800
Construction	 1 • 200
Source: Libyan-London Universities Joint Research Project [1969],
p. 162.
Before the oil era, Libya did not constitute an exception to the general
rule that wages are lowest in agriculture. The wage level in agriculture
was very depressed, between £L0.100 and £L0.150 in 1952-54, and the
rural/urban wage differential, although small, favoured the emerging modern
sector. When, in 1956, oil companies started exploring the desert they
offered employment at wages substantially higher than the rates prevailing
either in agriculture or industry, and the wage-gap between the traditional
and modern sectors widened considerably. Between 1956. and 1959 wage rates
in agriculture rose from £L0. 140 to £L0. 180, as Table 6.18 shows, while oil
companies were recruiting unskilled labour at rates varying between £L0.250
and £L0.400.
a
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Table 6.18
Median Agricultural and Oil Industry Wages in Libya
1956-1959
Year	 Agriculture (L/d)
	 Oil industry (L/d)
1956	 0.145	 0.250
1959	 0.180	 0.400
Source: Mabro [1970], p.327.
In later years, 1960-62, agricultural wage rates rose sharply toL0.400
but it is doubtful whether the increase represented a real gain to the
workers, for prices were rising sharply too. These were very difficult
years for the State; the level of expectations was high, the operations of
the oil industry were exerting strong pressures on the price-level and the
government was facing demands for higher wages and for the opening up of
new employment opportunities. The State, however, was not in a position to
satisfy these demands, not having received as yet any substantial revenues
from oil. Rural migrants were flowing to the towns, amplifying a movement
that seems to have started before the beginning of the oil era and that
gained momentum in later years.
Other figures help to illustrate how low wages were in agriculture in
relation to other sectors of the economy. In 1971, agriculture employed
around 30% of the Libyan labour force, but the agricultural wage bill
represented only 2% of the total wage bill for all sectors. (We should
remember that workers in agriculture also receive a significant portion of
payments in kind such as meals, and therefore, considering only money wages
paid to agricultural workers is misleading). On the other hand, the
construction sector employed nearly 7% of the labour force while its
employees received about 17.1% of the total wage bill [National Accounts
1962-71].
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The result is that the rural surplus of labour was transferred into the
towns.	 Because of their small size, neither manufacturing nor the oil
industry could be expected to absorb the urban surplus. The private
services sector may have expanded somewhat, offering means of subsistence
to the newcomers, however its capacity is limited. There seemed to be no
other option for the State but to create new jobs in its own departments.
When oil revenues started to flow into the Treasury, the Government found
itself able to respond to the demands; the salary scales were revised and
adjusted upwards in 1964 and in 1966, and official employment considerably
expanded. Recruitment was not restricted to the towns but extended to the
rural areas also. To a large extent, the policy was aimed at distributing
the oil revenues to some segments of the population. From then on, wages
paid by the Government to unskilled workers were as high, if not higher,
than the wages paid by oil firms.
As from 1964-65, the oil industry ceased to be the wage-leader of the
economy, this role being taken over by the State. The reversal of the
agriculture/industry wage differential, which seems to have taken place
around 1964/65, can be explained by a combination of three factors:
(1)	 Internal migration, which created a small surplus and some
unemployment in the towns.
(2) The wage and employment policies of the State, which established the
rate of £LO.7OO-LO.8OO as the minimum reward for a relatively easy job.
Agricultural wage-rates were bound to rise above this, especially during
the seasonal peak when labour is short and the work irksome.
(3) The stagnation of employment in the oil sector.
After 1964 employment in the oil industry failed to expand significantly
forat least two reasons:
(a) The passage from exploration to production that took place during
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this period is labour-saving in character.
(b) Oil firms started to contract out a number of auxiliary operations
such as transport, catering and construction. In earlier years these
activities were undertaken by the firms themselves.
The oil sector was thus facing favourable conditions in the labour
market, excess supply and a stagnant demand. There were no pressures for
higher wages.
The construction sector is in a different position. Construction is a
very large employer and demand for labour is expanding continually. The
conditions of work on building sites are not very attractive because of the
nature of the physical effort required. Building contractors encounter
great difficulties in recruiting Libyan labour and wages are consequently
high. Their only alternative is, within the limits set by the allocation
of work permits, to employ foreign labour. It is clear that the Government
is employing so many workers that shortages of labour for construction, the
private sector, as well as for transport and trade are being created. In
fact, workers who could be easily absorbed in agriculture and in other
productive sectors, are employed by the State. In 1964, 30% of the Libyan
labour force was employed by the government [Stanford Research Institute
1969 p.152]. It is difficult to believe that the Government sector is free
from disguised unemployment in an economy where jobs and wages are the most
convenient means of distributing oil revenues. The evidence supporting
this argument is that in the early 1970s more than 60,000 government
employees were reallocated to productive sectors, mainly to agriculture and
industry.
However, despite the increase in employment supply in the urban centers
and disguised unemployment among government employees, wages were gradually
increasing. The only constraint on such increases is the increased rate of
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inflation as will be discussed next.
6.3.6 Inflation:
One of the undesirable effects of the oil boom on the Libyan economy was
the inflationary pressures that accompanied the rapid growth of this
sector. The inflationary trend was the result of the disproportionate
injections of funds leading to the existence of continued increasing demand
for goods and services in excess of domestic output capacity.
	 This
condition has been aggravated by the extensive development programmes
adopted by the government since the early 1960s. The inflationary
pressures are clear from the trends of both the money supply and the cost
of living index, as will be detailed below.
Inflation may increase the price of imported goods and services relative
to export prices, as was the case in Libya in the 1960s, which brings
favourable terms of trade. This means that Libya can obtain more foreign
goods and services. This is equivalent to an appreciation effect of oil
revenues in a free market economy, where the demand for a country's
currency in the foreign exchange market is large in relation to its supply.
The increasing surplus in the balance of payments, which is indicated by
the rising net debt of the banks and monetary authorities, has been
reflected in the rapid increase in the gold and foreign exchange assets of
the Bank of Libya (central bank), which rose from £L86 million in 1965 to
£L190 million in 1968'and £L1446 million in 1977. The increasing revenues
of the country are reflected in the money supply, which rose nearly six
times between 1962 and 1968, and rose on average 28% a year during the
197 Os.
Figure 6.12 below shows the changes between 1965 and 1978 in the assets
and liabilities of the Libyan monetary system, which together determine the
net changes in the money supply. Money, here defined as demand deposits
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and currency outside banks, is the chief liability of the monetary system,
together with savings and time deposits of various kinds (quasi-money), and
government deposits. All of these are claims of the public or the
government on the monetary institutions.
In creating these liabilities the monetary institutions aquire assets for
which they pay out the currency or create bank deposits. The assets may be
foreign exchange or other claims on foreigners, or domestic government and
private securities of all kinds, or other claims on the public. Figure
6.12 shows two kinds of assets; foreign assets and claims on the private
sector, in the acquisition of which the liabilities have been created;
money or quasi-money and government deposits, as well as a variety of other
liabilities.
It can be seen from Figure 6.12 that the assets acquired by the monetary
system rose very steeply until 1972, but the increase in claims on the
private sector (primarily credit extended by commercial banks) went up
almost as fast as foreign assets. The effect of the acquisition of these
two types of assets on the money supply was partly offset by the rise in
quasimoney" (almost half of which was time and savings deposits in
commercial banks), and the rise in government deposits in the bank of
Libya, which are not treated as part of the money supply.
Time and savings deposits are excluded from the money supply on the
assumption that thes are "idle balau,e8" and not held as means of
payments. It is likely, however, that some part of the demand deposits are
held for the same reasons as time and savings deposits and should be
excluded from the money supplies, especially when the relation between
money and prices is considered.
The rise in claims in the private sector indicates the strong part played
by this sector in economic activity, while the increase in government
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deposits reflects budget surpluses due -to the rapidly rising government
revenues in relation to an inflationary effect on prices.
In 1973 foreign exchange reserves fell sharply, while the money supply
rose by 25%. The fall in foreign exchange reserves was accompanied by a
big drop in government deposits, by budgetary deficit and by large
government capital transfers overseas. Even so, the money supply remained
more than 100% covered by foreign exchange reserves. In the same year
(1973) for the first time the Central Bank included, as cover for part of
the currency issue of LD487 million, treasury bills and government
securities to a value of LD19 million.
Another factor which may have a bearing on the money supply is hidden in
the Figures for "Other (net)" liabilities in Table 6.19 below. These had,
until 1972, been positive, comprising among other things banks' capital and
other liabilities of a long term nature. In 1973 this item turned strongly
negative, and continued thus in subsequent years. A negative liability is
an asset, but the nature of the net assets of the banking system thus
included is not revealed. As they have not been classified as lending to
private sector, it seems reasonable to infer that are associated with a
public sector borrowing requirement.
In 1974, when the favourable balance of payments on the oil account more
than doubled, foreign exchange reserves recovered and exceeded the supply
of money by a comfotable margin (see Table 6.19). The position was,
however, again reversed in 1975 because of a fall in oil revenues, and a
fall in revenue from oil (Libya being a one commodity exporter) resulted in
an unfavourable balance of payments and a marked reduction in foreign
exchange reserves. In addition to the increase in the stock of money,
there was marked increase from 1973 in the velocity of money circulation,
which increased from 0.7 in 1971 to 1.3 in 1973 and 1.4 in 1975 [Central
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Table 6.19
Money Supply Determinants in Libya (LDM) 1965-1978
End of year	 1965	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1978
As sets of Banking
system:
1.Foreign Assets	 87.11	 966.32	 668.80	 1167.08	 690.07	 1295.75
2.Claims on the
Private Sector	 35.20	 151.09	 240.22	 448.35	 641.56	 950.40
Total	 122.31	 1117.41	 909.02	 1615.42 1331.63
	 2246.15
Liabilities to
Banking system:
1.Money	 66.78	 392.74	 490.97	 753.83	 844.45	 1687.81
2.Quasi-money	 28.72	 174.67	 296.84	 579.25	 490.66	 682.63
3.Governm.deposits 15.82	 531.12	 355.71	 403.58	 336.09	 464.84
4.Other (net)
	
10.96	 18.88 -234.50	 -121.24 -339.57 	 -589.13
Total	 122.31	 1117.41	 909.02	 1615.42 1331.63	 2246.15
Velocity of money	 1.8	 0.8	 1.3	 0.8	 1.4	 1.1
Consumer price
index (1964=100)	 108.3	 152.1	 170.4	 178.5	 197.0	 297.2
Retail price index
for food in Tripolf 157	 219	 200	 215	 259	 325
Source: Central Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletins Oct./Dec [1979]
Tables 14, 15, 22, 23 and July/Dec. [19741, p.37.
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Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin Oct/Dec.1979]. The great increases in the
bank advances in and after 1973, which include loans to semi-government
institutions, reflect the greater needs of the State oil sector for bank
credit, as much of the oil industry became nationalised and a larger
proportion of the industry's operations was financed in Libya.
Table 6.19 above and Figure 6.13 below show the rise in the index of
consumer prices and foodstuffs in relation to the money supply. It can be
seen that prices rose steadily, but not nearly as fast as the money supply.
It rose, throughout the post-revolutionary period, at an average of 5.5% a
year.	 The largest increases were in 1973 (12%) and in 1975 (10.4%), when
the balance of payments was unfavourable. Throughout this period the
plentiful exchange earnings allowed expansionary monetary policies to be
pursued without excessive inflationary effects.
The effect of the increases in the supply of money on prices will depend
very much on the supplies of goods coming on the market for people to spend
their money on, and of these goods, imports supply a large proportion in
Libya. Imports, as I noted earlier, more than doubled between 1964 and
1968, when the terms of trade were more favourable, but since the money
supply more than tripled there was bound to be some pressure on prices in
the absence of a large increase in the domestic production of goods for the
domestic market. The supply capacity of the Libyan agricultural sector
could not keep pace with the increasing demand that resulted from higher
incomes and increased population, as I showed earlier. The limited supply
capacity of the domestic economy to satisfy the high levels of demand led
the government to abolish most tariffs on food imports in order to fight
inflation.
The steep rise in imports up to 1974 are reflected in the increases in
quasi-money, much of which corresponded to the margins (usually 100%)
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deposits for letters of credit, which thus took the money involved out of
circulation.
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s rates of interest were stable, as
would be expected in a Muslim country. The central bank's rediscount rate
was 5% and the rate for second loans and overdrafts was 7%.
As I discussed in Chapter 5, the majority of the population still prefers
to hold cash to settle transactions rather than use the banking system, and
this is reflected in the money supply figures. In April 1980 the
government increased interest rates on savings accounts from 4% to 5%, on
short-term deposits from 5% to 5.5%, and on medium-term deposits from 6% to
9% in an effort to increase the value of quasi-money in relation to total
money supply, which in 1979 made up just under 30% of the total.
These and other operations had to be carried out by only six commercial
banking organisations throughout the country. These are all under Libyan
control, following banking legislation passed in 1969, which required 51%
Libyan ownership of the banks' capital and the chairman and majority of
directors of each bank to be Libyan nationals. The Central Bank of Libya
exercises strong control over banking activities and has done so since
legislation passed in 1971. The banking sector is still, however, very
small owing to the high proportion of cash transations.
Future economic prospect:
It is important to mention that forecasts for the oil industry made for
the 1970s and early 1980s have proved to be highly erroneous. Table 6.20
presents three forecasts for Libyan production and exports of crude oil
during the decade 1980-1990. All three sources suggest production and
export levels below those used in preparation of the Prospective Plan.
Discrepancies between the forecasts for exports can be explained by the
exclusion from the Speerplan-Finnmap projections of all product exports,
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while projections I and II in Table 6.20 are inclusive of exports of
products. NLOC assumed steady levels of output of crude oil through to the
year 2000 on the basis of indicated or desired production ceilings.
Table 6.20
Forecasts of Crude Oil Production and Exports in Libya (000 b/d)
	
1985	 1990
	
1	 1,500	 1,500
Production	 11	 1,600	 1,200
	
111	 1,000	 1,000-750
	
1	 1,380	 1,340
Exports	 11	 1,430	 890
	
111	 520	 250-350
Source: I. LNOC [Middle East Economic Survey Sep.1981].
II. Fesharaki: (1981]
III. Speerplan-Finnmap: [1981]
In fact, production ceilings imposed by the Libyan government became less
relevant from 1980 as the balance between oil demand and supply in the
international market increasingly favoured the consumer. The demand fell
while the non-OPEC supply increased, pushing the price downwards. I
discussed oil supply-demand balances and imbalances and the role of world
oil producers in market stability in Chapter 3. LNOC, however, like many
other national oil compaies in other producing countries, had difficulties
disposing of its crude oil during 1981, and output fell below one million
b/d by the middle of the year to levels not experienced on a consistent
basis since 1963. Difficulties in selling Libyan crudes at prices
acceptable to the national oil company and the government during 1980 and
1981, served to undermine previous possibly over-ambitious plans for Libyan
crude oil output rising to 2.5 inb/d in the period 1980-1990. The terms of
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trade seemed to be not in favour of Libya by this time, thus some steps
have to be taken such as a reduction in the imports of foreign goods and
services. Constraints on oil exports, while creating the need for some
financial adjustments in October 1981, did have the virtue of enforcing
conservation of Libyan oil reserves.
The economic implications of a much reduced potential for crude oil
exports could be serious. A marked decline in the government's access to
oil revenues would diminish its abilities to fund growth within the
domestic economy and limit its use of foreign exchange to finance imports
of goods and services. The problem would be mitigated or worsened by the
degree of success or failure in commercial exports of the refineries and
petrochemical plants that will in future consume so large a proportion of
the country's oil output.
Thus, the emergence of the oil booming sector in the late 1950s and early
1960s has changed the Libyan economy from a state of deficit and stagnation
to a state of capital-surplus and rapid economic growth. The spending
effect analysis of the oil revenues pointed out some significant remarks
concerning this economy:
(1) The rapidly growing oil revenues, especially since the early 1970s in
the hands of the Libyan government, have enabled the Libyan public sector
to invest relatively large amounts in both directly productive activities
e
(agriculture and industry) and social overhead capital (education, roads,
health facilities and the like).
• The irregular rainfall and the over exploitation of the underground water
in the Northern agricultural areas, has actually begun to slow down
agricultural progress, despite heavy spending. Industry too has been
facing some real problems, such as shortage of skilled labour and
management, the need for raw material imports, and above all competition
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from foreign goods.
(2) The major general constraint facing the Libyan public sector spending
on development programmes has been the limitation on co-operant
(complementary) factors such as skilled labour, entrepreneurs,
administrators, professionals, and fertile land. The inadequate supply of
such co-operant factors has limited the absorptive capacity of the Libyan
economy to utilize efficiently the growing capital funds.
(3) Capital is a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve and to
sustain economic development. Other factors of production such as human
resources, natural resources, and technological progress are as important
and as effective in the process of development. Furthermore, institutions
and attitudes that are favourable to modernization are important
ingredients toward achieving and sustaining economic and social
development.
However, Libyan economic achievements, even though faced with some real
problems such as the inadequate supply of co-operant factors, were no doubt
remarkable. The main reason for such success, I think, is very much
attached to Libyan handling of the development of its oil industry. The
Government's bargaining with the international oil companies working in
Libya, in the early 1970s, and the ability of this Government to enlarge
such a domestic event to involve other oil producing countries in the
world, is the secret behind Libyan economic and political achievements.
This topic will be discussed in the next chapter.
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ChAPTER 7: OIL COMPANIES' BARGAINING WITh LIBYA AND OPEC
The decade of the 1970s has seen a significant change in the history of
the world petroleum industry, and in the economic power of the oil
exporting nations. The price of oil at the end of the decade was over five
times higher than it was at the beginning in real terms, with profound
economic, political, and social consequences for producing and consuming
countries.
Apart from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Iranian crises of 1979,
the rise in oil prices and OPEC success was closely attached to Libyan oil
policy since September 1969. The conflict between the Libyan Government
and the oil companies was essentially a bargaining situation. The ability
of Libya to gain its ends depended, to an important degree, on the choices
and decisions taken by the oil companies. Libya, as I argued in the
previous chapter, had been helped by the fact that it had very little
domestic capacity to absorb oil revenues, because of the backwardness of
its economy. In fact, Libya tended to accumulate huge foreign exchange
reserves, which could easily meet the short or medium run public spending.
This increase in income coincided with the change in the Libyan regime,
from a traditional pro-Western monarchy to an anti-Western revolutionary
regime. The latter had successfully persuaded a third party (the Libyan
people) fully to support the leader of the revolution against the interests
of the oil companies. The oil industry, which used to be under the
complete control of foreign companies, has had a priority in the new
regime's political and economic policies.	 At one stage in Libyan
negotiations with the oil companies, Deputy Prime Minister Jalloud stated
that Libyan demands were intended to u hu the (U.S) companies and force
them to put pressure on the United States to change its pro-I8raell.. policy"
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[Al-Sowayegh 1984 p.110]. To the Libyan revolution, the demand for higher
oil prices and the nationalisation of oil companies was of no less
importance than the evacuation of foreign armed forces (British and
Americans) from the country. These two reasons, from the point of view of
this thesis, are the main factors which enabled Libya not only to stand
firm in its negotiations with the oil companies, but also to spread the
word to other OPEC members, which were not slow to join in taking action
against oil companies.
Libyan conflict with the oil companies coincidentally happened at the
time when some international problems were causing difficulties for the oil
industry. The following events, even though they were not part of the
conflict, assisted the Libyan position indirectly:
(1) The 1967 Arab-Israeli War caused the closure of the Suez Canal and
the periodic interruption of the "Tapline t1 , the pipeline that carries oil
from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. This substantially raised freight
rates, which comprised a large proportion of oil prices.
(2) The Biafra War stopped oil production in Nigeria.
(3) In addition to the proximity of Libya to Europe, the growing
influence of environmentalists in these countries made the low-sulphur
Libyan crude more desirable in comparison with other crudes. Western
European imports of Libyan crude reached 30% of their total crude oil
imports by 1969.
(4) A large quantity of Libyan oil was processed by small "independents",
which had no alternative sources of supply with which to honour their
ãontracts and to keep their refineries in operation.
Before the Libyan revolution a single, closely interlocking set of
companies had dealt with a divided group of countries. OPEC tried to
redress this disparity by overcoming the division among the countries.
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Libyan policy reversed the former situation fully, by dividing the
companies and thus allowing a single government to rule them. As just
mentioned, for many of the Independents or newcomers among the oil
companies, Libya was their only source of crude. Hence, unlike the majors,
they were not inclined in any dispute with the government to face the
threat of a shutdown. This fact was the key to Libyan success, as will be
argued below.
This thesis has as its running theme the notion of a multiple game. For
instance I discussed in Chapter 3 the game between various OPEC members and
the game between OPEC as one player and other oil producers as the other
player.	 In this chapter I intend to add another game. This game is
concerned with a group of international oil companies in a medium range
producing country. It is the game between what is called the "Libyan
producers", which is a group of international Major and Independent oil
companies, on one side, and the Libyan Government on the other. It will be
shown that Libyan success, to a great extent, has in fact resulted from the
outcome of another game between the companies themselves. The companies
followed their individual interests and refused to sacrifice to help the
troubled member. As will be shown in the case of Occidental, this resulted
in a non-cooperative solution, which Libya fully exploited to its
advantage. The lack of coordination and cooperation between the foreign
oil companies worki9 in Libya, U Libyan producers", to overcome the
situation had resulted from the Libyan first move against Occidental. This
had encouraged the Libyan Government to generalize the terms of
Occidental's agreement to the rest of the companies, and thus control them.
The non-cooperation between companies, in addition to Libyan power
(discussed in the previous chapter), had actually ended the game as a
complete success for the Libyan Government, and the effect of this victory
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spread to oil producers all over the world.
One would expect that the producing countriest first successful attempt
towards output restriction and facing up to the oil companies would be made
in Saudi Arabia, or Iran, or Iraq, or Venezuela, or even Kuwait, the
established leaders of the founding members of OPEC, rather than in Libya
the newcomer to the oil industry. But for the reasons mentioned above, the
successful break-through had actually been made in Libya.
The game Libya played against the oil companies was in the form of a
repeated two-person game. First against the Occidental Company, then
against the Majors and finally against the rest of the Independents. The
objective of the game changed over time. While at the beginning the price
of oil was the centre of negotiations, later it appeared to be price
differentials which were the concern of the Libyan Government. At the time
of participation and nationalisation arrangements the objective of the game
was neither oil prices nor price differentials, it was the management of
the industry itself and the sale of the buy-back of Libyan oil.
In this chapter I will analyse the Libyan Government's tactics in
negotiations with the oil companies, and the impact these have had on both
the major and the independent companies. I also consider the point at
which OPEC took over from Libya in this conflict, and the implications its
actions had on the government backed foreign oil companies. But first I
will discuss the Libyan oil prices and the efforts of the Libyan National
Oil Corporation (LINOCO) to manage the increased responsibilities of the
oil sector of which participation, nationalisation, partnership-ventures
and marketing of royalty oil, as well as domestic refining of crude oil,
are the dominant activities of its function.
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7 • 1 Libyan oil price:
The first sign of Libyan concern about the Government oil income and the
price of oil, was apparent from the beginning of oil exports in the early
1960s. This was first signified by the 1961 amendment of the Petroleum
Law, which was accepted by the operating companies. The amendment that
they state a posted price in their fiscal accounts. The price posted by
Esso in 1961 was $2.21 a barrel for 390 API gravity oil, with a drop of 2
cents a barrel for each degree of gravity less than 39o, but a ceiling
price of $2.23 for 40o gravity and above [Wright 1981]. Of the other
producing companies only Marathon had posted, at the same level as Esso.
The calculations by which Esso arrived at its posting ($2.21 a barrel)
prices is shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1
Libya's First Posting Prices In (tJS$/b):1961
Posting	 Saudi Arabia(34o)	 Iran(34o)	 Iraq(36)
Ras Tanura Sidan	 ltharg Island Banias
Posted Price f.o.b.
	 1.80	 2.17	 1.73	 2.21
Freight to Rotterdam	 0.58	 0.26	 0.69	 0.26
C.i.f. Rotterdam	 2.38	 2.43	 2.42	 2.47
Less:
Freight Brega/Rotter. 	 0.22	 0.22	 0.22	 0.22
Oil value at Brega
	 2.16	 2.21	 2.20	 2.25
Average Brega Price 	 2. 16+2.21+2.20+2.25/4 =$2.2 05 or$2.21
Source: Middle Eaet Economic Survey, 9 and 16 Aug. [1968].
The company rounded up $2.205 to $2.21 and choose 390 as the gravity of
Libyan oil commercially equivalent to the four oils used in the calculation
[MEES 1968]. The other producers followed Esso's posting in their
financial statements to the Government by published postings of their own.
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The companies then, as I argued in Chapter 5, proceeded in their accounts
to deduct from the posted price, published or deemed, the marketing
expenses as defined by the 1961 amendment of the Petroleum Law, including
rebates, in order to reach a figure for their income resulting from
operations in Libya. After deduction of allowed costs and expenses, this
income was taxed at the rate of 50%. Table 7.2 gives the average per
barrel prices declared by the Libyan producers during 1961-1964.
Table 7.2
Fiscal Price per barrel($) Declared by Libyan Oil Producers: 1961-64
Company	 1961	 1962	 1963	 1964
Esso Standard	 2.19	 2.19	 2.20	 2.17
Marathon	 -	 1.64	 1.62	 1.59
Continental	 -	 1.71	 1.50	 1.64
Axnerada	 -	 1.46	 1.53	 1.61
Esso Sirte*	 -	
-	 2.17	 1.96
Mobil, Gelsenberg 	 -	 -	 1.89	 1.89
(*) Liamco and Grace, sold their oil to their partner Esso Sirte
at this period.
Source: Waddams [1980], p.119.
The posted prices by oil companies was the natural start of the Libyan
Government's comparison of its oil with other Middle Eastern oils. 	 The
location of Libya on the Mediterranean, near to European markets gave it
the advantage of what become known as a "Bhort-haul oil". In addition,
crude oil is a composite commodity, and different crudes yield different
product quality according to the content of each crude of some specific
chemical elements. The most important elements for the purpose of
manufacturing are API gravity and sulphur content. The higher the gravity
and the lower the sulphur content, the better the crude and vice versa.
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Table 7.3 shows a comparison between some of the Middle Eastern crude oil.
Table 7.3
Middle Eastern Crude Oil Data
Country	 Crude Name	 Crude Gravity (API) Sulphur Content %WT
Libya	 Brega	 40.4	 0.21
Bu-Attifel	 41.0	 0.04
S.Arabia Arabian Light	 33.4	 1.76
Arabian Medium	 30.4	 2.43
Iran	 Cyrus	 18.8	 3.46
Dartus	 33.8	 2.54
Iraq	 Basarah Light	 34.0	 1.95
Basarah Medium	 30.1	 3.15
U.A.E.	 Murban	 39.4	 0.74
Umm Shaif	 37.0	 1.38
Qatar	 Qatar Export	 41.4	 1.10
Qatar Marine	 37.0	 1.50
Kuwait	 Kuwait Export	 31.1	 2.51
Source: Jenkins (1984], Table 97, 115-116.
From the Table above, it can be seen clearly that Libyan crude enjoys
three advantages over the Gulf oil:
(1) Low sulphur content.
(2) High degree of API [American Petroleum Institute Specifications]
gravity (which means higher yields of the valuable light products).
(3) Proximity to European markets.
These advantages carry premia over the price of marker crude (Arabian
Light 34o) which serves as a reference to other crudes. On the other hand,
these advantages encouraged Libya to start negotiations with oil companies
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in order to increase the price of Libyan crude to match other crudes and to
gain further adjustments for its advantages mentioned above. Such claims
can be formalized an a game between the Libyan Government as one player and
oil companies as the other player, as will be argued later in this chapter.
7 • 2 The organ i 'ration of the national oil industry:
Unlike the days of Mosaddeq in the early 1950s, when nationalisation of
foreign oil companies was seen to be a crime against Western oil companies,
nationalisation in the 1970s, especially after the OPEC rise, has become
the norm and a necessary step to be taken by sovereign countries.
As a result of the successful confrontation with the oil companies,
Libya, and in this matter other OPEC countries, had increased their foreign
exchange reserves substantially prior to the October War and the Arab
embargoes. For example, Libyan foreign exchange reserves increased from
$ml,499 in 1970 to $m2,925 in 1973. Saudi Arabian foreign exchange
reserves increased from $m520 in 1970 to $m3,707 in 1973. This is shown in
Table 7.4.
Table 7.4
Foreign Exchange Reserves($m),And Crude Production(mb/d)
In Selected OPEC Countries: 1970-73
1970	 1971	 1972	 1973
Country	 F.Ex. Pro.	 F.Ex. Pro	 F.Ex. Pro.	 F.Ex. Pro.
Libya	 1,499 3.32	 2,566 2.76	 2,826 2.24 2,925 2.17
S.Arabia	 520 3.80	 1,291 4.77	 2,347 6.02 3,707 7.60
Iran	 76 3.83	 478 4.54	 760 5.02	 976 5.86
Kuwait	 96 2.94	 171 2.20	 247 3.28	 357 3.02
Iraq	 319 1.55	 432 1.69	 582 1.47 1,323 2.02
Algeria	 101 1.03	 233 0.79	 204 1.06	 823 1.10
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS). 29. F19761. and
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OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (OASB), [1982], p.13.
Unlike some members of OPEC, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iran, Libya
had not only increased its posted prices and foreign exchange reserves, but
at the same time had reduced crude production and exports in order to force
the oil companies to adhere to the Government demands. Its production as
shown in the Table above had been reduced from 3.32 mb/d in 1970 to 2.76
mb/d in 1971 and 2.17 mb/d in 1973.
OPEC members had for some time in the 1960s been trying to reach a
unified approach to participation in the ownership of the oil companies
working in their territory. As I discussed in Chapter 4, OPEC resolution
No.XVI.90 of 25 June 1968 declared that governments of member countries may
acquire a reasonable participation. This had been made possible by the
break through of 1970-7 1 started by Libya, and the availability of foreign
reserves to pay for the participation in or nationalisation of oil
companies.
For Libya to manage the growing activities of the oil sector, it had to
establish a new and qualified management. Some personnel had to be
borrowed from other sectors of the economy. The Libyan National Oil
Corporation was established in March 1970 replacing the old Lipetco, to
take resposibility over the oil and gas resources, from exploration to
final manufactured products as well as participation and joint-agreements
ventures. This topic ill be discussed below.
7 • 2 • 1 Libyan National Oil Corporation (LINOCO):
After independence in 1951 Libya was divided into 10 provinces; in order
to adapt the Petroleum Law of 1955 to all of them, each province was
represented by one member in the Petroleum Commission under a federal
chairman. The terms of that law have been discussed in Chapter 5. The
Commission was to be responsible for the implementation of the provisions
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of the Law under the supervision of the federal Minister responsible, at
that time the Minister of National Economy. When the time for petroleum
production approached, the increasing complexity of the problems and
administration of the industry showed the Commission to be quite inadequate
for its task. A Ministry of Petroleum Affairs was created in 1960. Under
Law No. 6 of 1963, the Commission was abolished and all its powers and
responsibilities transferred to the Ministry of Petroleum Affairs. The
Ministry's activities involved the management and exploration of oil
resources in its various phases, the distribution of locally manufactured
and imported petroleum products, participation with oil companies, and the
determination and safeguarding of price levels. The Libyan General
Petroleum Corporation (Lipetco) was created by Law No. 15 of 1968, to be
responsible for executing these activities. During the first year of
Lipetco's life its major activity was concerned with joint ventures. The
first joint-venture agreement was made in the spring of 1968 with the
French State-owned Erap/Aquitaine group. The agreement stipulated that the
French partner would undertake exploration with very substantial minimum
working obligations ($22.5 million expenditure in 10 years) [MEES, 19 April
19681.
	
Lipetco's share was to be 25% of production up to 200,000b/d,
increasing by steps until it reached 50% at a production level of
550,000b/d. Lipetco was to finance the development costs of its share, but
the French companies • would procure finance for Lipetco at favourable
interest rates. There was also to be a progressive royalty payment,
beginning at 12.5% and rising to 15% when production reached half a million
barrels per day. The bonus payable was $1 million on signature, $3 million
on commercial discovery and $9 million when production reached 300,000b/d.
Four other joint-ventures were embarked upon in the summer of 1969 with
Shell, Agip, Ashland Oil and Refining Co. and Chappaqua Oil Corporation.
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Because of the lack of experienced personnel at first, the joint-venture
agreements which were made in the spring of 1968 with the French companies
were negotiated in the Ministry, under the supervision of the Minister, and
handed over to Lipetco only at signature [Wright 1981 p.233].
After two years, on 5 March 1970, the revolutionary government replaced
Lipetco with a new National Oil Corporation (Linoco). Its prerogatives,
fields of activity and duties were similar to those of Lipetco. It
continued to be an independent body, operating under the supervision and
control of the Minister of Petroleum in order to achieve the development
plan objectives in the oil sector. The new Law No. 24 of March 1970,
limited any new joint ventures to those in which the foreign partner took
the whole of the risks in the pre-commercial exploration period, and
insisted on Linoco's share being fixed at a given percentage from the start
of operations, and not on a sliding scale as in previous joint ventures.
This new corporation had various activities; for convenience I split these
activities under two headings, corresponding to upstream operations and
downstream operations. These are; (A) drilling and production and, (B)
domestic refining.
A- Drilling and production:
Linoco acquired most of the relinquished areas and surrendered
concessions. The land under direct exploration by Linoco was recorded as
234,000 square Ki1omtres. Early in 1972 a joint drilling venture was
established between Linoco and ENI by which the latter's subsidiary,
Saipem, was to operate 18 drilling rigs in Libya for Linoco, 12 of which
were for exploration. In 1974 the number was increased by the 3 rigs of
the Oasis companies and from then onwards more rigs were added as a result
of the new production sharing deals. There was some real increase in
Linoco's exploration, as well as drilling as indicated in Table 7.5.
	 In
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the 1970s many oil fields were developed, the most important, of which
Agip's Bu Attifel field in Concession 100, promised to be a major operation
of 300,000 b/d production.
Table 7.5
Linoco's Oil Activities: 1977-1980
Year No.of oil wells Linoco's prod. (000b/d) Other prod.(000b/d) Total
1977	 1827	 1,369	 693	 2,063
1978	 1935	 1,302	 681	 1,983
1979	 2093	 1,412	 680	 2,092
1980	 2218	 1,232	 589	 1,830
Source: Central Bank of Libya, 25 Annual Report, [1980], p.86. Md OPEC
Annual Statistical Balletin, [1982], p.81.
After 50% Government participation in October 1972, production began and
reached 110,000 b/d in 1973, rising to 156,000 b/d in 1976. Linoco's
production averaged 300,000 b/d during 1973-1976, and counted for 65.66% of
the total production in 1978 [Central Bank of Libya 1979]. Its exports
fell from 45.5% of total exports in 1979 to 45.3% in 1980 [Central Bank of
Libya 1980]. Linoco's first group of sale contracts of royalty oil abroad
was made between September 1970 and March 1971 as shown in Table 7.6.
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Table 7.6
Linoco's Sale Contracts Of Crude Oil(000 tons): 1970-1971
Date of contract	 Buyer	 Quantity	 contracted Q.delivered
Sep.1970	 OMV[Austrian]
	
300	 304
Oct.1970	 Witco[Austrian]
	
4,700	 118
Oct.1970	 Egyptian Pet.Co. 	 750	 467
Dec. 1970	 Perola S.A.[Swiss]
	
2,250	 100
Mar.1971	 Naphthachem[Bulgarian	 1,000	 493
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Libyan Oil, 1954-1971, [1972], p.116.
The quantities involved amounted to 9 million tons, of which 1.5 million
tons was delivered by the end of 1971. These sales were made in times of
great uncertainty about the future course of prices, and the prices stated,
at or above the posted prices of oil at the times of sales, were agreed in
principle. In April 1974 Linoco was selling direct to customers 70% of its
settlement. There were barter deals, one with France in March 1974 of 7
million tons a year, another with Argentina in November 1974 of 50,000 b/d
in exchange for food and, there are still some barter deals operating.
In the 1966 concessions most applicants had offered, as an extra benefit,
priority to Libyan tankers, provided their terms of charter were on a par
with other available tankers. Libya thus had a ready-made potential for
tanker usage, and from 1971 onwards Linoco began ordering vessels. Orders
for two vessels of 47,000 tons each from Spain (for the Zawia refinery) as
part of a barter deal for oil, and two of 86,000 tons from Japan, at a cost
of $14 million each, were reported in 1972, and two further tankers of over
100,000 tons were ordered in 1973. These orders were fulfilled in 1975,
and in 1975, and in 1976 plans were announced to increase the fleet by 50%
to 12 vessels of a total tonnage of 686,500 tons. By 1980 15 oil and
products tankers were being operated by the state Libyan General Maritime
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Transport Organization (LGMTO).
B-Domestic refining:
The first purpose of a local refinery was to meet the country's own
rapidly increasing demand for the main oil products that had previously
been imported. Domestic oil consumption increased from 16,000 b/d in 1970
to 48,000 b/d in 1975 and 120,000 b/d in 1980, (giving the highest
consumption per capita in Africa), with a projected total of 215,000 b/d in
1985 [OAPEC Bulletin Jan.1980]. The consumption of refined products in
Libya have risen from 63,000 b/d in 1977 to 80,300 b/d in 1979 and 109,700
b/d in 1981. The rapid increase in domestic refined products has affected
the exports of these goods, which declined from 99,200 b/d in 1978 to
84,600 b/d in 1979 and 72,500 b/d in 1980, as shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7
Domestic Consumption and Exports of Refined Products in Libya(000b/d)
1977- 1980
Year	 Domestic consumption	 Exports	 Total
1977	 63.0	 91.2	 154.2
1978	 69.8	 99.2	 169.0
1979	 80.3	 84.6	 164.9
1980	 89.3	 72.5	 161.8
--- .---- ---------
	 -----a, -
Esso's original 10,000 b/d refinery, opened at Mersa Brega in 1967, was
never able to meet all domestic demand. A refinery at Zawia (40 km. west
of Tripoli), of 60,000 b/d, built by an Italian firm called Snam Progetti
at a cost of 25 million, was completed and commissioned in 1974 [Central
Bank of Libya 1977]. Thereafter a doubling of its capacity was completed
in June 1977. Zawia was also well placed to be the main outlet for the
long-projected "Western pipeline", designed to gather in the production of
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production of the small and scattered strikes made in various parts of
western Libya since the 1950s, but not considered individually commercial
because of their size and remoteness. Linoco's plans for an 18-inch, 400
km. pipeline to deliver an initial 50,000 b/d of this western country
crude to Zawia (rising eventually to 150,000 b/d) were finally approved in
1977 and a consultancy contract was awarded in 1980 [Mansfield 1981 p.31].
In 1971 Linoco arranged a processing deal with Sincat in Italy for refining
oil products for Libyan consumption. Concessionaires were obliged by the
Petroleum Law to supply crude oil at field storage price for a refinery in
Libya producing for Libyan consumption. By July 1971 the companies
supplied 70% at cost and 30% from royalty oil. Thus the Government
achieved a cheap supply of oil for internal Libyan consumption. This was
made even less costly when Linoco acquired its own crude oil supplies and
when the Zawia refinery came on stream in 1974.
In its 1966 concessions Occidental had offered, in addition to the
development of Kufra as described earlier, to construct and pay for 50% of
an ammonia plant, the Ministry was to pay the other 50%, to provide
fertilisers for Libyan agriculture and for export. It was to have an
initial production capacity of 600 tons a day, capable of expansion to
1,200 tons a day, and to use gas supplied by the Libyan Government. The
company thereupon requested to switch to a methanol plant on similar terms,
and this was agreed by the Government after the Revolution in 1969. In
1972 the National Methanol Company was created to implement the agreement
with Occidental. The plant was to have a capacity of 1,000 tons a day of
methanol, but it was not until 1974 that a contract for construction was
entered into, the cost involved being $88m [OAPEC 1976 p.213]. Occidental,
as part of its production-sharing agreement of 1974, was relieved of
further financial obligations at a time when the costs had amounted to 15%.
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A complex was first planned near Benghazi, to which Agip had offered to
construct a gas-line as its joint-venture deal. The site was subsequently
changed to Mersa Brega where royalty gas would be readily available, and
British firms, which included Power Gas Company and Id, were retained by
Linoco as consultants. A plan to construct an ethylene plant to produce
300,000 tons a year at a cost of LD6O million (Libyan Dinars) was announced
in June 1975. Libyan petro-chemical production rose from 305,000 tons in
1978 to 500,000 tons in 1979 [Central Bank of Libya 1979 p.43]. It was not
until mid-1980 that the Government took a 51% share in Esso's technically
complex and troublesome natural gas liquefaction plant at Mersa Brega,
mainly because of lack of local technical expertise.
7 • 2 • 2 Participation/nationalisation movement:
Participation refers to negotiated joint ventures, production-sharing,
service contracts and other forms of co-operation between government and
company. Nationalisation is taken to mean compulsory acquisition of part
or all of an oil company's business by the government. The distinction is
blurred when government participation is forced on a company under
pressure, and the company acquiesces either at the time or subsequently.
These cases will be classified here as nationalisation.
In its Resolution No.XVI.90 of 25 June 1968, OPEC, as I mentioned before,
declared that governments may acquire a reasonable participation on the
grounds of changing crrcumstances. In June 1971 OPEC set up a Ministerial
Committee to draw up the basis for the implementation of effective
participation by member countries. The Committee recommended that
participation should be implemented, without committing itself to a precise
percentage figure, that compensation should be at net book value, and the
companies should be obliged to buy back participation oil to the extent
required by governments.	 Thereafter Libya, together with Nigeria,
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announced that they intended to pursue negotiations for participation with
their concessionaires on an individual basis [MEES, 10 March 1972].
The first Libyan agreement on participation in an existing concession was
with the Italian company ENI, and its subsidiary Agip. Agip had developed
the Bu Attifel field in Concession No.100, with an ultimate potential of
some 300,000 b/d, but it hindered in by a Ministry order which insisted on
satisfactory utilisation of associated gas. In September 1972, after two
years of desultory negotiations, ENI proposed 50 percent state
participation to combine with its already existing joint venture, where
there had been 43 wells drilled resulting in 8 non-commercial discoveries.
The terms were that the Government would pay in cash 50% of approved
expenditure already incurred in Concession 100 [P1w, 9 Oct.1972 and 5 March
1973]. This was agreed at $62.4 million to be paid over 5 years. The
output target for Bu Attifel for 1973 was put at 200,000 b/d. There was to
be a management committee of 3 Italians and 3 Libyans, the Chairman being
Libyan and the Managing Director Italian.
BP was nationalised on 7 December 1971, by the decision of the
Revolutionary Command Council. This was done in reaction to British
failure to act to prevent the Iranian seizure of the Tumb islands in the
Arabian Gulf. The decision established the Arab Gulf Exploration Company
(INJAZ), a subsidiary of Linoco, to take over the assets and business of
BP. The Libyan actioxt presupposed that BP represented the UK Government,
which held approximately half of its ordinary shares. BP's personnel were
ordered to stay in their posts, and Libyans were drafted in from other
companies, which were to continue to pay them. The nationalisation
decision included provisions for compensation to be fixed by a 3-man
committee set up under the chairmanship of a Counsellor of the Libyan
Courts of Appeal, whose decision would be final. BP was prevented from
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loading oil at Harega terminal, but N.B.Hunt, its 50% partner (but not
operator) in the Sarir field was unaffected.
	 Other oil companies'
production was frozen at existing levels so as not to supply BP.
	 In
October 1972 N.B.Hunt received a demand from the Government for a
half-share of all oil sold since the nationalisation of BP, and a 50% State
Participation thereafter. This demand was accompanied by a ban of Hunt's
exports, which lasted until January 1973 when liftings were resumed. At
the same time it was made clear by the Government that 50% State
participation was negotiable, and was a preliminary step to a greater
portion being acquired by the State later, and that such participation
would apply only to profitable concessions. In June 1973, following Hunt's
refusal to accept participation terms and to market Injaz's (previously BP)
share of Sarir crude, Hunt's interest was nationalised.
BP, as well as pursuing claims for its oil through the courts whenever it
could, also initiated arbitration proceedings against the takeover in the
International Court of Justice. However, much of the nationalised oil was
sold to Eastern Europe where it was safe from pursuit. For example, Soviet
liftings of Sarir crude rose to more than 100,000 b/d [P1w, 31 July 1972].
In November 1974 the Libyan Government reached a full and final settlement
with HP, whereby the latter received a net payment of £17.4 millions. This
represented £62.4 millions compensation for the value of the assets seized,
less £45 millions retrdactive payments assessed as due from BP according to
the terms of the posted price agreement of October 1970. In October 1976
BP stated that its dispute with the Libyan Government was ended, and that
it would consider service contracts with the Libyan Government [P1W, 11
Oct.1976].
In September 1975 Hunt came to an agreement with the Libyan Government,
and announced that he had no further rights in his concession or the oil
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from it.
During the early months of 1973, negotiations with companies took place
in which the Libyans proposed 50% take-overs at net book value, and
buy-back of Government oil so acquired at a price half-way between posted
price and tax-paid cost to the companies. In May the Government requested
the companies to make their own proposals along the lines of the service
contracts/production-sharing arrangements, similar to the new arrangements
in Iran and elsewhere. This was followed by a one-day stoppage of loadings
as a protest at the situation in the Middle East. On 11 August the
Government decreed a partial nationalisation of Occidental (51%), and the
company formally signified its acquiescence. Immediately afterwards Oasis
was subjected to similar treatment with 51% nationalisation and
compensation at net book value. Continental, Marathon and Amerada, the
concession-holders which between them owned 83.33 of Oasis, acquiesced, but
Shell, which owned the remaining 16.67%, did not. Its liftings of oil were
embargoed from 12 August. The Oasis settlement also included a company
undertaking to maintain three rigs in operation in Libya, mentioned earlier
when I discussed Table 7.5.
After the leading independents, the Government turned to the majors.
Amoseas the operating company of Texaco and Socal almost immediately had
its allowable production cut by 50% to 100,000 b/d, and at the same time
strong pressures were put on all the majors to acquiesce in nationalisation
on similar terms. Refusal would be likely to result in total shut-down of
their Libyan operations. The general nationalisation decree of 51% of the
assets and business of the producing majors came on the fourth anniversary
of the revolution, 1 September 1973. It comprised all the producing majors
Esso, Texaco and Socal and their partners Liamco (Arco), Grace and
Gelsenberg.	 The nationalisation decrees took 51% of the assets and
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business of the companies concerned for the Government, with the exception
of ESSO'S gas liquefaction plant [MEES, 14 Sept.1973]. Compensation was to
be decided by a committee of three, headed by a Justice of the Court of
Appeal and including Linoco and Treasury representatives. The companies
were to continue to operate in the concessions under a management committee
of three appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum, two of whom, including the
chairman, were to be Libyans, the third the resident manager of the
operating company. All employees of the companies, regardless of
nationality, were to continue at their posts, and the parties were to make
arrangements within a month for the lifting of Linoco'S share, including
the quantities and prices involved.
The Government decision, which made the non-nationalised companies
somehow relaxed, was that in the middle of September Occidental was allowed
to increase its production from 360,000 b/d to 475,000 b/d, with a
stipulated buy-back price of $4.90 per barrel for its nationalised oil. By
the end of September it was reported that Libyan crude was being sold for
$5.50 per barrel and there were rumours that Occidental's high-gravity oil
was fetching $5.85-$5.90 per barrel. Until February 1974 the majors had
been continuing to lift their Libyan oil as fast as they could, and to pay
Government dues on the old concession basis. In the middle of February the
Libyan government seized the 2moseas operation (Texaco and Socal) and the
Liamco (Arco) share of Esso Sirte (25.5%). In March Mobil acquiesced in
its 51% nationalisation and at the beginning of April the government seized
the Shell 16.7% interest in Oasis, bringing its total interest in this
partnership operation to 59.16%. In the middle of the month Esso
acquiesced in 51% nationalisation (which excluded the gas plant).
Shell reached an accord with the Government on compensation for
nationalisation in June 1974. The agreement provided for payment in oil at
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a rate of 40,000 b/d and for liftings by Shell of Linoco's oil at a
discounted price. Thereupon Shell dropped all legal complaints against the
Government [P1W, 17 June 1974]. Amerada had received $19.4 million
compensation, Continental and Marathon $42.5 million each [Central Bank of
Libya 1973]. Towards the end of 1977 Texaco and Socal reached a settlement
on their nationalisation, which amounted to $76 million payable in oil over
15 months [Petroleum Economist Nov. 1977].
The State's share of total Libyan production in 1975 of 1.5 mb/d and in
1976 of 1.9 nib/d amounted to 64%, excluding royalty oil. During 1978 the
situation of the operating companies, concession-holders, and partners was
as shown in Table 7.8 below.
New terms for old business:
While the nationalisation battle with the majors was still raging,
Occidental signed a production-sharing agreement with Linoco, covering 21
widely spread areas of new land. It was described as a "pace-maker" for
several other similar ventures that followed. The principal provisions of
the agreement were that Occidental undertook to spend $90 millions on
exploration in the new areas and would be entitled to 19% of the oil
produced from them, free of Libyan taxes and royalties. Linoco would pay
to Occidental its own 81% share of development costs, but would be
reimbursed for this at a rate of 5% per annum interest-free after oil
exports from the areas allocated reached 100 million barrels. This
production-sharing agreement was quickly followed by others, which were
agreed in principle in April 1974 and signed in the following October. The
agreements so concluded were with Exxon, Mobil (later joined by
Gelsenberg), Campagnie Francaise Des Petroles (CFP), Elf-Aquitaine and
Agip.	 In essence they were similar to each other and to the Occidental
venture. They all provided for production sharing between the Linoco and
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Table 7.8
List of Operators,Concession-Holders,and Their Partners
During 1978 and 1982
Operating company	 Concession-holders and partners %1978	 %1982
1.Oasis Oil Company	 Amerada	 8.20	 -
Marathon	 16.30	 -
Continental	 16.30	 -
Linoco	 59.20	 -
2.Occidental Libya	 Occidental	 49.00	 -
Linoco	 51.00	 -
3.Mobil Oil	 Mobil	 31.85	 -
Gelsenberg	 17.15	 -
Linoco	 51.00	 -
4. Agip	 Agip	 50 • 00	 -
Linoco	 50.00	 -
5.Aquitaine	 Aquitaine	 28.00	 -
Murphy	 16.00	 -
Hispanoil	 42.00	 -
Elf	 14.00	 -
6.Esso Standard	 Esso Standard	 49.00	 00
Linoco	 51.00	 100.00
7.Esso Sirte	 Esso Sirte	 24.50	 00
Grace	 12.00	 -
Linoco	 63.50	 88.00
8.Arabian Gulf	 INJAZ	 100.00	 -
9.Axnoco	 Amoco	 100.00	 -
10.Wintershall Libya	 Wintershall	 50.00	 -
Al-Forat Libya	 50.00	 -
11.tjnion Rheinische 	 Union Rheinische AG
	
100.00	 -
12.Om Al-Farood Field • 	 Linoco	 100.00	 -
(-) No change.
Source: Ministry of Planning, Annuai Rerx'rt on Libyan Oii Industry,
November [1979], 32,33. Aid O.A.S.B., [1982], p.79.
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the company in the ratio of 85:15 on-shore and 81:19 off-shore [Petroleum
Economist, Nov. 1981 p.30]. The company expenditure commitment on
exploration was $90 millions over six years for Esso, $70 millions over
five years for CFP, $45 millions over four years for Elf-Aquitaine and $82
millions over five years for Agip. Linoco was to provide its share
proportion of development costs on-shore and 50% of them for off-shore
development. These would be reimbursable to Linoco by the company at a
rate of 5% a year, beginning after three years of exports or 80 million
barrels.
It is not easy to quantify the expected profitability to the companies of
these agreements, made at a time of great disturbance in oil companies'
command over their oil resources, of volatility in price levels and
uncertainty about the future course. It is, however, clear that to
establish title to even 15% of oil reserves established through their
exploration commitment, at cost and free of taxes and royalties, would be
of substantial benefit. On the Libyan side, the agreements provided a
satisfactory answer to the problem of stimulating exploration by the large
funds, the high technical skills, and expertise in execution which the oil
companies possessed, by giving them strong incentives to achieve success.
The large investment required by Linoco in the case of development was by
no means beyond the financial capacity of the State, as I stressed at the
beginning of the chapter. In addition to the pay-back of these investments
from Linoco's share of production, they would be recouped from the oil
company partners over 20 years in the case of the establishment of sizeable
fields.
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7.3 Libya's threat and the oil companies' response:
It is clear from the above discussion that Libyan oil had been
underpriced, despite the advantages of being a short-haul oil with low
sulphur content and a high API gravity. To correct the course of business
the Libyan government had to negotiate with oil companies, either
collectively or one by one. This seemed a hard task for the monarchy
government before 1969. Even though King Idriss, as I discussed in Chapter
4, demanded a 10 cent rise in the posted price for Libyan oil, he was not
able to get what he wanted. Probably because of its close political,
military and economic relationships with the West, especially the U.S. and
the U.K, the monarchy would not put pressure on oil companies. However,
these governments were concerned with the security of the companies,
especially those companies which to a great extent were government owned,
such as the British Petroleum Company (BP).
The game between Libya and the foreign oil companies had effectively
begun after the September Revolution of 1969. The conflict between the
Revolutionary Government in Libya and the companies was, in fact, part of
the wider anti-Western move against the U.S., the U.K. and other
governments. This is evident from the beginning when the Libyan Government
immediately started serious negotiations with both the Imerican Government
and the British Government to evacuate their military forces from Libya.
The opposition to Italian and Jewish settlers was another evidence of
a
Libyan intentions. Thus it is not surprising that the Government would
wish to renegotiate the interests of foreign oil companies in Libya.
The problem which affected the companies decisions is that there were
other parties interested in the outcome of the game between the companies
and Libya, even though these parties were not directly involved in the
game.	 The companies were fully aware that if Libya had any success in
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these negotiations the outcome would be multiplied and the effects would be
widened to other oil producing countries. This was an important factor in
the companies' final decision. The most interested parties in this game
were as follows:
(a) Oil companies other than Libyan producers; these were mostly
affiliates to the same companies working in Libya. They were likely to be
faced with similar demands by their host governments if Libya succeeded in
its negotiations with the companies.
(b) OPEC producers; these had been trying for a whole decade (the 1960s)
to break through the companies' defences, without visible success. If
Libya succeeded no doubt they would follow suit.
The conflict Libya had with the foreign oil companies was essentially a
bargaining situation. According to Schelling [1963 p.5], bargaining
situations are situations in which the ability of one participant to gain
his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions
that the other participant will take. Meanwhile, participants make their
decisions independently, they do not choose a pair of strategies together.
The Libyan Government's general aim was to use the same amount of oil
resources to get higher utility. Its payoffs can be distinguished as
short-run and long-run targets:
(a) In the short-run the aim was to increase oil revenues with a constant
or even reduced rate of depletion. It initially meant to reverse the
monarchy's oil policy, that the companies were allowed to produce more oil
than they should. This could be done to gain public support. Behind that
Libya sought to pursue a new policy, that sovereign nations could increase
their oil revenues by selling oil at higher prices as long as there is
sufficient demand for it.
(b) In the long-run Libya aimed to maximize the value of oil reserves.
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The higher the price of oil the higher the value of the country's reserves.
In the attempt to achieve these aims the Government put forward a list of
demands for the companies to study and submit proposals. These demands
were:
(a) An increase in posted prices.
(b) A change in the gravity differentials structure.
(c) A rise in the tax rate on profits.
Since oil companies had enjoyed for some time cheap, high quality Libyan
oil, they preferred to do so for a longer time if they could. But since
the Libyan Government had changed course, they somehow had to deal with the
Government's new demands. The possible strategies open to them were as
follows:
(a) Accept the Libyan Government's demands.
(b) Refuse the Libyan Government's demands.
(c) Accept some of the items and reject the others.
(d) Increase the posted prices with a reduction in the rate of output.
(e) Slow or freeze new exploration and development programs.
(f) Pull out of the country.
The companies' choice of any of these strategies depended upon the Libyan
Government's actions and VCC Versa. The companies needed to form a clear
view of the Government's strategies. These are similar to their own
strategies.	 The Libyan Government's possible courses of action were as
e
follows
(a) Welcome and praise the companies acceptance of its demands.
• (b) Reduce the country's crude production.
(c) Re-organize the granting of exploration, concessions and probably
invite companies not involved in Libyan crude operations to submit tenders.
(d) Freeze crude oil production.
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The employment of a particular strategy by the Government depended solely
on the companies' response to its demands, but the companies had a wide
range of choice, extending from acceptance of government demands to a
pull-out of the country. Their choice would depend, on one hand, on the
cost of each strategy; for instance the cost of a pull-out of Libya was
certainly higher than the cost of a slow-down in exploration and
development programs. On the other hand their choice would depend on the
anticipated Libyan Government action.
At the start of negotiations both parties had to search for the "BtatUB
quo" utilities; these are the parties' security levels. Meanwhile, each
party disposes of alternative sanctions it may exercise in case of a
breakdown of negotiations. Correspondingly each party has a choice of
threat, and so the positions in which the two parties would find themselves
if there were a breakdown is no longer necessarily the "8tatus quo ite".
It is now a variable payoff pair, depending on what sanctions will be
taken. I will follow the literature and call this pair the "threat paint".
Libya from its side announced the action it would take in such a case.
It made it clear to the other party that it would freeze crude oil
production if the oil companies would not agree to its demands. The
announcement of this choice constituted a threat to the oil companies. The
efficacy of such threats depends on the credulity of oil companies that the
Libyan Government would carry it out.
As I mentioned above, the Libyan Government's insistence on evacuating
foreign military forces from the country and the anti-Western attitude of
this Government were actually clear examples of the seriousness and
determination of the rulers of Libya to fulfil their ambitions.
Taking this into account, Libya's threat to the oil companies was no
doubt credible, especially after Qadhafi's address to oil company
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representatives, where he stressed that Libyan people had lived for five
thousand years without petroleum were able to live again without it.
Another point of concern which made the Libyan threat to the oil
companies credible is that by the time negotiations were in progress, Libya
had accumulated enough reserves to keep the country running for more than
two years at the spending rate of that time. Total foreign exchange
reserves were $2666 million while total expenditure was about $1207 million
per annum. This gave foreign exchange reserves equal to 2.2 times total
annual government expenditure (Parks 1974 p.2321.
Even though the Libyan threat to the oil companies was credible, this in
no way determines the outcome of the game. What actually determines the
outcome of the game is the reaction of oil companies to the Libyan threat.
The oil companies seemed not to have payed much attention to the Libyan
threat; instead they set out to negotiate, and two of them, Occidental and
Esso, made some proposals. These were dismissed by a government committee.
After six months delay the Government proceeded to take action by employing
strategy (b). It ordered the cutbacks on Occidental's production. The
latter company turned to Esso, the most important producer, for help.
Either the other companies should compensate Occidental for the cut in its
production, or it would agree to the Libyan Government's demands.
The companies' negotiations between themselves could be of great benefit
to the Libyan Government. There was nothing the Government wanted more at
a
that stage than disagreement between the oil companies. The companies,
though, turned to each other in an attempt to re-organize themselves in
order collectively to work out a unified plan of action against the Libyan
Government.
The oil companies, all of them, realised at this stage that the only
strategy, if any, to protect them from the Libyan actions was complete
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cooperation and co-ordination between the so-called "Liby2n prodUCer8".
Against this background Occidental approached the other oil companies for
negotiations. Its aim or payoff was to reduce the scale of the cutback in
its production and to prevent further cuts. The other companies' payoff
was to prevent a similar treatment of themselves by the Libyan Government.
The companies had to set their strategies, which were as follows:
(A) To back Occidental and compensate it for the cutback in its
production.
(B) Not to compensate Occidental.
If the companies chose strategy (A), it would mean that Occidental would
not accept the Libyan Government's demands unilaterally; it had to act
according to the companies collective strategy. This strategy at the
minimum would delay the agreement by Occidental, or any other company, to
the Libyan demands. Nevertheless the other companies may still have to
face Libyan actions if the latter decided to carry on with such a strategy.
If this was the case, the other companies would lose more by employing
their first strategy. Thus the employment of strategy (A) depended upon
how far Occidental was prepared to cooperate with these companies. In
other words how much other companies trust Occidental to cooperate with
them.
Now suppose the other companies did not trust Occidental and decided not
compensate the company (strategy B). In this case there would be no
alternative, the companies either voluntarily accept Occidental's agreement
with the Libyan Government if the latter (Occidental) agreed to comply with
the Government demands, or face similar treatment by means of a cutback in
other companies' production.
The other companies' decision is actually dependent upon the strategy
that Occidental would employ. These companies, for instance, would not
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wish to back Occidental if the latter decided to accept the Libyan demands.
But as I argued in Chapter Three, mutual dependence is part of the logical
structure of the game and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual
accommodation, tacit if not explicit, even if only in the avoidance of
mutual disaster. But conversely, mistrust between the parties could lead
to non-cooperative behaviour.
However, Occidental's strategies seemed to be limited. It had a choice
of the following strategies:
(a) To reject the Libyan Government demands and co-ordinate with other
oil companies.
(b) To accept the Libyan Government's demands regardless of other
companies' strategies.
If Occidental employed its strategy (a), under the condition of other
companies employing their first strategy (A), this would mean that the
companies (all of them) decided on a cooperative strategy (Aa). Such a
choice would have a significant impact, not only because it leads to a
cooperative outcome of the game between the oil companies themselves, but
also for a possible ultimate gain concerning the original game between
Libya and oil companies. But because of mistrust between oil companies
this strategy would not be employed. That is because a number of Libyan
producers, who happened to be the most important producers of Libyan crude,
are Major companies. These had for some time, especially during the 1950s
a
and 1960s, been competitors to the rising Independent companies of which
Occidental was one. If the other companies mistrusted Occidental by
employing their strategy (B) while Occidental went on rejecting the Libyan
demands with strategy (a), the parties would end up with (Ba) as shown in
the matrix below.
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Such a strategy would not be of great significance to Occidental simply
because the company would not be able to stand firm alone against the
Libyan Government. And if Libya employed its extreme strategy by freezing
Occidental's production that would be less than a third of the country's
total production. This would not be as costly for Libya as it would be for
Occidental. So the possibility of further cutbacks in Occidental's
production by the Libyan Government was still there.
However if Occidental choose strategy (b) by accepting the Libyan
Government's demands, there would not be much point in the other companies
compensating for Occidental's production cutbacks (Ab). The other
companies would have no choice but to prepare themselves either to be faced
with similar action from the Libyan Government or to accept the Government
conditions and sign an agreement similar to Occidental's. Thus at last the
companies had come to end up with a non-cooperative solution by choosing
(Bb) (matrix above). The above assessment illustrates the non zero-sum
game, which I discussed in Chapter Three in relation to the prisoners'
dilemma. The difference between the two cases is that the communication
problem facing the prisoners is replaced with a trust problem in the case
of the oil companies' game.
To illustrate the above discussion graphically, suppose that Occidental's
crude production from Libya is represented by the horizontal axis in the
Figure 7.1, while the other companies' production is represented by the
a
vertical axis.
The total companies' production prior to the Government cutbacks of
Occidental's production is at point D on the production line AB.
Occidental's production is OM and other companies' production is OL. The
trouble started when the Government ordered the cutback in Occidental's
production in May 1970. This action is represented in the Figure as a
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shift in the production line from AB to AC where Occidental's production is
reduced by NM, while the other companies' production was unchanged at OL.
If this was the case, point E would determine the outcome of the game.
However, the new position created a negotiation set, EF, between Occidental
as a first player and the other oil companies as the second player. That
is, if the companies wanted to deter Libyan action and back Occidental in
not accepting Libyan demands. Esso, when appealed to by Occidental, faced
a dilemma; either to cooperate with Occidental in order to deter the Libyan
action, or to let its competitor, Occidental, face the Libyan action alone.
Esso decided to take the latter option knowing that it might be the next to
be ordered by the Libyan Government to cut its production. Such a response
by Esso on the grounds of the past relations with the independent companies
eliminated any means of deterrence to Libyan threats. This incident, in
particular, directed the outcome of the game towards non-cooperation, point
E in the Figure above.
The Government then knew that the companies would not resist its actions.
Accordingly, it imposed more cutbacks on Occidental and other companies as
well (Oasis, Mobil, Esso,...). This shifted the production line to the
left even further, to RS, showing that the problem is no longer
Occidental's, but that of Oasis, Mobil and others, as shown in Figure 7.2
below.	 -
The Figure shows that the negotiation set was widened and this made
a
reaching an agreement even harder for the producing companies whose
production had not yet been reduced. The producing companies would end up
at a point like Y, somewhere between K and H. This point is clear enough
to indicate the worsening position, in terms of production only, that the
companies ended up with. Occidental's production would be reduced by NG,
while other companies' production would be reduced by U.
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Considering the profitability of the companies the position would be
different, because when the companies agreed to accept the Government terms
the price was increased by $0.30, which of course increased the companies'
profits after the storm was over. This matter was raised in Chapter 3; I
showed that the incremental increase in posted prices was divided between
the Libyan Government and oil companies. I also showed that there was no
loss to the oil companies, but the advantage of cheap Libyan oil in
comparison to other oils in the Middle East was almost removed.
The above is a theoretical assessment, but, practically, in December 1969
(less than four months after the Libyan Revolution) a committee was
established with membership drawn from officials of the Ministry of
Petroleum, to negotiate with oil companies to adjust the posted price of
Libyan crude oil (A1-Thaurah 23 Dec.1969]. The first meeting on January
1970 was followed by a further meeting of heads of oil companies on 29
January, which was addressed by Colonel M'uammar al Qadhafi, who had
emerged as leader of the Revolutionary Command Council. In his address to
the companies he made the remark which was to become famous, that "the
Libyan people, who have liveii for five thousand years without petroleum,
are able to live again without it". This statement, together with other
reasons mentioned above, made Libya's threat to oil companies credible.
Both Occidental and Esso had agreed in principle on a price adjustment, and
had made some proposals for small increases to be phased in over a period
a
of years. These had been dismissed by the Pricing Committee as trivial.
It was widely expected that the Government would first turn its attention
to Occidental, since this company had no oil resources other than its
Libyan fields and was thus most susceptible to pressure. Occidental was
ordered to cut back its production in successive stages by nearly 400,000
b/d.	 In July 1970 Oasis was subject to similar treatment, having its
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production allowance reduced by 125,000 b/d (after having reached over one
million b/d earlier in the year), and in August Mobil's output was reduced
by 55,000 b/d. Further cutbacks were imposed on Occidental and Esso
(110,000 b/d) at the beginning of September.
During this period some other important decisions were taken by the
Government. First, a decree of July 4 nationalised the marketing of oil
products in Libya and took over all distribution installations and service
stations. This affected the three companies Esso, Shell and Asseil, which
distributed and marketed oil products in Libya. Second, Esso was prevented
from exporting Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) from Mersa al Brega, pending an
adjustment of prices, and also from drilling twelve fill-in wells on the
Zelten Field. Third, new port dues of 1 cent/b were imposed on tankers
shipping oil. Fourth, in a decree issued at the end of August, overseas
payments by oil companies to employees and contractors were banned.
The decision by Occidental to concede higher posted prices marks, in a
sense, the end of an era in the international oil industry, and the
beginning of a new one. The basic agreement with Occidental was for an
increase in posted prices of 30 cents/b, to be raised by a further 2
cents/b on 1 January of each of the following five years [Ghanem 1975
p.302]. The generalized agreement was later accepted by the other oil
producing companies. The most important measure included in this agreement
was a rise in the rate of tax, from 50% to 58%. This was rationalized as
a	 -
the consolidation of 5% of pre-tac profits which Occidental was
contributing towards the development of Kufra (an agriculture development
in the Oasis of Kufra, agreed when the concessions were awarded in 1966).
A further 3% was in lieu of back payments of tax on the higher posted
price, which was to apply retroactively to the beginning of Occidental's
production in 1968.
	
The 5% increase of tax in lieu of the Kufra
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expenditure doubled these payments, as Occidental had been treating them as
tax deductable and recovering half as a tax credit. As for the other 3%,
an option was given of making the retroactive tax payments in cash, or
increasing permanently the rate of tax. Another element in the agreement
which had big consequences was a change in the base gravity and in price
differentials for different gravities. Even though this matter was
parallel to oil prices achievements, it has received more attention since
then, as will be observed through the rest of this chapter.
Hitherto the base gravity, which Esso had used for posting at $2.21/b,
was 390, with a 2 cents fall in price for each degree below this, and a 2
cents increase for 400 oil only (and no increase above 400). The new
agreement made 400 the base gravity for price, extended the 2 cents
differential to each degree of gravity above 40 0 , and reduced the
differential to 1.5 cents for each degree of gravity below 400.
When Occidental had made the agreement, most of its cut-backs in
production were restored, perhaps to encourage the other companies to make
agreements; these followed within 6 weeks. First the Oasis companies,
Continental, Marathon, Amerada-Hess (Amerada had merged with Hess, a major
distributor and refiner on the US Eastern Seaboard, in 1969) and Shell were
made an offer similar to Occidental t s in the third week of September 1970.
Continental, Marathon and Ainerada-Hess, for each of whom their Libyan
production was more than 50% of their total world-wide production,
a
consented after a week. Shell demurred and immediately experienced an
embargo on its exports. Shell's Libyan production was only 3% of its
ttal. However, Shell subsequently agreed terms in the middle of October,
and had its production restored, but was still subject to the cut-backs
applicable to all Oasis production. The Government then called on all
Independents, Gelsenberg, Hunt, Liamco and Grace, to capitulate. The four
- 266 -
companies did so at the beginning of October, together with the inoseas
companies (Socal and Texaco). This latter event broke the resistance of
the majors, and after a further week Esso, Mobil, BP and Aquitaine
accepted. Figure 7.3 shows the effects of these cutbacks on Libyan crude
production at the time of the Libyan conflict with the oil companies in the
early 1970s. This downward trend of crude production, together with the
increase in oil revenues shown in Figure 6.1 (Chapter 6), form a unique
outcome of the game Libya played with the foreign oil companies.
As a result of all the Government-company agreements the new base posted
price for Libyan oil became $2.53/b for 400 API from 1 September 1970,
applied retroactively to 1 January 1965. This was to rise by a further 2
cents/b on 1 January each year for the next five years. The new gravity
differentials of 2 cents per degree above 40 0 and of 1.5 cents per degree
below 400 raised the price of all oils other than 400 by more than the
basic 30 cents/b. The tax rate of profits was raised from 50% to an
average 54%.
The distinctive feature of the Libyan threat, as described above, is that
Libya had the incentive to carry out the threat if the companies did not
comply with its demands, because of the reasons mentioned above namely;
(a) The availability of foreign exchange reserves.
(b) The change in the Libyan regime from a conservative government
to an anti-Western government.
Cc) The attitude of the new regime towards foreign oil companies.
(d) The non-cooperation between oil companies working in Libya.
As I argued in Chapter 3, the threat and not its fulfilment gains the
end.	 Libyan threats to oil companies showed that fulfilment is not
required if the threat succeeds. The credibility of the Libyan threats
indicates clearly that the more certain is the contingent fulfilment, the
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less likely is actual fulfilment.
The Libyan threat achievement, in fact, rewarded both parties (the Libyan
Government and oil companies); it simply shifted the solution point or Nash
solution to the right (see Figure 7.4).
The incremental increase in posted price was divided between the
government and oil companies. The Libyan gain as a result of the threat is
measured by L 1 L2
 in Figure 7.4, while the companies' gain is measured by
C 1 C2 . There was no loss to oil companies other than a temporary shortage
of crude oil to their refineries due to the cutbacks, but the advantage of
cheap Libyan oil in comparison to other oils was almost removed. Probably
more important is that Libyan success in threatening the oil companies
opened the door to other producers for similar claims, as will be discussed
below.
Of course, the threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other
party, and the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or
display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post,
have an incentive to carry it out. An example of this case (fulfilment) is
provided from the treatment of the Shell oil company in August 1973, when
its production was embargoed. The event had no negative effect on the
Libyan Government, while Shell actually lost Libyan low-sulphur crude. In
addition, such an embargo made it clear to all other companies that the
Libyan government certainly meant what it said, and thus made credible the
threat to the oil companies.
OPEC's view of Libyan tactics: OPEC had supported the implementation of
cnservation in Libya, and viewed with satisfaction the cut-backs, which
stimulated sharp increases in petroleum prices. When the Libyan settlement
was achieved, the breached line of the oil companies' defence became
vulnerable everywhere and the OPEC countries were not slow to attack. In
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their meeting at Caracas on 9-12 December 1970, they passed Resolution No.
XXI.120, that the reference price for the purpose of determining the tax
liability of the concessionaire companies should be determined by the
Governments of member countries. The objectives that all member countries
should adopt were:
First, to establish 55% as the minimum rate of taxation on the net income
of the oil companies, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Second, to eliminate existing disparities in posted or tax reference
prices of the crude oil in member countries, on the basis of the highest
posted price applicable in the member countries. This should take into
consideration differences in gravity and geographic location and any
appropriation escalation in future years.
Third, to establish a uniform general increase in the posted or tax
reference prices in all member countries, to reflect the general
improvement in the conditions of the international petroleum market.
Fourth, to adopt a new system for the adjustment of gravity differentials
of posted or tax reference prices, on the basis of 1.5 cents/b for each one
degree of gravity for crude oil of 400 and below, and 2 cents/b for crude
oil of one degree above 400.
Fifth, to eliminate completely the allowance granted to oil companies as
from 1 January 1971.
These demands and the companies response will be summarized below.
a
The oil companies, under the . leadership of the majors and with the
support of their governments, responded promptly to these events. In
January 1971 they delivered to the Governments of the ten OPEC member
countries a message proposing an all-embracing negotiation between
themselves and OPEC for the achievement of an overall and durable
settlement.	 At the same time they made an agreement between themselves,
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known as the Libyan Producers' Agreement, on 15 January 1971 [P1w, 6 May
1974]. The message to OPEC countries stated that the companies could not
negotiate further the development of claims by member countries of OPEC on
any other basis than one which reached a settlement simultaneously with all
producing governments concerned. It then proposed the broad lines of a
settlement, as follows:
1- A revision to the posted prices of all crudes in all member countries
of OPEC, with the provision that the new levels should be subject to a
moderate annual adjustment against the yardstick of world-wide inflation,
or a similar criterion.
2- A further temporary transportation adjustment for Libyan crudes, with
appropriate adjustments for other short-haul crudes, such adjustments to
vary both up and down by reference to a freight escalator.
3- No further increase in the tax rate percentage beyond current rates
(55%), no retroactive payments and no obligatory re-investment.
4- The foregoing all to be firm for a period of five years from the date
of settlement, after which the terms would be subject to review.
The companies reaction and OPEC demands can be summarized as follows:
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Summary of OPEC Demands and Oil Companies Response
OPEC demands	 Oil companies response
l.A rise in the taxation rate
	 l.Negotiations with OPEC as a whole
from 50% of net income to 55%
2.To eliminate posted prices
	 2.A revision to posted oil prices
disparities
3.An increase in posted prices
	 3.Further adjustments to BhOrt-
haui CrudeB
4.The adoption of a new system for
	 4.Agreed to increase tax rate to
gravity differentials adjustments
	 55% but not more
5.Eliminate completely company
	 5.The terms would be subject to
allowances from 1 Jan.1971
	 review after 5 years from the
agreement
The message also expressed great concern over OPEC's continuing series of
claims and proposed an all-embracing negotiation between the companies and
OPEC. The companies asked for OPEC's reaction as soon as possible, and
offered to meet OPEC representatives "whenever and wherever" the producing
governments wished.
	 Each side had its position clear; the way for
negotiation was open.
The Tehran Conference, as I mentioned in chapter 4, convened as scheduled
on 12 January 1971 in a very tense atmosphere. The first meeting broke up
without any fruitful results. The OPEC oil ministers were frustrated by
the companies' positionbut resolved to stand firm. The Saudi Oil Minister
Yamani warned after the 12 January breakdown:"I am afraid that they are
going to have to pzy a heavy price for this, for it Wi11 hurt them as zll
a	 the innocent COnsumer" [MEES .15 Jan.1971].
	
The companies'
representatives, on the other hand, were alarmed at the deteriorating
situation.	 it became clear that they were stalling for time while a
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strategy was worked out in New York for dealing with the Tehran
negotiations and the Libyan demands. John McCloy, the companies' legal
adviser, suggested that, in addition to the companies' general strategy,
"it zvuid be wiae if the government could enter into thie thing zd get the
heads of the countrieB involved to moderate their denands" [Sampson 1975
p.218]. To accomplish this task, the State department sent Under-Secretary
John Irwin to Iran. When Irwin arrived to meet the Shah in Tehran, the
companies' collective message, with diplomatic support, was received by
OPEC and took all OPEC countries by surprise. Denouncing what he called a
"poisoned letter", the Libyan Deputy Minister proclaimed that "Liby2 will
defeat the consuming countries and also the oil comp:2nie8". On 19 January
he put pressure on Hunt and Occidental to dissociate themselves from the
industry-wide approach "or face government action".
In Tehran, meanwhile, the Shah and his Oil Minister, Amuzegar, objected
to OPEC-wide negotiations. By then the companies recognized OPEC's demands
for two separate negotiations, but they nevertheless tried to maintain a
bridge between the separate Gulf and Mediterranean discussions. On 25
January the companies split their negotiating team, with BP's Chairman Lord
Strathalmond heading the Tehran group, and Exxon's Piercy leading the
Mediterranean team.
On 28 January Strathalmond began the Tehran "Gulf only" negotiations.
The Libyans refused to negotiate in Tripoli until the Tehran negotiations
a
were concluded. 	 The Gulf countries set a five-day deadline by which
negotiations were to be finalized. The companies proposed an increase in
the posted price of 15 cents per barrel and allowances for inflation. The
Gulf countries demanded an extra 54 cents a barrel and a much higher
inflation allowance. The producing countries threatened to legislate for
their terms unilaterally if the companies did not voluntarily accept OPEC's
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demands. If the companies did not accept legislation, OPEC threatened to
"take appropriate steps including total embargo". Only Indonesia abstained
from the total embargo vote.
A full OPEC meeting was called on 3 February, and passed Resolution
XXII.131, which set 15 February as the deadline for agreement with the
companies. Discussions were thereafter resumed and agreement was reached
on 15 February, which became known as the Tehran Agreement. It
incorporated the substance of OPEC demands, as listed in Caracas the
previous December, as well as most of the safeguards for stability
requested by the oil companies in their message of 16 January 1971. The
tax rate was stabilised at 55%, and posted prices were raised by 35
cents/b. These posted prices were to be increased by 2.5% plus 5 cents/b
on the following first of June, and a further 2.5% plus 5 cents/b on 1
January in each of the years 1973-75. The price differentials for
different gravities were to be those proposed in the OPEC Caracas
Resolution, and there were to be further adjustments for claims from
individual states in respect of existing posted price disparities. 	 The
allowances dating from the OPEC formula of 1964 were to be eliminated
immediately.	 Table 7.9 shows the change in posting prices in all OPEC
members during Feb.1970 and Feb. 1971.
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Table 7.9
Posted Prices changes In OPEC Countries($/b): Feb. 1970-Feb. 1971
1970	 1971
Country	 2PI Gravity	 Feb.	 Sep.	 Nov.	 Jan. Feb.
Algeria	 Saharan Blend	 2.650	 -	
-	 2.700 2.700
Gabon	 Mandji	 1.539	 -	 -	
-	 1.700
Indonesia Minas
	 1.700	 -	 -	
-	 1.700
Iran	 Iranian Light 34
	 1.790	 -	 -	
-	 2.170
Iraq	 Basarah	 1.720	 -	 -	
-	 2.155
Kuwait	 Export 31
	 1.590	
-	 1.680	
-	 2.085
Libya	 Libyan Light 40
	 2.230	 2.530	 -	
-	 2.530
Nigeria	 Nigerian Light
	 2.170	 2.420	 -	
-	 2.420
Qatar	 Dukhan 40	 1.930	 -	 -	
-	 2.280
S.Arabia	 Arabian Light 34
	
1.800	 -	 -	
-	 2.255
The t.J.A.E. Murban 39
	 1.880	 -	 -	
-	 2.235
Venezuela Boscan
	 1.429	 -	
-	 1.434 1.434
Source: Annual, Stat1.8twaj	 l7,etn of OPEC, [1982], 155-175.
The Libyans were dissatisfied with the Tehran Agreement, both on the
grounds of inadequate price increases and because of the value of the
short-haul freight premium for Libya quantified and agreed there. On the
first count it was pointed out that Libya was taking from the companies
royalty oil in kind and selling it at substantially more than posted
prices, thus demonstrating that posted prices were too low [P1W, 18
Jan.1971].
	
On the second, it was widely felt that agreement on a Libyan
short-haul premium was an unwarranted intervention in Libyan affairs, to
achieve an all-embracing solution which the companies wanted but Libya had
rejected. A settlement was reached (the Tripoli Agreement of 20 March
1971) [Tugendhat 1975], and took the form of each company submitting an
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offer of amendment to its Deeds of Concession which comprised one
integrated proposal. The new posting of $3.32 for 40° gravity oil was
broken down into a Base Posting of $3.07, a Suez Canal allowance of 12
cents/b and a temporary Freight Premium of 13 cents/b. The Base Posting
was to be increased by 0.2 cents/b for each 0.10 degree of gravity above
400 , and decreased by 0.15 cents/b for each 0.1 0
 degree of gravity below
40°. Libya thus adopted the gravity differential prices embodied in the
OPEC Caracas Resolution and the Tehran Agreement, changing for each
one-tenth of a degree, instead of for each one full degree as fixed in the
September 1970 Agreement.
The base posting included, for the first time, a low-sulphur premium of
10 cents/b, applicable as long as sulphur was less than 0.5% by weight of
Libyan crude. This sulphur premium was to be increased by 2 cents/b on 1
January of each of the years 1972-75. The Base Posting was to be increased
by 5 cents/b plus 2.5% as from the Operative Date, and was to be further
increased by the same amounts on 1 January of each years 1973-75 (Waddams
1980 p.243]. The only difference between this and the Tehran Agreement was
the advancing of the first increases from 1 June to 20 March 1971, the
Operative Date. The Suez Canal Allowance would be reduced to 4 cents/b on
the first day the Canal was re-opened to ships of 37 feet draft, and
eliminated entirely if and when it was open to commercial ships of 38 feet
draft.
	
	 The Temporary Freight Premium would be varied quarterly by 0.058
a
cents/b for each 0.1%.
	 A permanent short-haul freight premium was
incorporated in the Base Posting. This temporary premium was intended to
reflect the excess of current high freight rates over the norm. Thus there
was introduced a proposal made by the Ministry of Petroleum Affairs in 1967
for the proper implementation of the Petroleum Law provisions, that posted
prices should include necessary adjustments for freight. This proposal had
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been ignored by the companies at the time.
Thereafter the differences between Libyan and the Arabian Gulf prices
varied, as the temporary freight premium changed and the low-sulphur
premium for Libyan oil rose by 2 cents/b a year. The contrast between the
price differentials after the Tripoli Agreement and those prevailing before
the revolution suggest that the Libyan advantages over Arabian Gulf oils in
gravity, quality and geographical position had by then been more than
adequately recognised in prices. This is shown in Table 7.10 where the
posted price of Arabian Light in relation to the Libyan light (Brega 4Oo
I,
had increased from 63.24% in March 1971 to 66.75% in July and 67.23% in
October of the same year. Libya had by now lost the cost advantage which
it had had in the markets of Europe and North America [P1w 19 April and 10
May 1971].
Table 7.10
Marker and Libyan Light Prices($/b) :March-Oct. 1971
0	 0Period	 Libyan Light (40 )
	
Arabian Light (34 )
	
(%)
March	 3.447	 2.180	 63.24
July	 3.423	 2.285	 66.75
October	 3.399	 2.285	 67.23
(*) Percentage of Arabian Light prices in relation to Libyan Light
prices.
Source: Annual Statistical lietin of OPEC, 1982, for Libyan crude
oil prices p.164, and for Arabian Light prices p.167.
On 15 August 1971, the United States of America suspended convertibility
of the US dollar into gold, and thereafter the value of the dollar
depreciated in terms of most of the major currencies of the countries in
which Libyan oil was sold. In September 1971 the Libyan currency was
changed from the pound to the Dinar at par, and at the same time the Libyan
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Dinar was revalued in terms of the US dollar from the middle rate of
$2.80=LD1 to $2.90 [Central Bank of Bank of Libya March 1974 p.7]. This
was done just before the oil companies were due to make large payments to
the Libyan Government (in Libyan currency, unlike the Middle Eastern
concessions, in which such payments were made in dollars) and caused
confusion about how much payment was due.
The Libyan Government ensured that the companies should buy at this rate
to pay their Dinar dues which had already been calculated in accounts at
the $2.80 rate, thus costing them 3.5% more in dollars, which would accrue
to the Bank of Libya.
Libya, the new-corner to the oil industry, was able in few months in
1970-71 to achieve what the whole of OPEC had been trying to accomplish for
a decade. The Libyan build up of huge foreign exchange reserves as a
result of fast development of the oil sector, and the inability of the
non-oil sector to absorb the accumulated revenues from oil activities, had
put Libya in a well-funded position and helped to exert more pressure on
the oil companies.
It might be argued that if there had been no revolution in Libya in 1969,
there would have been little success for Libya and OPEC. It could equally
be argued that if the revolution happened not to have found such huge
foreign reserves when it came to power, there would have been no such
progress for Libya and consequently for OPEC as a whole. But the fact is
a
that the combination of the availability of hard currency to Libya together
with the rise of the anti-Western 1 Sept. revolution made Libyan and OPEC
success just a matter of time.
Thus Libyan success was only a prelude to the world-wide wave of
bargaining which began when other OPEC members started to follow Libya's
lead.	 As Marwan Iskander (1973 p.78] put it:"There i.8 iittie room for
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doubt that Eibyz' a success started the snowball roiling and ls1 to
Resolution XXI.120 cvid consequently the Tehran and Tripoli agreements".
7.4 Libya and OPEC triumph:
Even though Libya had successfully made the first steps in breaking the
solidarity of the oil companies by raising its posted prices, it should be
clear that the politics of the Middle East had been the direct cause for
the quadrupling of oil prices. As a result of the cut-backs in production
and embargoes to the USA and the Netherlands imposed by the Arab States on
27 October 1973, less than 20 days after the outbreak of hostilities
between Israel and Egypt oil was sold at auctions by the Iranians at $17/b,
and by Nigeria and Libya at over $20/b, mostly to American independents.
On 23 December the OPEC Gulf States announced their decision to increase
posted prices in such a way as to yield a government take of $7/b. This
resulted in a posting for the Arabian Light 34°, which was the marker
crude, of $11.651/b, as from 1 Jan. 1974. Libyan posted prices were
changed to accord with the change in the marker crude price, with
adjustments for freight and low-sulphur premium. Libyan crude of 40 0
 rose
from $4.60/b at the beginning of October 1973 to $8.925 on 19 October and
to $15.768 on 1 January 1974. The relationship with ,
 the marker crude
prices of the last two postings were as shown in Table 7.11 below.
a
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Table 7.11
The Relationship Between Marker Crude And Libyan Light In($):1973-74
Item	 19 Oct.1973	 1 Jan.1974
Posted Price,Arabian Light 34°	 5.119	 11.651
Gravity Differential	 0.120	 0.360
Permanent Freight Differential 	 1.740	 1.811
Low-Sulphur Premium
	
1.336	 1.336
Suez Canal Premium	 0.152	 0.152
Temporary Freight Premium	 0.458	 0.458
Posted Price,Libyan Light 40°	 8.925	 15.768
Source: Chanem, [1975], p.222.
The gravity differential applied for 1974 was 6 cents per degree below as
well as above 40°, although the Gulf States decided only to double existing
gravity differentials from 1.5 to 3 cents per degree below 40°, and from 3
to 6 cents per degree above 40° [Ghanem 1975].
As conditions became more stable, embargoes lifted and freight prices
fell, the Libyan price was soon seen to be too high. It compared with
$8-$9.5/b acquisition cost of the Arabian marker crude, where buy-back.
prices to the companies for the participation oil had been set at 93% of
the posted price of $11.651/b. Beginning in April 1974, the buy-back price
for oil was lowered in Libya by stages to reach $11.86/b at the beginning
a
of 1975 as shown in Table 7.12 below.
- 279 -
Table 7.12
Comparison Between Marker Posted Price,Brega's Price
And Libyan Royalty Sales Price In (US$):1974-75
Date	 Marker Posted Price Brega Posting Royalty Sales Price
	
1 Jan.1974	 11.651	 15.768	 16.000
	
1 Nov.1974	 11.251	 14.600	 11.860
	
1 Oct.1975	 12.376	 16.060	 12.320
Source: OPEC Annual Btati8tical Bulletin, [1982], 164,168.
And Wright, 11981], p.236.
In early 1974 the Gulf states raised royalties to 16.67% and profit taxes
to an average of 65.7%, posted prices remaining unchanged. Libya followed
the increase in royalty but raised its tax to only 60%. At the same time
the buy-back price for companies was reduced to $12.50/b, making an average
acquisition cost to them of $11.66/b and average government take $11.16/b.
On 1 January 1975, Libya increased company tax to 65%. This left the
average acquisition cost to the companies unchanged at $11.66/b.
Oil companies were seen, by OPEC countries, to be making enormous
profits, because the higher the posted price, the higher the oil company
profit on that part of their concessions left to them. The raising of
royalty and tax rates diminished the profit margins of the companies on
their own oil. In February 1975 Linoco cut most of its sales prices, which
was the same as the buy-back prices to the companies, by between 15 and 29
a
cents/b, to reduce the average acquisition cost to the companies by 10
cents to 11.56. This was further reduced in stages to $10.90 $11.00 in
June. At this time Brega 40°, at $10.97/b acquisition cost, was only 73
cents/b more costly to the companies than the Arabian marker crude at
$10.24 (see Table 7.12 above)..
In October 1975 Libya raised its sales prices, posted prices and hence
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company acquisition costs by 10%, in line with the OPEC decision. In July
1976 OPEC attempted to adopt a new system, on the lines used by Algeria, of
replacing the fixed gravity differentials and sulphur premium with prices
derived from net-back calculations of the value of different oils in the
markets, and Libya followed suit. As a result the price band of the
various oils widened from 22 cents/b to 57 cents/b. The prices of 42°
Libyan crude was raised from $12.62/b in December 1976 to $14.25 as from
July 1977 (Central Bank of Libya 1972].
In the context of oil producing countries policy aimed at off-setting the
erosion in the purchasing power of their resources on account of
depreciation of the dollar, they made varying rises on their crude oil
prices, depending on the quality of crude and proximity to markets.
Accordingly, the prices of 40° Libyan crude (Brega) was raised from
$13.85/b in December 1978 to $14.69/b as from January 1979, $23.45/b as
from the beginning of July 1979 and then to $29.95/b in December 1979. On
1st January 1980 the price stood at $34.67/b, then was raised to $37/b from
September, and $41/b in January 1981 (Central Bank of Libya 1979]. The
latter increases in oil prices had been as a result of the cutback in
Iran's production due to the Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Shah's
monarchy.	 This was further accelerated by the war between two major oil
producers Iraq and Iran since 1980.
Gas contracts: The increase in the oil prices in the 1970s was associated
with an increase in gas prices. Esso had contracted prices for its sales
of gas to Italy and Spain in 1969 of 38.5 cents per million British Thermal
Units (BTU) for ENI and 42 cents per million BTU to Catalana de Gas
delivered (as a rule of thumb one cubic foot of natural gas is often taken
as producing 1,000 BTU]. The securing of firm long-term contracts (20
years for ENI and 15 years for Catalana de Gas) was a necessary condition
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for Esso to undertake the great investment involved, in order to give some
assurance of adequate profitability. The company would pay royalty of
12.5% of the value of all natural gas derived from the concession area
after deducting any handling charges, duties and imposts and the cost of
transport. The net income would be taxed at the rate of 50%. The tricky
problem was that gas would be deemed to be a by-product of the production
of oil, or of drilling for oil, and its costing could vary between nil and
full allocated oil production costs on a deemed equivalence of so much gas
equal to one barrel of oil.
After the 1970 oil price settlement, the government insisted on the
prices to the Italian and Spanish gas customers being the same, thereby
claiming to dictate prices, not only to Esso but also to the purchasers of
the gas from Esso. At the time of the 1971 oil price negotiations
culminating in the Tripoli Agreement, a price of 43 cents/mbtu was accepted
by the Spanish customer. The royalty and tax reference price in Libya was
agreed at 34 cents/mbtu, raised from the original proposal by Esso of 20.6
cents/mbtu. In accepting this, Esso reduced its freight deduction from 11
cents to 9 cents per thousand cubic feet. After the great rises in oil
prices in 1973, the Libyan government made demands for increase in gas
prices. Such rises would bring the price of gas some way towards that of
oil, calculated on equivalent thermal properties of the two. A new f.o.b
price of $1.62/mbtu was decreed in October 1974, but ENI refused to lift it
a
at that price level. On a thermal basis this price would equate a barrel
of crude oil at $9-$ 10/b. This price was far below the crude posted price,
which was $15.768/b for 40° gravity; the State sale price was $11.860/b in
November 1974. Within a month enough production was again allowed to
supply the Spanish customer, who submitted to the price increase. Early in
1975 an agreement was reached with ENI for a price of $1.14/inbtu to be
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phased in over three years, the first-year price being $1.04/mbtu. The
Spanish customer thereupon demanded similar treatment. Whether he obtained
it or not was not reported.
The problem of gas utilisation persisted, and gave rise to a number of
warnings from the Ministry of Petroleum requiring oil producers to use it,
give it to the State under Regulation 8 or suffer penalties for waste as
was the case with ENI in 1974, when it refused to lift the gas because of
the increase in price.
The Libyan settlement with the oil companies had been praised by all OPEC
member countries, especially Iraq and Algeria. The OPEC members recognised
the Libyan achievement as a guide line to follow; as a result they produced
the Caracas, Tehran and Tripoli agreements. Even though the Middle East
War of October 1973 had seen the biggest sudden rise in oil prices, OPEC in
the pre-War period had increased its prices; as I showed in Table 7.9, the
marker crude increased from $1.800/b in 1970 to $2.255/b in February 1971,
and from $11.251/b in November 1974 to $12.376/b in October 1975 (Table
7.12). The profit taxes had been raised from 50% of net income to 65.7% in
1974, and at the same time royalty was raised from 12.5% to 16.67%. No
doubt these developments had accumulated huge foreign exchange reserves for
OPEC members, especially the Gulf members, which they used in their battle
for participation with, and n-ationalisation, of the oil companies.
Thus Libyan success in dealing with international oil companies pulled
OPEC members together in a confrontation with oil companies and the success
that followed. This not only increased the per barrel revenue of OPEC
governments to 65% of profits plus over 16% royalty, but also increased
crude prices substantially. Moreover, the series of actions in the 1970s
assured OPECtS self-confidence, which was translated into various
participation/nationalisation agreements in almost all member countries.
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What is left to OPEC is to maintain, as I showed in Chapter 3, the
cohesiveness of its menthers in order to manage future market fluctuations.
Meanwhile the individual members are urged, from the fact of oil exhaution,
to maximize the benefits from every barrel of crude produced and to use oil
revenues economically and efficiently.
S
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this study has been to analyse OPEC stability which, if it
exists, means that OPEC is able to determine the price of crude oil in the
market. Accordingly its members should be able to assess the amount of oil
revenues they receive, which is the main source of economic finance in most
of these countries. Libya is taken as an example to investigate how much
effect oil revenues have had on these economies. It is proposed here to
bring together the main conclusions which have emerged.
The pre-OPEC oil market was a monopolistic market. The famous major oil
companies known as ttSev Si st ers" controlled virtually all of the
international oil business. They also controlled all of the oil reserves
in the under-developed, oil-exporting regions of the world. Oil prices
were fixed administratively rather than determined by market conditions or
by the forces of supply and demand.
The power of the Majors remained unchallenged until the mid-1950s, when
the number of Independent companies began to increase. The latter
companies competed with the Majors in refining crude oils but had little or
no sources of crude in the third world.
However, the real challenge to the major oil companies was the rise of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Following its
formation in 1960, OPEC only managed to prevent oil prices from falling.
In the 1970s it moved to demonstrate its power in managing its crude oils.
Royalty payments to OPEC governments increased, as well as taxes and
prices. No doubt the biggest blow was the quadrupling of oil prices in
1973. Since then OPEC has been recognized by most Western economists as a
cartel, controlling oil prices and production. Some went so far as to
divide the cartel into sub-groups such as; Output Maximizers, Price
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Maximizers and the Cartel Core. They also predicted, depending on the
notion of cheating, that the collapse of OPEC is inevitable.
among the OPEC behaviour models, that of Hnyilicza and Pindyck [1976],
departed from the usual approach in viewing OPEC behaviour even, though it
adopted the idea of cartelization. The model introduced game theory of
which Nash Cooperative Solutions were used to explain the likely future
OPEC behaviour. This model assumed that OPEC members are only interested
in profits, but none of them is willing to sacrifice by reducing production
to prevent a drop in prices and the consequent OPEC collapse.
In my analysis to OPEC behaviour I used game theory concepts concerning
cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour to provide a comprehensive
explanation to OPEC stability. n OPEC country t S interests in my view may
be coincidental with or opposed to the interests of its fellow members.
Furthermore, the violation of price-output agreements by any member may
well be met by accommodation from the other members in the form of reduced
production. This sort of game suggests a possibility of sacrifice by a
number of producers to prevent mutual disaster (the collapse of OPEC).
This, certainly, is not acceptable by a monopolist whose main function is
pure profits.
OPEC in recent years has not acted as unified cartel; while some members
violated the price-output agreements, others have accommodated these
violations in order to prevent unstable situations. For example, when the
demand for OPEC oil fell from about 23 mb/d in 1981 to 19 mb/d in 1982 some
OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE reduced their
production to prevent the fall in price. Another example, in October 1984,
when the North Sea oil price was reduced and Nigeria followed, immediately
Saudi Arabia announced that it would cut its production in an attempt to
limit further price reductions.
	 Thus, while Nigeria violated the
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price-output agreement, Saudi Arabia tried to protect the collective
agreement by reducing its own production. OPEC will be stable as long as
the group preference is maintained by the individual members, or at least
by a sufficient number of producers.
However, OPEC stability might be equally threatened by non-OPEC
producers, which significantly increased their share of crude production in
the last decade at the expense of OPEC production. The only solution which
increases the payoffs of OPEC and Non-OPEC producers is through cooperation
and coordination strategies between world oil producers.
I also attempted to explain OPEC success in the 1970s through a
formulated game between Libya and the oil companies. Libya emerged as an
oil producer in the early 1960s. Helped by the quality advantage of its
crude oil and the proximity to European markets, Libya managed to become a
major crude oil producer in less that a decade.
In its confrontation with the oil companies, Libya first split them into
two groups, Majors and Independents. The Independents were not in a
position to dispute the Libyan Government demands. Libya for most of these
companies was the only source of crude oil. Under the threat of a shutdown
the Libyan Government enforced the cutbacks on Occidental's production.
The company lacked the support of other companies, especially the majors,
and had no choice but to agree to the Libyan Government's demands. Soon
the other companies followed suit and signed similar agreements with the
Libyan Government. OPEC immediately took over from Libya, enlarging the
scale of confrontation with the oil companies and consequently strengthen
the grip of OPEC over the world oil markets. Thus although the oil
business started as a monopoly, since the early 1970s it has become a real
game
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